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9Striatal dopamine and motivated cognitive control
Imagine for a minute that you are a squirrel and that you and your friend are in the forest, 
looking for nuts and berries. While collecting food, you follow a path, taking you along nut 
trees and berry bushes. When you encounter a fork in the road, you decide to go left and your 
furry squirrel friend takes the path to the right.
Along the chosen path you initially encounter many nuts which you gather and hide with 
diligence. After a while, nut trees become increasingly scarce. Luckily, the amount of berry 
bushes increase, so you shift your focus to indulging in berries. Your squirrel friend on the 
other hand has chosen a more challenging road where nut trees and berry bushes quickly 
alternate. As he proceeds along his road, he will need to sometimes eat a berry, then collect 
nut or two, followed again by a berry. After a while your paths meet and you find yourself 
waiting for your friend for quite some time. Why was your fellow squirrel so much slower? 
Well, each time he had to switch his focus from nuts to berries and vice versa, he had to 
construct a new set of appropriate responses. Switching your focus (whether it is between 
collecting berries and nuts or between updating your Facebook status and writing your thesis) 
is more costly compared with repeating the same behaviour. Therefore alternating between 
tasks takes more time to complete. This process is known as task switching.
Finally your friend arrives, you continue foraging together. Suddenly you stumble upon 
another Y-junction. This time your friend insists on taking the path to the left and you go 
right. Unfortunately, nut trees and berry bushes randomly alternate along both paths and you 
both need to exert quite some control over your behaviour to switch between the two tasks 
(i.e. finding nuts and berries). Your friend finally catches a break: the trees and bushes on his 
road produce enormous nuts and berries. When you reach the end and the two roads meet 
up again, your friend is waiting for you with a smug grim on his squirrel face. Why was your 
squirrel friend faster this time around? Well, your friend anticipated a higher payout for his 
efforts, which may have made it easier for him to alternate between tasks. Why is this and how 
does this work in the brain? 
We refer to the internal and external factors that can orient and invigorate behaviour in order 
to obtain a goal as reward motivation (e.g. when you can obtain large berries). We know that 
reward motivation can alter cognitive control, a set of processes and mental abilities allowing 
the pursuit of goals in a volatile and distracting environment. For example, knowing that you 
can obtain large berries (reward motivation) can alter the ability to quickly alternate between 
tasks (i.e. task switching). Moreover, the neurotransmitter dopamine plays an important role 
in reward motivation and cognitive control. Recent work has shown that dopamine also plays a 
role in the interaction between reward motivation and cognition (such as when the anticipated 
size of the berries and nuts alters the ability of the squirrel to quickly alternate between tasks). 
In the following section I will provide an overview of the status of the literature prior to the 
start of the experiments presented in this thesis. In addition, I will propose a hypothesized 
neural mechanism by which information about rewards may influence cognitive processes. In 
chapter 2 I will present an outline and general introduction of the work in this thesis.
 
 10
Chapter 1 Striatal dopamine and motivated cognitive control
Striatal dopamine and the interface between motivation and cognition
The ability to control our behaviour requires our actions to be goal-directed, and our goals 
to be organized hierarchically. Goals can be defined at different levels: motivational goals 
(e.g. rewards), cognitive goals (e.g. task-sets), and action goals (e.g. stimulus-response 
mappings). Thus, goal-directed behaviour requires, among other things, the transformation 
of information about reward into abstract cognitive decisions, which in turn need to be 
translated into specific actions. The mechanisms underlying this hierarchy of goal-directed 
control are not well understood.
This paper focuses on the degree to which such goal-directed behaviour is controlled by 
incentive motivation. We have restricted our discussion to the effects of appetitive motivation, 
while taking note of the wealth of evidence indicating that stimuli that activate the appetitive 
motivational system have an inhibitory influence on behaviour that is controlled by the 
aversive motivational system (Konorsky, 1967; Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). Unlike aversive 
Figure 1.1  Ventromedial to dorsolateral direction of information flow through frontostria-
tal-nigral circuitry
Interactions between the different frontostriatal loops involved in motivational control (red/orange), 
cognitive control (green), and motor control (blue) can take place at the level of the SNS connections 
(bend arrows) or at the level of the frontostriatal connections (straight arrows). The direction of 
information flow is always from ventromedial to dorsolateral regions in the frontostriatal circuitry. 
SNS, striato-nigral-striatal; N. Acc, nucleus accumbens (ventromedial striatum); Cau, caudate nucleus 
(dorsomedial striatum); Put, putamen (dorsolateral striatum); OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; ACC, anterior 
cingulate cortex; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; PMC, premotor cortex.
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motivation, appetitive motivation refers to the state triggered by external stimuli that have 
rewarding properties and has been argued to have a general potentiating or enhancing effect on 
behaviour and cognition (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002; Robbins and Everitt, 2003; Krawczyk 
et al., 2007; Jimura et al., 2010; Pessoa and Engelmann, 2010). Its effects on behaviour and 
cognition have been associated with changes in neurochemical activity, such as increases 
in dopamine signalling in the striatum (Lyon and Robbins, 1975; Ikemoto and Panksepp, 
1999; Robbins and Everitt, 2003; Berridge, 2007). This observation is generally in keeping 
with proposals that dopamine plays an important role in reward-related effort (Salamone et 
al., 2007) and generalized activation/energization of behaviour (Robbins and Everitt, 2007). 
It is also consistent with data suggesting that dopamine might direct information flow from 
ventromedial frontostriatal circuits, implicated in reward and motivation, to more dorsal 
frontostriatal circuits, associated with cognition and action (Alexander et al., 1986; Haber 
and Knutson, 2010) (figure 1.1). 
Although the widely distributed and diffuse nature of its projection system to large parts of 
the forebrain concurs with an account of dopamine in relatively non-specific terms, such 
as serving activation or energization, it is also clear that dopamine does not simply amplify 
(or suppress) all forebrain activity in a functionally non-specific manner. Indeed extensive 
evidence indic l systems (Robbins, 2000; Cools et al., 2001a; Frank et al., 2004). In line with 
these insights, we suggest here that changes in appetitive motivation, which may result from 
changes in neurochemical activity, for example, due to stress, fatigue, or neuropsychiatric 
abnormality, also have functionally selective consequences for cognition.
More specifically, we put forward the working hypothesis that appetitive motivation might 
promote selectively our ability to switch between different tasks, providing us with some of 
the cognitive flexibility that is required in our constantly changing environment. Conversely, 
we speculate, based on preliminary data, that dopamine-mediated appetitive motivation 
might also have detrimental consequences for cognition, e.g. by impairing cognitive focusing 
and increasing distractibility. The implication of this speculation is that dopamine-mediated 
appetitive motivation might potentiate flexible behaviour, albeit not by potentiating the 
impact of current goals on behaviour. This  speculation stems partly from the recognition 
that the motivational forces that drive behaviour are not always under goal-directed control 
and can be maladaptive (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). Moreover dopamine is well known 
to play an important role in mediating the detrimental (i.e. non goal-directed) consequences 
of reward (Berridge, 2007; Robbins and Everitt, 2007). 
Our working hypothesis is grounded in (albeit preliminary) empirical evidence indicating 
opposite effects of both dopaminergic and motivational/affective state manipulations on 
cognitive flexibility and cognitive focusing, which have been argued to reflect distinct striatal 
and prefrontal brain regions respectively (Crofts et al., 2001; Bilder et al., 2004; Dreisbach 
and Goschke, 2004; Dreisbach, 2006; Hazy et al., 2006; Cools et al., 2007a; Rowe et al., 
2007; van Steenbergen et al., 2009; Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). Indeed current models 
highlight a role for dopamine, particularly in the striatum, in the flexible updating of current 
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task-representations (Hazy et al., 2006; Maia and Frank, 2011). The finding that appetitive 
motivation is associated with robust changes in dopamine levels particularly in the striatum, 
thus concurs with our hypothesis that appetitive motivation potentiates (at least some forms 
of) cognitive flexibility, perhaps even at the expense of cognitive focusing. Such a bias towards 
cognitive flexibility should be generally adaptive, given that motivational goals in the real 
world are not often readily available, thus requiring preparatory behaviour that is flexible 
rather than focused (Baldo and Kelley, 2007).
Together these observations suggest that appetitive motivation acts to enhance cognition in 
a manner that is functionally specific, varying as a function of task demands, and that these 
functionally specific effects are mediated by dopamine. Clearly, as in the case of dopamine 
(Cools and Robbins, 2004; Cools et al., 2009b), effects of appetitive motivation will vary not 
only as a function of task demands, but also as a function of the baseline state of the system. 
Thus both motivational and neurochemical state changes will have rather different effects in 
individuals with low and high baseline levels of motivation, consistent with the existence of 
multiple Yerkes Dodson ‘inverted U shaped’ functions (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908; Cools and 
Robbins, 2004). 
Let us briefly discuss the role of striatal dopamine in the two separate domains of motivation 
and cognitive control before addressing its role in their interaction.
Dopamine and appetitive motivation
The ventromedial striatum (VMS, including the nucleus accumbens) is highly innervated 
by mesolimbic dopaminergic neurons and is well known to be implicated in reward and 
motivation (Robbins and Everitt, 1992; Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Ikemoto and Panksepp, 
1999; Schultz, 2002; Knutson and Cooper, 2005; Baldo and Kelley, 2007). Thus dopamine 
manipulations in the VMS affect performance on multiple paradigms thought to measure 
motivated behaviour, including conditioned reinforcement, Pavlovian-instrumental transfer 
paradigms, effort-based decision making tasks, and progressive ratio schedules (Taylor and 
Robbins, 1984; Dickinson et al., 2000; Wyvell and Berridge, 2000, 2001; Parkinson et al., 2002). 
These experiments primarily reveal effects of dopamine on so-called preparatory conditioned 
responses, which are thought to reflect activation of a motivational system (Dickinson and 
Balleine, 2002), while leaving unaffected, or if anything, having the opposite effect on the 
more stereotypic patterns of consummatory responding (Robbins and Everitt, 1992; Baldo 
and Kelley, 2007). Thus administration of the indirect catecholamine enhancer amphetamine 
in the VMS of hungry rats potentiated locomotor excitement in the presence of food and 
increased lever pressing in response to, or in anticipation of a reward-predictive cue, while 
decreasing or leaving unaffected food intake as well as appetitive hedonic responses like taste 
reactivity (Taylor and Robbins, 1984; Bakshi and Kelley, 1991; Pecina et al., 1997; Wyvell and 
Berridge, 2000, 2001). Conversely, dopamine receptor blockade or dopamine lesions in the 
VMS reduced locomotor activity and cue-evoked incentive motivation for reward (Dickinson 
13
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et al., 2000; Parkinson et al., 2002), while again leaving unaffected or even increasing food 
intake (Koob et al., 1978). These animal studies emphasize the importance of VMS dopamine 
in appetitive motivation and suggest that the hedonic or consummatory aspects  of reward 
are likely mediated by a different, possible antagonistic system (Floresco et al., 1996; Robbins 
and Everitt, 1996; Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Ikemoto and Panksepp, 1999; Robbins and 
Everitt, 2003; Baldo and Kelley, 2007; Berridge, 2007; Phillips et al., 2007; Salamone et al., 
2007), (for similar suggestions in humans, see Aarts et al., 2010).
At first sight, this well-established observation provides apparently clear grounds for 
assuming that dopamine contributes to optimal reward- or goal-directed behaviour. However, 
psychologists have also long recognized that there are multiple distinct components to the 
motivation of behaviour (Konorsky, 1967; Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). Thus instrumental 
behaviour is motivated not only by the goals that we set ourselves, but also by generalized 
drives and/or so-called Pavlovian ‘wanting’, the latter two processes not necessarily always 
contributing to adaptive, optimized behaviour. To clarify this point, it may help to consider 
the operational definition that psychologists have invoked for distinguishing instrumental 
behaviour that is goal-directed from instrumental behaviour that is not goal-directed, i.e. 
habitual (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). Following this tradition, behaviour is goal-directed 
only if it accords to two criteria; first, it has to be driven by knowledge about the contingency 
between the action and the outcome (as measured with contingency degradation tests); 
second, it has to be sensitive to changes in the value of the goal (as measured with outcome 
devaluation tests, involving for example selective satiety). Using these operational definitions, 
Balleine and Dickinson (2002) have established that Pavlovian conditioned stimuli that 
induce so-called ‘wanting’ can modify instrumental behaviour without accessing action-
outcome representations, that is, in a manner that is not goal-directed. This is illustrated most 
clearly by the role of reward-predictive stimuli in compulsive craving for drugs of abuse or 
other targets of addiction, which almost always implicates dopamine dysfunction (Berridge 
and Robinson, 1998; Everitt and Robbins, 2005; Volkow et al., 2009a). In keeping with this 
observation are suggestions that motivational influences on instrumental behaviour by 
Pavlovian stimulus-reinforcer contingencies might reflect modulation of well-established 
habits rather than of goal-directed behaviour (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). Data showing 
that dopamine D1/D2 receptor antagonists attenuated Pavlovian-instrumental transfer 
without affecting instrumental incentive learning (Dickinson et al., 2000) indeed suggested 
that dopamine might act through Pavlovian processes rather than through modifying action-
outcome representations (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002).
In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that the effects of appetitive motivation on 
cognition that are mediated by dopamine are functionally specific, leading to cognitive 
improvement or cognitive impairment depending on the specific task demands under study. 
An important implication of this observation is that effects of dopamine on interactions 
between motivation and cognitive control that appear to be mediated by a modification of 
motivational influences on cognitively mediated, goal-directed behaviour may in fact reflect 
modification of motivational influences on habitual behaviour. 
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Dopamine and cognition
Accumulating evidence in the domain of cognitive control indicates that manipulations of 
dopamine can have contrasting effects as a function of task demands. For example, opposite 
effects have been observed in terms of cognitive flexibility and cognitive focusing (Crofts et al., 
2001; Bilder et al., 2004; Cools et al., 2007a; Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008; Durstewitz et al., 
2010; Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). Mehta and colleagues (2004) have shown that dopamine 
D2 receptor blockade after acute administration of the antagonist sulpiride impaired 
cognitive flexibility (measurWed in terms of task switching), but improved cognitive focusing 
(measured in terms of delayed response performance with task-irrelevant distracters). Similar 
contrasting effects on cognitive flexibility and focusing have been reported after dopamine 
lesions in non-human primates (Roberts et al., 1994; Collins et al., 2000; Crofts et al., 2001), 
after dopaminergic medication withdrawal in patients with Parkinson’s disease (Cools et al., 
2001a, 2003; Cools et al., 2010) and as a function of genetic variation in human dopamine 
genes (Bilder et al., 2004; Colzato et al., 2010a). Evidence from functional neuroimaging 
and computational modelling work has suggested that these opposite effects might reflect 
modulation of distinct brain regions, with the striatum mediating effects on at least some 
forms of cognitive flexibility, but the prefrontal cortex (PFC) mediating effects on cognitive 
focusing (Hazy et al., 2006; Cools et al., 2007a; Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). This hypothesis 
likely reflects an oversimplified view of dopamine’s complex effects on cognition, with different 
forms of cognitive flexibility implicating distinct neural and neurochemical systems (Robbins 
and Arnsten, 2009; Kehagia et al., 2010; Floresco and Jentsch, 2011). In particular, the striatum 
seems implicated predominantly in a form of cognitive flexibility that involves shifting to 
well-established (‘habitized’) stimulus-response sets, that does not require new learning or 
working memory. For example 6-OHDA lesions in the striatum of marmosets impaired set 
shifting to an already established set, but left unaffected set shifting to a new, to-be-learned set 
(Collins et al., 2000). This finding paralleled the beneficial effects of dopaminergic medication 
in Parkinson’s disease, which implicates primarily the striatum. These effects were restricted 
to task switching between well-established sets, and did not extend to switching to new, to-be-
learned sets (Cools et al., 2001b; Lewis et al., 2005; Slabosz et al., 2006).  The PFC might well 
be implicated in higher-order forms of switching that do involve new learning and/or working 
memory (Monchi et al., 2004; Floresco and Magyar, 2006; Cools et al., 2009a; Kehagia et 
al., 2010). Interestingly, the beneficial effects of dopaminergic medication in Parkinson’s 
disease on this striatal form of well-established, habit-like task switching were accompanied 
by detrimental effects on cognitive focusing, as measured in terms of distracter-resistance 
during the performance of a delayed response task (Cools et al., 2010). These findings 
paralleled pharmacological neuroimaging work with the same delayed response paradigm 
demonstrating that effects of dopamine D1/D2 receptor agonist administration to healthy 
young volunteers on flexibility (task switching) and focusing (distracter-resistance) were 
accompanied by drug effects on the striatum and the PFC respectively (Cools et al., 2007a). 
In sum, dopamine’s effects on cognition are known to be functionally specific rather than 
15
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global, with opposite effects on cognitive flexibility and cognitive focusing. These opposite 
effects have been proposed to reflect modulation of distinct brain regions, with dopamine 
in the striatum playing a prominent role in a form of flexibility that involves shifting to well-
established, i.e. ‘habitized’ stimulus-response sets. 
Dopamine and the motivation-cognition interaction
So far we have seen that striatal dopamine’s effect on motivated behaviour is most prominent 
in terms of its preparatory component and that such preparatory effects can be maladaptive. 
This observation that dopamine’s effect on motivation might have maladaptive consequences 
for behaviour concurs with observations that effects of dopamine in the cognitive domain 
depend on task demands and associated neural systems, so that dopaminergic drugs can have 
detrimental as well as beneficial consequences for cognition. Together these insights have 
led to the speculation that incentive motivation might act to enhance cognitive performance 
by potentiating dopamine in the striatum in a manner that is functionally specific, i.e. 
restricted to a form of cognitive flexibility that involves shifting to well-established habits, 
and not extending to, or even at the expense of cognitive focusing. Below we review empirical 
evidence that addresses the different aspects of this working hypothesis. 
Evidence from neuroanatomical studies
Motivation-cognition interactions have long been proposed to reflect dopamine-dependent 
interfacing between different parallel fronto-striatal circuits associated with motivation 
and cognition (figure 1.1). For example, neuroanatomical studies in rats from the 70s have 
suggested that activity in the dorsal striatum is modulated by activity in the ventral striatum 
via the dopaminergic cells in the substantia nigra (Nauta et al., 1978). Tracer experiments in 
nonhuman primates have revived this notion by revealing an arrangement of spiralling striato-
nigro-striatal (SNS) connections between the dopaminergic cells in the midbrain and striatal 
regions that were defined on the basis of their frontal cortical input (Haber et al., 2000; Haber, 
2003). Similar connections have been found in rodents (Ikemoto, 2007). The SNS connections 
are thought to direct information flow in a feed-forward manner via stepwise disinhibition of 
the ascending dopaminergic projections from the VMS (including the nucleus accumbens), 
via the dorsomedial striatum (DMS, caudate nucleus), to the dorsolateral striatum (DLS, 
putamen). The resulting information flow from ventromedial to dorsolateral striatal regions 
provides a hierarchical (or heterarchical, seeHaruno and Kawato, 2006) mechanism by 
which motivational goals can influence cognitive and subsequent motor control processes. 
Indeed, the VMS has long been hypothesized to provide the basis for the interface between 
motivation and action on the basis of its major inputs from limbic areas like the amygdala, 
hippocampus and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and output to the motor areas via the 
globus pallidus (Mogenson et al., 1980; Groenewegen et al., 1996). However, rather than a 
direct limbic-motor connection, the SNS connections provide a more physiologically and 
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psychologically plausible mechanism by which motivational goals exert their influence on 
action (Haber et al., 2000). 
Evidence from psychopharmacological studies in animals
Rodent research on drug addiction has provided evidence for the functional importance 
of dopamine-mediated interactions between ventral and dorsal parts of the striatum. For 
example, Belin and Everitt (2008) have adopted an intrastriatal disconnection procedure in 
rats to investigate the necessity of the SNS connections in the transition of reward-directed 
drug-seeking behaviour to habitual behaviour associated with the DLS. The authors lesioned 
the VMS selectively on one side of the rat brain and, concomitantly, blocked dopaminergic 
input from the substantia nigra in the DLS with a receptor antagonist on the contralateral 
side of the brain. Thus, they functionally disconnected the VMS and DLS on both sides of 
the brain, while leaving unilateral VMS and DLS on opposite sites intact. This functional 
disconnection between VMS and DLS greatly reduced the transition of VMS-associated to 
DLS-associated habitual behaviour, whereas the unilateral manipulations were ineffective in 
isolation (Belin and Everitt, 2008). These data show the functional importance of the spiralling 
SNS connections in VMS control over dorsal striatal functioning in addiction (Belin et al., 
2009). 
Functional evidence for a role of dopamine in interactions between motivation and DMS-
associated functions has also been established in non-human primates. For example, 
neurophysiological recordings by Hikosaka and colleagues during the performance of a 
memory-guided saccadic eye-movement task revealed sensitivity of neuronal firing in the 
DMS as well as midbrain dopamine neurons to appetitive motivation. In this task, one of 
four directions was randomly assigned as the target location by a cue that also signalled the 
anticipation of reward. Subsequently, the monkey had to make a saccade to the remembered 
location. It was found that cues that predicted reward resulted in earlier and faster saccades 
relative to cues that predicted no reward. Firing patterns in caudate nucleus (DMS) neurons 
correlated with the change in saccade behaviour, changing their preferred direction to the 
rewarded direction (Kawagoe et al., 1998). In a follow-up study, the authors observed that 
reward-predictive cues resulted in increased firing of dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain, 
as well as in neurons of the caudate nucleus (DMS) (Kawagoe et al., 2004). Together, these 
findings demonstrate that effects of reward anticipation on DMS activity and associated 
motor-planning behaviour were accompanied by changes in dopamine activity. 
In humans, a role for dopamine in the effects of motivation on cognition has so far been 
addressed only in the domain of long-term memory associated with the hippocampus 
(Wittmann et al., 2005; Adcock et al., 2006; Schott et al., 2006; for a review, see Shohamy and 
Adcock, 2010). This relatively young field suggests that dopamine may well play a role in the 
long term plasticity-enhancing effects of motivation. In the next section, we address studies 
that focus on dopamine-dependent effects of motivation on shorter term plasticity, involving 
the striatum.
17
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Evidence from human studies: motivation & cognitive flexibility
Data from two recent studies support the hypothesis that dopamine is critical for interactions 
between motivation and cognitive control. Specifically, these studies highlight an important 
role for dopamine in the modification by appetitive motivation of switching between well-
established habits. The task-switching paradigm involved cued task switching between 
well-learnt task-sets, minimizing learning and working memory processes (Rogers and 
Monsell, 1995). Subjects switched between responding according the direction of the arrow 
(task A) and responding according to the direction indicated by the word (task B) of a series 
of arrow-word targets (consisting of the words “left” or “right” in a left or right pointing 
arrow; figure 1.2a). Repetitions or switches of task-set were pseudo-randomly preceded by 
high or low reward cues. In the first study, young healthy adults performed the task in the 
magnetic resonance scanner and both behavioural and neural responses were assessed as a 
function of inter-individual variability in dopamine genes (Aarts et al., 2010). In particular, 
we focused on a common variable number of tandem repeats (VNTR) polymorphism in 
the dopamine transporter gene (DAT1), expressed predominantly in the striatum. Relative 
to the 10R homozygotes, the 9R carriers exhibited significant reward benefits in terms of 
overall performance and increased reward-related BOLD responses in VMS. However, most 
critically, they also demonstrated significant reward benefits in terms of task switching (i.e. 
reduced switch costs in the high versus low reward condition). This effect was accompanied 
by a potentiation of switch-related BOLD responses in DMS (caudate nucleus) in the high 
reward versus the low reward condition (figure 1.2b and c). Importantly, the reward-related 
activity in VMS correlated positively with the effects of reward on subsequent switch-
related activity during the targets in DMS, with high dopamine subjects demonstrating high 
activity in both striatal regions (figure 1.2d) (Aarts et al., 2010). These dopamine-mediated 
motivation-cognition interaction effects were recently replicated in an independent dataset 
(van Holstein et al., 2011) and strengthened our working hypothesis that striatal dopamine 
mediates motivational modification of certain forms of cognitive control in humans. 
In a second study, we investigated the effect of appetitive motivation on cognitive flexibility 
in patients with PD using the same paradigm (figure 1.2a). Effects within the PD group 
were associated with the degree of dopamine depletion in different striatal sub-regions as 
measured with 123I-FP-CIT single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT). First, 
we replicated previous studies by demonstrating a switch deficit in PD relative to healthy 
controls. Interestingly, this deficit was restricted to certain conditions of the task, revealing a 
disproportionate difficulty with switching to the best established, most dominant “arrow” task. 
Additionally, the SPECT measurements showed that this switch deficit in PD was associated 
with dopamine cell loss in the most affected striatal sub-region (posterior putamen, figure 
1.2e), thus demonstrating the involvement of striatal dopamine in this particular “habit-like” 
type of cognitive flexibility. More critically, our results demonstrated compensatory capacity 
of reward-predictive signals to facilitate cognitive flexibility in mild PD. Specifically, when 
anticipating reward, patients were able to reduce the switch cost in the dominant arrow task 
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Figure 1.2  Experimental evidence for the beneficial effect of motivation on cognitive flex-
ibility in humans
(A) The rewarded task-switching paradigm used in our studies to investigate the motivation–cognition 
interface. (B) In our genetic imaging study (Aarts et al., 2010), participants with genetically determined 
high striatal dopamine levels benefited more from reward anticipation in terms of task switching than 
participants with low dopamine levels. (C) In our genetic imaging study (Aarts et al., 2010), reward 
cues elicited activity in VMS (in red), whereas the dopamine-dependent effect of reward prediction 
on task switching was observed in DMS (in orange). (D) Activity in these striatal sub-regions (see C) 
was positively correlated, with high striatal dopamine subjects showing high activity in both VMS and 
DMS during reward anticipation and rewarded task switching respectively. (E) In our SPECT study 
in Parkinson’s disease (Aarts et al., 2012), patients showed the most marked dopamine depletion in 
the dorsolateral striatum (posterior putamen), whereas the ventromedial striatum (n. accumbens) was 
least affected. (F) Patients with the greatest dopamine depletion (i.e., least dopamine cell integrity) 
showed the greatest effects of anticipated reward in reducing the switch cost in the dominant arrow 
task [(switch-repeat)low − (switch-repeat)high]; presumably by increased reward- induced dopamine 
release in the relatively intact neurons in ventromedial striatum.
to such an extent that the switch cost no longer differed from that of controls on high reward 
trials. Interestingly, the use of reward was also highly correlated with the amount of dopamine 
depletion in the most affected striatal sub-region (Aarts et al., 2012). Patients with greater 
dopamine cell loss made more use of anticipated reward for reducing the switch cost than 
did patients with less dopamine cell loss (figure 1.2f). Further exploration of this finding 
demonstrated that this effect of motivation on task switching was driven by two opponent 
processes: first, patients with more dopamine depletion made more errors on repeat trials 
under high than under low reward. This detrimental effect of reward on repeat trials could 
reflect a form of impulsivity, where the current task representation is rendered unstable by 
reward, leading to reduced cognitive “perseverance” or maintenance (see also Hazy et al., 
2006). Controls did not show such detrimental impulsive behaviour on repeat trials under 
high reward. Second, patients with more dopamine depletion made fewer errors on switch 
trials under high than under low reward. Thus, anticipated reward proved beneficial for 
switching to the other task-set, which profits from reduced cognitive perseverance. This effect 
of reward on switch trials in patients did not differ from that of controls. The beneficial effects 
of anticipated reward on task switching in the young healthy adults mentioned above (Aarts et 
al., 2010) was driven by a beneficial effect of reward on switch trials only, instead of opposite 
effects of reward on repeat and switch trials. In sum, PD patients differed from controls in 
showing detrimental effects of reward on repeat trials, which were greatest in patients with 
most dopamine cell loss in the striatum (Aarts et al., 2012). This result fits with previous 
findings that a low baseline dopamine state contributes to trait impulsivity and addictive 
behaviour (Cools et al., 2007a; Dalley et al., 2007); presumably due to reduced auto-regulatory 
mechanisms, resulting in increased dopamine release (Buckholtz et al., 2010). Hence, we 
speculate that reward-induced impulsivity in our PD group was caused by increased reward-
related dopamine release in the relatively intact dopamine cells projecting to the ventral 
striatum (figure 1.2e). In line with this view are the findings of increased dopamine release in 
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ventral striatum in PD patients diagnosed with impulsive–compulsive behaviour relative to 
those without (Evans et al., 2006; Steeves et al., 2009; O’Sullivan et al., 2011). Our PD data are 
also in accordance with the working hypothesis that striatal dopamine mediates motivational 
effects on cognition depending on task demands.
Evidence from human studies: functionally specific effects of motivation 
Motivation has been shown to improve attentional processes in many perceptual and cognitive 
control domains (for reviews, see Pessoa, 2009; Pessoa and Engelmann, 2010). Data from a 
number of human imaging studies have suggested that motivation might have non-specific 
enhancing effects on cognitive processing. For example, in a functional neuroimaging study, 
motivational incentives increased PFC activity and connectivity during cognitive control 
tasks, in a manner that seemed to depend on the cognitive effort (i.e., cost-benefit ratio) 
rather than on the specific qualitative cognitive demand of the tasks (Kouneiher et al., 2009). 
Based on these data the authors argued that motivation and cognitive control can be regarded 
as two separate, additive instead of interactive factors of executive functioning (Kouneiher 
et al., 2009). However, such an additive view of motivation and cognition contrasts with 
the conclusion drawn by a different set of recent studies which enabled the disentangling of 
different cognitive control components. These studies have found that effects of appetitive 
Figure 1.3  Incentive motivation might have detrimental effects on cognitive focusing
(A) The rewarded Stroop paradigm, including a reward cue (1 or 15 cent), an information cue about 
the upcoming target congruency [informative: incongruent (this example) or congruent (green circle); 
or uninformative (gray question mark)], and an arrow-word Stroop target. The task was to respond 
to the direction indicated by the word. (B) Reward anticipation had opposite effects on widening and 
focusing of attention as measured with the information benefit (uninformed–informed) on congruent 
and incongruent targets respectively; with high anticipated reward particularly impairing proactive 
focusing on the incongruent trials (M. van Holstein, E. Aarts, R. Cools, unpublished observations).
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motivation and affect may well depend on the type of cognitive processing at hand (Dreisbach 
and Goschke, 2004; Dreisbach, 2006; Rowe et al., 2007), consistent with our working hypothesis. 
Before turning to these studies, we will discuss preliminary data from our own lab. So far we 
have seen that appetitive motivation can potentiate certain forms of task switching to well-
established stimulus-response mappings in a dopamine-dependent manner. The observation 
that these effects were driven by detrimental effects of anticipated reward on repeat trials and 
beneficial effects on switch trials in the PD group (Aarts et al., 2012) already indicates a level 
of functional specificity. To test more directly the hypothesis that these beneficial effects of 
appetitive motivation on some cognitive functions might come at the expense of impairments 
on other cognitive functions, we designed a Stroop-like conflict task with high and low 
reward conditions. This task resembled the previously used task-switching paradigm in many 
ways except that it required cognitive focusing instead of cognitive switching. Seventeen 
participants performed this Stroop-like task by responding with a left or right button press to 
the words “left” or “right” in a left or right pointing arrow (figure 3a). The direction denoted 
by the word was either congruent or incongruent with the direction indicated by the arrow. 
Similar to the task-switching paradigm discussed above (Aarts et al., 2012), all trials began 
with a cue predicting high or low reward for correct performance. Critically, following the 
reward cues, we explicitly informed participants about the (in)congruency of the upcoming 
Stroop target (see Aarts et al., 2008). In half of the trials, participants were informed about 
this congruency by informative cues (figure 3a). In the other half of the trials, the targets were 
preceded by cues that gave no information about the upcoming congruency. The idea here 
was that incongruency-predictive cues (relative to non-informative cues) would encourage 
participants to reduce their attentional focus, whereas the congruency-predictive cues would 
encourage participants to widen their attentional focus. In other words, cues that signalled 
upcoming incongruent targets would encourage participants to proactively focus on the task-
relevant word, preventing distraction by the task-irrelevant arrow, whereas cues that signal 
upcoming congruent words encouraged participants to proactively widen attention in order 
to comprise both the task-relevant word as well as the task-irrelevant arrow (see Aarts et al., 
2010). The combination of reward and information cues enabled us to determine the effects 
of appetitive motivation on the cognitive focusing of attention.
Consistent with our previous results (Aarts et al., 2008) we showed that (irrespective of 
reward condition) participants responded faster and made less errors when informative 
cues preceded the congruent and incongruent targets relative to uninformed targets (M. van 
Holstein, E. Aarts, R. Cools. unpublished observations). Importantly, as predicted, appetitive 
motivation significantly altered the information benefit depending on the congruency of the 
targets. That is, proactive widening of attention (uninformed-informed congruent targets) 
benefitted from anticipated reward (15 vs. 1 cent), whereas proactive focusing of attention 
(uninformed-informed incongruent targets) was hampered by anticipated reward (figure 
1.3b). Intriguingly, these data show that, depending on the task at hand, appetitive motivation 
can have both beneficial as well as detrimental effects on cognitive function.
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Similar findings have been obtained when studying the effects of positive affect on cognitive 
control. Thus, positive affect has been shown to increase cognitive flexibility (i.e., decreasing 
perseveration), while increasing distractibility (i.e., decreasing cognitive stability) on different 
types of trials in a task switching paradigm (Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004). Similar opposite 
effects have been observed in an AX continuous performance task: Positive affect increased 
cognitive flexibility when a maintained goal unexpectedly changed (Dreisbach, 2006; 
van Wouwe et al., 2009), but, within the same task, positive affect decreased the ability to 
maintain the goal when nothing changed (Dreisbach, 2006). Functionally specific effects of 
positive affect have also been demonstrated in conflict paradigms, like the Eriksen flanker 
task. Some authors have shown that positive affect increased attention towards the distracting 
flanker arrows, thus, increasing ‘the breadth of attentional selection’ (Rowe et al., 2007); 
similarly, others have found that positive affect reduced the ability to focus on the target 
arrow after experienced conflict (van Steenbergen et al., 2010). Our preliminary results from 
the rewarded Stroop conflict paradigm extend these effects of positive affect in the flanker 
conflict task, by revealing contrasting effects of appetitive motivation on the widening and 
focusing of attention within the same task and within the same participants. In sum, both 
appetitive motivation and positive affect enhance certain forms of cognitive flexibility at 
the expense of cognitive focusing. According to our working hypothesis, these effects might 
reflect dopamine-dependent flow of information processing related to Pavlovian incentives 
from ventromedial parts of the striatum to more dorsal regions in the striatum, associated 
with habit-like information processing. 
It might be noted here again that multiple mechanisms have been proposed to underlie the 
motivational control of behaviour (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). We have highlighted that 
some motivational influences can be maladaptive, and these might implicate dopamine. 
However, there is also evidence for motivational influences on goal-direct behaviour, that 
is, those mediated by instrumental incentive learning and acquisition of action-outcome 
representations (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). These alternate mechanisms might account 
for findings that at first sight seem incompatible with the current working hypothesis. 
Specifically, appetitive motivation has been shown to increase spatial orienting to a target 
location in the face of distracters (Engelmann and Pessoa, 2007; Engelmann et al., 2009), or to 
reduce conflict by biasing visual selection (Padmala and Pessoa, 2011). Furthermore, in young 
and old adults as well as in medicated patients with Parkinson’s disease, motivation increased 
anti-saccade performance, encompassing incompatible stimulus-response mappings like in 
Stroop and flanker paradigms (Harsay et al., 2010). The critical question is whether these 
effects are also dependent on striatal dopamine, or whether they implicate modulation by 
different neurochemical systems. Addressing this question requires controlled dopaminergic 
medication withdrawal and/or pharmacological manipulation approaches.
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Frontal control of dopamine-dependent striatal processing
The striatum does not act alone and requires interactions with specific frontal regions to operate 
effectively (Alexander et al., 1986; Passingham, 1993) (figure 1.1). Recent neuroimaging 
work in humans and monkeys has revealed that effects of appetitive motivation on cognitive 
control are accompanied by modulation of responses in the PFC (Ichihara-Takeda and 
Funahashi, 2008; Kouneiher et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2010; Ichihara-Takeda et al., 2010; Jimura 
et al., 2010; Wallis and Kennerley, 2010). For example, functional interactions between the 
medial and the lateral PFC have been shown to accompany effects of appetitive motivation on 
the cognitive control processes involved in task switching (Kouneiher et al., 2009). Another 
functional neuroimaging study concluded that the lateral PFC incorporates reward value in 
goal-directed control during working memory processes (Jimura et al., 2010). 
These data concur with the existence of multiple mechanisms for the motivational control of 
behaviour, which may interact in multiple ways, either competitively or synergistically. For 
example, signals in the PFC might control dopaminergic activity in striatal areas in a top-down 
manner, thus allowing controlled influences on value assignment to states or actions (Daw et 
al., 2005; Doll et al., 2009) (see figure 1.1). Consistent with this hypothesis are observations that 
stimulation of different parts of the frontal cortex (using transcranial magnetic stimulation) 
alters focal dopamine release in strongly connected topographically specific parts of the 
striatum (as measured using [11C]raclopride positron emission tomography) (Strafella et 
al., 2001; Strafella et al., 2003; Strafella et al., 2005; Ko et al., 2008). The role of the PFC in 
integrating motivation, cognition and action is also highlighted by anatomical tracer studies 
in non-human primates showing that value-sensitive regions in ventromedial PFC (i.e., ACC/
orbitofrontal cortex) project not only to strongly connected regions in ventromedial striatum, 
but also diffusely to more dorsal regions in the striatum that receive most projections from the 
DLPFC (Haber et al., 2006) (figure 1.1). Electrophysiological work with rodents has revealed 
that changes in dopamine release and receptor stimulation in the striatum can alter such PFC 
input to the striatum (Goto and Grace, 2005). More specifically, changes in tonic dopamine 
release were shown to modulate PFC inputs into the VMS – and to influence set shifting 
behaviour - through dopamine D2 receptors (Goto and Grace, 2005). These results show that 
striatal dopamine can modulate motivated behaviour not only via altering striatal output but 
also via altering striatal input from the PFC. 
Conclusions and future directions
There are multiple mechanisms for the control of behaviour and cognition by motivation. 
This paper focuses on the appetitive motivational system, while recognizing that opponent 
influences on behaviour are likely seen of the aversive motivational system. In particular 
we have concentrated on those effects of appetitive motivation that implicate dopamine. 
These dopamine-dependent effects of motivation likely have both detrimental as well as 
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beneficial consequences for cognition, via altering information flow from ventromedial to 
dorsolateral parts of the striatum. This general observation is in line with the observation 
that motivational influences on behaviour are not necessarily driven by representations of 
the goals of instrumental behaviour, but might well reflect Pavlovian or habit-like anomalies. 
This is particularly likely in the case of dopamine, which is recognized to play a special role in 
Pavlovian and habit systems. 
An important implication of this observation is that effects of dopamine on interactions 
between motivation and cognitive control that appear to be mediated by a modification of 
motivational influences on cognitively mediated, goal-directed behaviour, like task switching, 
may in fact reflect modification of motivation influences on habitual behaviour. Findings 
that the dopamine-dependent effects of motivation on task switching are strongest when 
participants are required to switch to well-established stimulus-response mappings are in line 
with this hypothesis, which requires testing in future work.
A further issue to be addressed in future research is the degree to which the contrasting effects 
of motivation on habit-like switching and on proactive focusing can be understood in terms 
of competition between a striatal system controlling habit-like processing and a prefrontal 
system controlling goal-directed behaviour (Dickinson, 1985; Daw et al., 2005). Clearly these 
questions require a careful integration of traditional psychological approaches, which leverage 
well-operationalized behavioural definitions of goal-directed and habitual behaviour, with 
pharmacological studies of cognitive control.
Furthermore given the proposed opponency between appetitive and aversive motivational 
systems, one might ask what is the effect of punishment-predictive stimuli on cognition? This 
is particularly interesting in the context of empirical findings that conditioned inhibitors, 
i.e. stimuli predictive of reward omission do not trigger an increase, but rather if anything 
a decrease in midbrain dopamine firing (Tobler et al., 2005). Moreover there is increasing 
speculation about the involvement of the part-opponent system of serotonin (Daw et al., 
2002; Dayan and Huys, 2009; Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Cools et al., 2011), an area that is 
wide open for empirical work.
Finally, progress in the understanding of the motivational control of cognition will depend on 
the degree to which the balance between transient and sustained, e.g., context effects are taken 
into account (e.g., Higgins et al., 1997; Maddox and Markman, 2010; Savine et al., 2010). For 
example, Maddox and Markman (2010) propose that performance does not only depend on 
local incentives and task demands (as discussed in the current review), but also interacts with 
global incentives like an overall bonus or punishment at the end of a task. Such advances 
will no doubt benefit from the recognition that the impact of transient (phasic) changes in 
neurotransmitter activity depends critically on the tonic neurochemical state of the system. 
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General introduction
In the overview in chapter 1, a number of hypotheses related to the role of dopamine in 
motivated cognitive control were proposed. The experiments presented in this thesis aim to 
address a number of these hypotheses, thereby focusing on the effects of reward motivation on 
flexible switching between well-established task sets. First, the experiments presented in this 
thesis speak to a causal role for dopamine in motivated cognitive control and aim to elucidate 
which dopamine receptor type is involved in this process. In doing so, natural variation in 
baseline dopamine signalling is taken into account to explain individual differences in task- 
and drug effects. Second, following previous neuroimaging work that suggests a role for the 
striatum in mediating the effect of motivation on task switching, the work in this thesis aims 
to assess the necessity of the striatum. Finally, it aims to test the hypothesis that the prefrontal 
cortex can alter processing in the striatum during motivated cognitive control.
Genetic differences in dopaminergic drug-response
Chapters 3 and 4 aim to further elucidate the role of dopamine and specific dopamine 
receptors in motivated cognitive control by assessing the effect of dopaminergic drugs on 
the integration of motivation and flexible control, both in healthy subjects (chapter 3) and 
patients with ADHD (chapter 4). 
One challenge with pharmacological studies is that individuals can vary greatly in their 
response to drugs. This idea is illustrated by a study in which the effect of a dopamine receptor 
agonist  on cognitive functioning was assessed (Kimberg et al., 1997). This work revealed 
that subjects with low basal memory capacity benefited from bromocriptine (box 2.2a) on 
a range of complex cognitive tasks, whereas already high functioning individuals (with high 
basal memory capacity) showed detrimental effects of the same drug (Kimberg et al., 1997). 
This phenomenon can be explained by an inverted U shaped theory, which states that an 
individual’s response to dopaminergic drugs depends on the baseline state of that subject 
(Cools and Robbins, 2004). Thus, dopamine can have beneficial effects on cognitive functions, 
but both too low and too high levels of dopamine can impair cognitive functioning (Williams 
and Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Arnsten, 1998). 
One source of individual variation in basal levels of dopamine activity may arise from genetic 
variation. Numerous pharmacogenetic studies have shown that individual differences in 
dopamine genes can account for individual differences in response to drugs. For example, 
Mattay and colleagues (2003) exploited inter-individual differences in natural variation in the 
gene coding for the catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) enzyme. COMT is the primary 
mechanism for terminating the action of dopamine in the prefrontal cortex. Variation in this 
gene is associated with individual differences in dopamine signalling. Mattay and colleagues 
showed that individuals with genetically determined low dopamine signalling performed 
worse on a ‘prefrontal’ cognitive task than those carrying the allele associated with higher 
dopamine signalling. However, after the administration of amphetamine, which increases 
dopamine levels, performance of low baseline subjects improved, while amphetamine had 
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no effect in the group of subjects with already high dopamine levels. Furthermore, a number 
of studies have shown that the effects of a dopamine D2 receptor agonist can be explained by 
natural variation in the gene coding for the dopamine D2 receptor (Kirsch et al., 2006; Cohen 
et al., 2007). Subjects carrying the Taq1A1 variant of the allele (A1+ subjects) have ~30% 
fewer dopamine D2 receptors in the striatum and exhibit impairments in reward processing, 
compared with those not carrying this allele (A1- subjects). Cohen and colleagues (2007) 
assessed whether this genetic predisposition could explain individual responses to a dopamine 
receptor agonist during reward processing. To this end they used a reversal learning paradigm, 
which requires flexible adaptation of behaviour when a previously rewarded stimulus is no 
longer rewarded and a new rule needs to be learned. In the placebo condition, the low dopamine 
receptor group (A1+ subjects) performed worse than the A1- group. However, administration 
of the dopamine D2 receptor agonist cabergoline improved rule-learning performance in the 
subset of subjects with genetically determined low dopamine receptor density (A1+), but 
the dopamine D2 receptor agonist impaired performance in those already performing well 
under placebo (the A1- group). This effect was accompanied by opposite effects in reward-
related neural responses in regions of the reward network (the medial orbitofrontal cortex 
and striatum): Administration of the D2 receptor agonist increased activity in these regions in 
subjects with low reward-related activity under placebo (A1+), while it had the opposite effect 
in those with already high baseline reward-related activity (A1-). 
As was discussed in chapter 1, in addition to predicting individual differences in drug response, 
natural (genetic) variation between individuals can also explain individual differences in task 
performance (e.g. (Frank et al., 2007; Dreher et al., 2009; Aarts et al., 2010; Colzato et al., 
2010a; Stelzel et al., 2010) (box 2.2c). In chapters 3 and 4, I exploited individual variability 
in the gene coding for the dopamine transporter (DAT) to account for inter-individual 
variability in task performance, neural signalling, and drug response. Task-related differences 
in performance or neural signalling as a function of variation in this genotype can be taken to 
suggest that dopamine is involved in the studied process. 
Evidence for a role for dopamine in the integration of reward motivation and cognitive control 
has been provided by a number of studies, and much of this evidence is reviewed in chapter 
1 of this thesis. Previous work that also employed the rewarded task-switching paradigm 
presented in this thesis (box 2.3) has shown that reward can modulate flexible control in 
the context of task switching (Aarts et al., 2010). The anticipation of a reward (i.e. high vs. 
low reward cue) increased neural responses in the ventral striatum, while the integration 
between reward and task switching was associated with increased signalling in the caudate 
nucleus. Interestingly, these signals correlated, suggesting that communication between the 
ventral and dorsal striatum may mediate the information transfer from reward regions to 
cognitive control regions (figures 1.2c, d and 2.1, box 2.1). Dopamine-dependent effects in 
this latter study were revealed by showing that inter-individual differences in signalling in 
the caudate nucleus depended crucially on individual differences in dopamine signalling, 
measured by exploiting differences in the DAT1 genotype. Although these results provide 
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a strong foundation for the hypothesis that dopamine is involved in motivated cognitive 
control, they do not directly manipulate the dopamine system, nor do they provide evidence 
for the involvement of any specific dopamine receptor subtype. 
Box 2.1 | The striatum and its spiralling striato-nigral-striatal projections
The striatum is the input structure of the basal ganglia, a collection of nuclei located deep 
in the brain, which are involved in a wide range of behaviours. The striatum can be roughly 
divided into three parts: the ventral part (VS, figure 2.1: red), including the nucleus 
accumbens, which is primarily involved in Pavlovian processes and the anticipation 
of rewards, the caudate nucleus (figure 2.1: orange/green), which is implicated in 
instrumental conditioning and goal-directed behaviour, such as the flexible updating of 
task demands, and the putamen (figure 2.1: blue), which is involved in motor processes. 
The striatum is well-connected to other parts of the brain and thus ideally suited to 
integrate signals about context and novelty from the hippocampus, affective processes and 
reward value from the amygdala and top-down processes such as attention, conflict and 
working memory related signals from the prefrontal cortex (figure 2.1).  
Approximately 90% of striatal neurons are GABA-ergic medium spiny neurons (MSNs), 
which express dopamine receptors. Importantly, these inhibitory MSNs cannot generate 
activity (unlike for example dopamine neurons). Instead, changes in striatal activity 
modulate signals from other regions, such as excitatory glutamatergic inputs coming from 
the frontal cortex. Dopamine signals in the striatum are thought to play an important role 
in how input from other regions, such as the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex, affect 
signalling in the striatum (Grace et al., 2007). These dopamine signals originate from the 
midbrain (VTA/SN: ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra) and can modulate the 
excitability of the striatum, either by facilitating or inhibiting neuronal activity, depending 
on which dopamine receptors are stimulated (i.e. D1 or D2) and the concentration of 
dopamine (box 2.2). Stimulation of D1 receptors increases the excitability of striatal 
neurons, whereas dopamine D2 receptor stimulation decreases the responsiveness of these 
neurons, making the striatum either more or less sensitive to prefrontal input, respectively 
(box 2.2). The striatum in turn sends projections back to the cortex (via other nuclei e.g. the 
pallidum, subthalamic nucleus and thalamus), forming the so-called corticostriatal circuits 
(Alexander et al., 1986) and to the midbrain, forming striato-nigral-striatal loops (Haber 
et al., 2000) (figure 1.1 and 2.1). These corticostriatal circuits are organized in functionally 
specific circuits (chapter 1). The segregated nature of the corticostriatal circuits in 
functionally specific circuits is largely maintained in these striato-nigral connections, but 
importantly, each region of the striatum projects to the part of the midbrain connected to 
a slightly more dorsolateral striatal region, allowing the integration of information across 
circuits. This organization of the striatum and cortex in cortico-striatal-pallidal-thalamus-
cortical circuits allows them to work together to enable a broad behavioural repertoire. 
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Dopamine receptor specific effects during motivated cognitive control
Optimal cognitive control requires persistence in the face of distracting stimuli when 
pursuing a goal, and the ability to flexibly adapt behaviour when circumstances change. 
The dual-state theory provides a mechanism by which these opposing cognitive functions 
can act together to allow adaptive behaviour (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008). This theory 
proposes that the cognitive effects of dopamine and dopaminergic drugs depend on the 
subtype of dopamine receptor that is activated in the prefrontal cortex (Durstewitz and 
Seamans, 2008). Two dopamine states are proposed to account for these opponent processes: 
A D1-dominated state, which is beneficial for robust online maintenance of information, 
and a D2-dominated state, which is associated with higher flexibility. Although this theory 
focussed on the prefrontal cortex, it is important to keep in mind that dopamine D2 receptors 
are abundantly expressed in the striatum, but that the expression of these receptors in the 
prefrontal cortex is low (Hurd et al., 2001). D2 receptors in the striatum might be especially 
important for the flexible updating of task representations, whereas prefrontal dopamine D1 
receptor stimulation is beneficial when a task requires stable representations. Experimental- 
and computational work indeed showed that the striatum is especially important when the 
updating of prefrontal representations is required (Frank et al., 2001; van Schouwenburg et al., 
2010). More specifically, the striatum is thought to act as a gating mechanism, which updates 
and stabilizes active maintenance in the prefrontal cortex. Interestingly, it was proposed that 
this gating mechanism is driven by (reward-related) midbrain dopamine (Cohen et al., 2002). 
The idea that dopamine D2 receptor stimulation plays an important role in flexible behaviour 
has further been evidenced by pharmacological experiments in rodents (Floresco et al., 
2006b; Kellendonk et al., 2006) and humans (Mehta et al., 2004; Stelzel et al., 2010). In terms 
of reward processing, both dopamine D1 and D2 receptor stimulation play a role (Ikemoto et 
al., 1997; Koch et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2007). However, the mechanism by which dopamine 
modulates motivated cognitive control so far remains elusive. 
In chapter 3, I aimed to assess whether dopamine D2 receptor stimulation modulates task 
switching, or the interaction between reward and task switching. To this end, I analyzed the 
results of an experiment in which the dopamine D2 receptor agonist bromocriptine was 
administered and compared performance on the rewarded task-switching paradigm (box 2.3) 
in a placebo session with performance after subjects received a dose of bromocriptine (box 
2.2a). However, bromocriptine does not act exclusively on the dopamine D2 receptor, but also 
has some affinity for dopamine D1 receptors. To confirm that the effects of bromocriptine 
were indeed associated with dopamine D2 receptor stimulation, a pre-treatment approach 
was used (box 2.2a). Further, building on previous work (Aarts et al., 2010; Cools and 
D’Esposito, 2011), we took into account the genetically determined state of the dopamine 
system for two reasons. First, we aimed to explain inter-individual differences in responses to 
dopaminergic drugs and on task performance. Second, we exploited variation in the DAT1 
genotype because the DAT is most abundant in the striatum. Therefore, it is conceivable that 
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any effects dependent on the DAT1 are associated with the striatum. The previous observation 
that motivated cognitive control depends on striatal dopamine signalling (chapter 1) was 
replicated in chapter 3, by showing that the effect of reward on task switching depended on 
individual differences in the DAT1 genotype. Although the administration of bromocriptine 
affected task switching, it had no effect on the interaction between reward and task switching. 
Thus, the work in chapter 3 revealed a role for dopamine in motivated cognitive control. 
However, evidence for the involvement of dopamine D2 receptors in motivated cognitive 
control was not provided. Given previous evidence for a role of dopamine D1 and D2 
receptors (Koch et al., 2000), or even combined dopamine D1 and D2 receptor stimulation 
(Ikemoto et al., 1997) in reward motivation, we aimed to manipulate the dopamine system 
in a more general manner in chapter 4. To this end we administered the rewarded task-
switching paradigm in patients with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) after 
intake and withdrawal of methylphenidate, a non-selective catecholamine reuptake blocker 
(box 2.2b), and compared their performance and brain activity to that of a group of subjects 
without ADHD. 
Clinical relevance: Neuropsychiatric deficits in motivated cognitive con-
trol 
ADHD is a neuropsychiatric disorder with symptoms related to hyperactivity, inattention 
and/or impulsivity, which start in childhood (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 
2013). ADHD is not exclusively a childhood disorder, but it continues to affect`~2.5% of 
adults (Simon et al., 2009). Deficits in flexible, adaptive control have been reported in ADHD 
(Sonuga-Barke, 2003; Dibbets et al., 2010), but also in other neuropsychiatric disorders such 
as schizophrenia (Ravizza et al., 2010), Parkinson’s disease (Cools et al., 2001a), and obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD) (Meiran et al., 2011). Interestingly, deficits in these disorders are 
not restricted to the cognitive domain, but often extend to reward processing deficits, at least 
in ADHD (Plichta and Scheres, 2014), schizophrenia (Strauss et al., 2014) and OCD (Figee 
et al., 2010). Combined with the abundance of evidence above showing that motivation can 
indeed change cognitive processing, it is conceivable that at least some of these cognitive 
deficits may actually stem from deficits in the motivational domain. 
Previous work has indeed shown that motivation can improve cognitive control in children 
with ADHD (Konrad et al., 2000), but studies on motivated cognitive control are thus far 
absent in this group. Previous attempts to elucidate the neural mechanism underlying 
aberrant neural processing in ADHD often focused on deficits in dopamine signalling in the 
prefrontal cortex, but deficits in reward-related striatal dopamine have also been suggested 
in ADHD (Tripp and Wickens, 2009). We hypothesized that ADHD would be accompanied 
by aberrant integration of reward and cognitive neural signalling and that striatal dopamine 
would be involved in this process. Chapter 4 addresses this issue by assessing, in adults 
with ADHD compared with healthy individuals, how reward motivation can alter neural 
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heading for titles in between
processing during the execution of the rewarded task-switching paradigm (box 2.3). To this 
end, I compared a group of adults who were diagnosed with ADHD with a group of subjects 
without ADHD while they performed the rewarded task switching paradigm in a functional 
MRI environment (box 2.4). Effects of dopamine in these patients were assessed by testing the 
patients both after their normal dose of methylphenidate (i.e. after Ritalin®, or an equivalent 
dose of Ritalin for those usually taking Concerta®; box 2.2b) and after withdrawal from their 
normal medication (box 2.2b). This enabled me to assess whether ADHD medication affects 
the integration of motivation and cognitive control signals. Further, to account for inter-
individual differences in task performance and neural processing during this task (Aarts et 
al., 2010), individual variability in the dopamine transporter genotype was taken into account 
(box 2.2c). The results revealed that ADHD was accompanied by excessive signalling in the 
striatum when patients had not taken their medication. However this effect depended on 
the DAT1 genotype, and was only present in a subset of patients. In addition, this excessive 
striatal response was normalized after intake of methylphenidate. Surprisingly however, we 
did not replicate the previous observation that motivated cognitive control varies according 
to the DAT1 genotype in healthy subjects ((Aarts et al., 2010) and chapter 3). One major 
difference between these studies was the age of the subjects: those in chapter 3 were ~22 
years old, whereas the control group in chapter 4 was on average 38 years old. In chapter 
5 I therefore aimed to assess whether the age of the participants could indeed explain the 
differences between these studies.
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Box 2.2 | Dopamine
Neuroimaging tools (e.g. functional MRI (fMRI); box 2.4 and TMS; box 2.5) provide 
valuable insight in the brain regions involved in the execution of tasks or in the connectivity 
between regions. Although fMRI BOLD might correlate with changes in dopamine 
(Knutson and Gibbs, 2007) and TMS can induce changes in dopamine release in the 
striatum (Strafella et al., 2003), these methods alone do not provide direct evidence for the 
involvement of any given neurotransmitter system. Ideally then, to assess the involvement 
of dopamine in the anticipation of reward, one would want to administer a drug that 
manipulates the dopamine system. 
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2.2a Dopamine receptor agonist / antagonist
In chapter 3, I used the dopamine receptor agonist, bromocriptine to assess the role of the 
dopamine system, in particular the dopamine D2 receptor, in rewarded task switching. 
One problem with human pharmacology is that many of the pharmacological agents lack 
receptor specificity. Bromocriptine for example, binds primarily, but not exclusively, to 
the dopamine D2 receptor (figure b and d). However, it also acts on the dopamine D1 
receptor and it can even exert its action via the noradrenaline and serotonin systems. To 
strengthen the claim of the involvement of dopamine D2 receptors when observing an 
effect of bromocriptine, a pre-treatment approach was used. To this end, bromocriptine 
was co-administered with sulpiride, a D2 receptor antagonist, which does not bind to 
dopamine D1 receptors (figure c). The rationale behind this design is as follows: If the effect 
observed after bromocriptine treatment was indeed mediated by dopamine (D2) receptor 
stimulation, then blocking the dopamine (D2) receptors (i.e. by means of co-administration 
of bromocriptine and sulpiride) should ‘undo’ the effect of bromocriptine. However, if 
the behavioural effects were mediated by another neurotransmitter system or D1 receptor 
stimulation, then blocking dopamine (D2) receptors should not affect the results obtained 
after bromocriptine treatment alone. 
2.2b Methylphenidate
Once dopamine has been released into the synapse, it binds to dopamine receptors, but its 
action is quickly terminated by reuptake, allowing it to modulate goal-directed and reward-
related behaviour on a relatively fast time scale (Floresco et al., 2003; Grace et al., 2007) 
(figure a). The dopamine transporter (DAT) is the primary mechanism for terminating 
the action of dopamine in the striatum. Methylphenidate (e.g. instant release: Ritalin®, 
slow release: Concerta®) is a drug that blocks the DAT, thereby increasing dopamine 
levels (Volkow et al., 2001) (figure e). Methylphenidate is the most commonly prescribed 
pharmacological treatment for ADHD. In chapter 4, I tested patients with ADHD twice, 
once after intake of their normal dose of Ritalin® (or after an equivalent dose of Ritalin® 
for those usually taking Concerta®) and once after patients had refrained from taking 
their medication for 24 hours. To account for individual differences to drug responses, we 
took into account inter-individual variability in the DAT1 genotype. When interpreting 
the effects of methylphenidate it is important to keep in mind that it not only blocks the 
dopamine transporter, but also exerts its action by blocking noradrenaline transporters, 
primarily in the prefrontal cortex. 
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2.2c The dopamine transporter genotype (DAT1/SLC6A3)
One way to account for inter-individual differences in dopamine function is by taking into 
account natural variation in the dopamine transporter (DAT) genotype (DAT1/SLC6A3). 
Within this gene, short sequences of DNA are repeated (in tandem), and the number of 
times this repetition occurs varies across participants (i.e. is polymorphic). When assessing 
variation in the variable number of tandem repeats (VNTR) in a particular part of the 
DAT gene, the 3’untranslated region (UTR), people can have between 3 and 11 repeats of 
the gene, but the 9-repeat (9R) and 10-repeat (10R) are most common and thus often the 
focus of research. 
Variation in this polymorphism has been used to assess whether drug and/or task effects are 
dopamine-dependent. However, the effect of having either of the VNTRs on the baseline 
levels of dopamine is still under debate. In vitro studies have shown that the VNTR has an 
effect on DAT expression and that the 10R allele is associated with higher expression (Fuke 
et al., 2001). A number of in vivo studies have used single photon emission computed 
tomography (SPECT) to assess DAT-density in human subjects. The results are inconsistent 
(table), but those with the largest sample of healthy subjects suggest that (healthy) humans 
carrying the 9R allele may have upregulated DAT. However, the next question then is how 
these inter-individual differences in DAT expression relate to differences in dopamine 
signalling. The SPECT studies measure DAT binding, reflecting how much DAT is present, 
and do not measure any differences in dopamine levels or dopamine release. The DAT is 
highly adaptive to homeostatic needs; it is thus possible that subjects with higher phasic 
dopamine levels will have upregulated DATs to terminate dopamine’s action after it has 
been released. 
Although the effects of either carrying at least on 9-repeat allele (9R+), of two 10-repeat 
alleles (10R/10R) DAT1 genotype are to be determined, we do consistently see effects of 
the DAT1 on behaviour and neural responses. For example, variability in the DAT1 gene 
predicted reward-related activity in ventral striatum (Dreher et al., 2009; Forbes et al., 2009; 
Aarts et al., 2010). In line with the hypothesized increase in phasic dopamine signalling in 
individuals who carry at least one 9 repeat allele, these studies revealed increased neural 
activity (measured with fMRI) in the ventral striatum in individuals carrier 9 repeats of the 
allele (compared with 10R homozygotes) during reward processing. 
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Box 2.3 | Cued task-switching paradigm with a reward manipulation
Subjects were presented with response-incongruent arrow-word combinations (targets), 
to which they had to respond by pressing a left or right button. There were two possible 
targets: a left-pointing arrow with the word ‘right’ in it (e.g. trial 2), and a right-pointing 
arrow with the word ‘left’ in it. A task cue preceding the target indicated according to 
which task (arrow or word) the subject had to respond on the current trial. Compared 
with the previous trial, the task could either switch (e.g. from word to arrow or vice 
versa) or remain the same (i.e. repeat). Switch and repeat trials occurred in random order. 
In addition to such task switches, the paradigm allows us to look at response switches 
(chapter 7), i.e. whether the correct response (left or right button), remained the same 
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H  
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(18-83) 
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iodopropen-2-yl)-2h-carbomethoxy-3beta-(4-chlorophenyl)tropane 
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compared with the previous trial, or switched. Finally, a reward cue at the start of each trial 
indicated whether €0.01 or €0.15 (or sometimes €0.10; chapter 5) could be earned after a 
correct and sufficiently fast response. Immediately following the response, feedback was 
given (e.g., “correct! 1 cent”).
Responses (both behaviourally and neurally) on this task can be used to assess switching 
(by comparing switch to repeat trials), reward anticipation (by comparing high with low 
reward trials) and their interaction (i.e. low reward (switch – repeat) – high reward (switch 
– repeat). In addition, in chapter 7 this paradigm is used to assess the integration between 
reward, task switching and motor switching.
This paradigm is used throughout this thesis to assess the effects of a dopamine receptor 
agonist (chapter 3) on behaviour and to assess differences in neural signalling (box 2.4) 
between patients with ADHD and the effects of methylphenidate (box 2.2; chapter 4). 
Subsequently, it was used to investigate whether performance on this task changes across the 
life span (chapter 5). In chapter 6 I present a version of this paradigm designed for rodents 
to assess the causal role for the striatum (box 2.5) in successful motivation-cognition 
integration. Finally, in chapter 7 I used non-invasive brain stimulation (box 2.5) in human 
subjects to perturb activity in the neural circuitry involved in reward processing to gain 
insight in the neural mechanism underlying the reward, cognition, action integration. 
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Box 2.4 | Functional magnetic resonance imaging
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a non-invasive imaging technique used 
to measure neural activity. Neural activity is accompanied by an increase in oxygen and 
glucose consumption. Functional MRI allows the mapping of brain function by making 
use of differences in magnetic properties between oxygenated and de-oxygenated blood. 
This difference is captured in the blood oxygen level dependent signal, or BOLD signal, 
which is used as a proxy for neural activity (Logothetis et al., 2001). FMRI offers good 
spatial resolution (~3 mm in this thesis), but blood flow changes are slow and delayed 
compared to when the neural activity took place. Therefore, changes in BOLD response 
start approximately 2 seconds after the neural activity took place and peak after 6 – 12 
seconds. Nevertheless, with the help of modelling techniques, which use the shape and 
delay of the BOLD response, we can implement rapid event-related fMRI. 
I am interested in brain activity associated with specific functions. Therefore, in the work 
described in this thesis, fMRI scanning took place while subjects performed a computer 
task (box 2.3). To assess neural responses associated with a specific function, I compared 
different conditions on a task. For example, to assess which parts of the brain are activated 
when a reward is anticipated, I assessed the BOLD response when people expect to earn a 
high reward, and compared this to their BOLD response when they expect to earn only a 
small reward. All other things being equal, the difference in BOLD response between these 
conditions is then due to changes in the reward prospect. However, and crucial to keep in 
mind when using fMRI, is that this co-occurrence of changes in BOLD and task-related 
processing does not imply causality. If we want to assess whether a region is crucial for a 
certain function, we will need to perturb activity in this region (e.g. using TMS; box 2.5; 
chapter 7) or apply lesions to a region (box 2.5; chapter 6).
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Aging and cognitive control
Aging is accompanied by a range of cognitive deficits and diminished striatal processing which 
are, at least partly, due to changes in the dopamine system. These changes in the dopamine 
system occur gradually across the life span and start early in adulthood (Backman and Farde, 
2001). In chapter 5 I explored how integration of reward with cognitive control information 
changes across the life span, from adolescence to senescence. The results presented in chapter 
5 show that aging is indeed accompanied by diminished integration between reward and task 
switching: younger subjects showed a reward-based adaptation of cognitive control, whereas 
responding in older adults did not vary with changing reward conditions. 
In summary, the DAT1-depencency and BOLD fMRI work in chapters 3 and 4 suggest 
that striatal dopamine is involved in motivated cognitive control. In addition, previous 
work has shown age-related reductions in striatal dopamine. In chapter 5 I observed age-
related changes in motivation-cognition integration (chapter 5). Together these results 
suggest a role for the striatum in mediating this interaction. However, changes in BOLD 
response (chapter 4 and box 2.4), DAT1 genotype-dependent effects (chapter 3 and 4) or 
the correlation between aging and motivated cognitive control (chapter 5) do not provide 
evidence for a causal role. When one wants to assess whether a region is crucial for a given 
function, the consequences of manipulating this region or its associated circuit is required. 
To assess whether the striatum was indeed crucial for successful integration of reward and 
task-switching signals, I aimed to disrupt processing in the ventral striatum in rodents. One 
challenge was the absence of a suitable paradigm to measure this effect in rodents. Paradigms 
in rodents often assess whether they can learn to flexibly adapt their behaviour, based on trial-
and-error learning (i.e. without the use of cues) (Ragozzino et al., 1999). Further, although 
rewards are generally used to reinforce behaviour, the amount of reward an animal anticipates 
is often not directly manipulated, at least not on tasks measuring behavioural flexibility. To 
overcome this issue, I first developed a rodent homologue of the rewarded task-switching 
paradigm (chapter 6). Next, I applied excitotoxic lesions (box 2.5) to the rodent striatum 
(i.e. the nucleus accumbens core) to assess whether it is crucial for optimal integration of 
reward information and cognitive processes (chapter 6). The results in chapter 6 showed 
reward-related improvements in cognitive flexibility in animals with an intact striatum, but 
not in those with lesions of the striatum. Together the results so far are in line with the role for 
striatal dopamine in motivated cognitive control. However, in chapter 1 we hypothesized that 
communication between the prefrontal cortex and the striatum may also be important for 
motivated cognitive control. More specifically, we hypothesized that signals in the prefrontal 
cortex might control activity in the striatum in a top-down manner. 
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Prefrontal control of striatal processing
In chapter 7 this idea was tested by assessing whether processing in the prefrontal cortex can 
alter processing of motivated cognitive control in the striatum (chapter 1). 
In humans, we can manipulate neural signalling by using non-invasive brain stimulation 
(transcranial magnetic stimulation; TMS; box 2.5). This technique can only target regions 
near the skull, but previous work has shown that neuronal excitability in regions connected 
to the stimulated region can also be affected. For example, stimulation of the motor cortex 
can alter dopamine signalling in the putamen (figure 2.1: blue) (Strafella et al., 2003; van 
Schouwenburg et al., 2012), and this technique thus provides a way by which we can target 
the striatum after stimulation of a cortical region in human subjects. Using this technique in 
healthy young human subjects, I aimed to assess the nature of the interactions between the 
cortex and the striatum. In chapter 7, I therefore used TMS to temporarily decrease neural 
signalling in three regions of the cortex (figure 2.1). More specifically, I used this technique 
to target the cortical regions involved in reward processing, cognitive control (task switching) 
and action (response switching) (figure 2.1). Combined with fMRI (box 2.4), this enabled 
me to assess whether stimulation of the cortex could indeed modulate processing in the 
striatum in a task-specific way. Based on anatomical work (chapter 1), we hypothesized that 
changing the excitability of the part of the prefrontal cortex involved in reward processing 
(the anterior prefrontal cortex; figure 2.1: orange) would affect processing in the part of 
the striatum implicated in reward processing (figure 2.1: orange). In addition, in line with 
the idea that information transfer between corticostriatal circuits is crucial for adaptive 
behaviour, we hypothesized that changing processing in the anterior prefrontal cortex could 
change processing. 
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Box 2.5 | Revealing causal effects 
One way to alter neuronal excitability in humans is by means of applying non-invasive 
brain stimulation, or transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (chapter 7). TMS uses 
electromagnetic induction to generate electrical currents in the brain to alter neuronal 
excitability. Applying TMS over a cortical region can either increase or decrease neuronal 
excitability, depending on a number of factors. One important factor is the type of protocol 
used for stimulation. While single-pulse TMS depolarizes neurons under the coil, causing 
single action potentials, repetitive TMS (rTMS) can have longer-lasting excitatory (e.g. 
5Hz, 10Hz, or intermittent theta burst stimulation; iTBS) or inhibitory (e.g. continuous 
theta burst stimulation; cTBS) effects (Huang et al., 2005; Wischnewski and Schutter, 
2015). Previous work using neurochemical positron emission tomography (PET) imaging 
has shown that applying rTMS over the frontal cortex can cause changes in dopamine 
release in the striatum (Strafella et al., 2003; Ko et al., 2008). Subsequent work has shown 
effects of frontal rTMS in the amygdala, striatum, and cortical regions distant from the 
stimulation site, using fMRI (e.g. (Volman et al., 2011; van Schouwenburg et al., 2012; 
Hanlon et al., 2013; Zandbelt et al., 2013). Work in rodents has confirmed that stimulation 
of the cortex can increase dopamine release in the striatum by directly measuring dopamine 
concentrations using microdialysis (Taber and Fibiger, 1993). Importantly, rodent work 
has shown that the effects of iTBS crucially depend on midbrain dopamine (Hsieh et 
al., 2015). This was revealed by showing that the excitatory effects of iTBS (reflected by 
increased motor evoked potentials) are blocked in animals with dopamine lesions in the 
substantia nigra. 
Another way to assess whether a region is necessary for a given function is by studying 
subjects with brain lesions. Overstimulation of the glutamatergic N-methyl-D-aspartate 
(NMDA) receptor can induce cell death. NMDA lesions are therefore commonly used to 
apply excitotoxic lesions (chapter 6) of a given brain region in rodents. Using stereotaxic 
surgery, we can lower an injection needle into the striatum and infuse the excitotoxic into 
the brain (Kirby et al., 2012). Next, we can compare animals with lesions to those without 
any damage (i.e. typically the animals in this group will undergo sham surgery, whereby 
saline instead of the excitotoxic compound is infused during surgery).
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In summary, genetic imaging work and work in patients with Parkinson’s disease (chapter 
1) has suggested a role for striatal dopamine in motivated cognitive control. A role for the 
dopamine D2 receptor in flexible updating of task demands has been suggested while reward 
processing has been associated with both dopamine D1 and D2 receptor signalling. In 
addition, inter-individual differences in response to pharmacological manipulations can be 
explained by taking into account the baseline state of the dopamine system. The role of specific 
dopamine receptor-types in motivated cognitive control has thus far not been assessed, nor 
have dopamine or the striatum been directly manipulated to assess their role in motivated 
cognitive control. One way by which reward may influence motivated cognitive control is by 
modulating the mechanism by which the prefrontal cortex and striatum communicate. 
The work presented in this thesis aimed to address three primary questions. First, it aims to 
elucidate which specific dopamine receptor is involved in motivated cognitive control. Second, 
the role of the striatum is further assessed by directly manipulating the striatum and testing 
whether it is crucial for motivated cognitive control. Third, I aimed to provide evidence for 
the idea that prefrontal modulation can change striatal processing during motivated cognitive 
control. Finally, in chapter 8 I will recap the results and provide an interpretation of the 
finding presented in this thesis. 
In short, the aim of the studies presented in this thesis was to increase our understanding 
of the neural mechanisms that allow prospective rewards to alter our ability to exert 
cognitive control. More specifically, the experiments in this thesis aim to elucidate the role 
for striatal dopamine and the corticostriatal network during the integration of reward 
and flexible cognitive control.
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Dopamine D2 receptors and cognitive flexibility
Chapter 3
Human cognitive flexibility depends on 
dopamine D2 receptor signalling
Based on: van Holstein M.*, Aarts E.*, van der Schaaf M.E., Geurts D.E., Verkes R.J., Franke B., 
van Schouwenburg M.R., Cools R. (2011) Human cognitive flexibility depends on dopamine 
D2 receptor signaling. Psychopharmacology (Berl) 218:567-578. * = shared 1st author
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Abstract
Accumulating evidence indicates that the cognitive effects of dopamine depend on the 
subtype of dopamine receptor that is activated. In particular, recent work with animals as 
well as current theorizing has suggested that cognitive flexibility depends on dopamine D2 
receptor signalling. However, there is no evidence for similar mechanisms in humans. We aim 
to demonstrate that optimal dopamine D2 receptor signalling is critical for human cognitive 
flexibility. To this end, a pharmacological pre-treatment design was employed. This enabled 
us to investigate whether effects of the dopamine receptor agonist bromocriptine on task-set 
switching were abolished by pre-treatment with the D2 receptor antagonist sulpiride. To 
account for individual (genetic) differences in baseline levels of dopamine, we made use of 
a common VNTR polymorphism in the 3’-untranslated region of the dopamine transporter 
gene, DAT1. Bromocriptine improved cognitive flexibility relative to placebo, but only in 
subjects with genetically determined low levels of dopamine (n = 27). This beneficial effect 
of bromocriptine on cognitive flexibility was blocked by pre-treatment with the selective 
dopamine D2 receptor antagonist sulpiride (n = 14). These results provide strong evidence 
in favour of the hypothesis that human cognitive flexibility implicates dopamine D2 receptor 
signalling.
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Introduction
Adequate adaptation to our environment requires a range of behavioural control processes, 
such as reinforcement learning, incentive motivation, working memory, and task switching. 
Brain dopamine has been most commonly implicated in working memory (Lyon and Robbins, 
1975; Cools, 1980; Oades, 1985) and in reward-related processes, including reinforcement 
learning and incentive motivation (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Schultz, 2002; Daw et al., 
2005; Baldo and Kelley, 2007). However, there is considerable evidence that dopamine is also 
critical for other control processes, such as task switching. This evidence comes mainly from 
work with experimental animals (Cools, 1980; Floresco et al., 2006b; Haluk and Floresco, 
2009) (for a review, see Oades, 1985; Redgrave et al., 1999; Floresco and Magyar, 2006), drug 
administration and candidate gene studies in healthy volunteers (Mehta et al., 1999; Cools 
et al., 2007a; Stelzel et al., 2010) as well as medication withdrawal studies in patients with 
Parkinson’s disease (Cools et al., 2001a, b, 2003). 
Accumulating evidence indicates that these cognitive effects of dopamine depend on the 
subtype of dopamine receptor that is activated (Seamans and Yang, 2004; Frank and O’Reilly, 
2006; Frank and Fossella, 2011). In particular, recent in vivo work with animals (Floresco et al., 
2006b; Floresco and Jentsch, 2011) as well as in vitro and theoretical work (Bilder et al., 2004; 
Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008) implicates the dopamine D2 receptor family in task switching. 
For example, in rodents, blockade of dopamine D2 receptors in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
impaired strategy set shifting, while leaving unaltered performance on working memory tasks 
(Floresco et al., 2006b). According to the dual-state theory put forward recently by Durstewitz 
and Seamans (Seamans and Yang, 2004; Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008), PFC networks can 
be either in a D1-dominated state, which is characterized by a high energy barrier favouring 
robust stabilization of representations, or in a D2-dominated state, which is characterized by 
a low energy barrier favouring fast flexible switching between representations. Consistent 
with this proposal are findings that dopamine D2 receptor agonists act in opposite ways to 
dopamine D1 receptor agonists, at least in vitro, on NDMA and GABA currents, neuronal 
excitability as well as on cyclic AMP production (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008) with 
dopamine D2 receptor stimulation inducing reduction in NMDA currents and GABAergic 
inhibition. 
The hypothesis that dopamine D2 receptor stimulation is important for task switching is 
corroborated by findings in humans that the dopamine D2 receptor antagonist sulpiride 
impaired performance on task-set switching (Mehta et al., 2004). However, according to 
current standards in animal pharmacology (Feldman et al., 1997), more direct claims about 
the receptor mechanisms of drug effects can be made based only on the observation that 
the action of a receptor agonist is blocked by pre-treatment with a receptor antagonist; an 
approach that has been rarely adopted in human research. Here, we provide stronger evidence 
for a role of dopamine D2 receptor action in cognitive flexibility by adopting such a pre-
treatment design in young healthy volunteers. Specifically we demonstrate that an effect of 
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the dopamine receptor agonist bromocriptine on cognitive flexibility was abolished by pre-
treatment with the dopamine D2 receptor antagonist sulpiride.
Cognitive flexibility was assessed using the task switching paradigm (Rogers and Monsell, 
1995). Unlike traditional measures of cognitive flexibility, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test (Grant and Berg, 1948) or indeed any other set switching paradigm with a rule learning 
component, this paradigm minimizes demands for learning and working memory. It requires 
the ability to switch rapidly, based on external cues, between already well-established task-
sets (stimulus-response mappings). Adequate performance does not depend on feedback or 
trial-and-error learning, and the acquisition of task-sets is a rapid learning process, where 
the formation of associations between stimuli (i.e. the word ‘left’) and responses (i.e. a left 
button press) does not require extensive training. After the acquisition of task-sets in practice 
blocks, switches can be rapidly performed and measured under time-pressure. Moreover, task 
switches are externally cued, which reduces the load on working memory. Therefore, the task-
switching paradigm is relatively specific for measuring task switching. 
One challenge to dopaminergic drug research is that there is large variability across different 
individuals, with only some people benefiting from the drug, thus obviating an effect across 
the population as a whole (Cools and Robbins, 2004; Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). We know 
that at least some of this variability reflects variation in baseline levels of dopamine (Mattay et 
al., 2003; Cohen et al., 2007; Cools et al., 2009b). For example, high-impulsive subjects (who 
likely exhibit low baseline dopamine function (Dalley et al., 2007; Buckholtz et al., 2010)) are 
more sensitive to the beneficial effect of dopaminergic drugs on task switching and reversal 
learning than are low-impulsive subjects (Cools et al., 2007a). Moreover, dopaminergic 
drugs like bromocriptine, amphetamine and methylphenidate have diametrically opposite, 
beneficial and detrimental effects in subjects with low and high working memory capacity 
respectively (Mattay et al., 2000). The hypothesis that this individual variability reflects 
variation in baseline levels of dopamine was strengthened by three recent observations. First, 
working memory capacity correlates positively with dopamine synthesis capacity in the 
striatum, as measured with neurochemical positron emission tomography (Cools et al., 2008). 
Second, dopaminergic drug administration was shown to have opposite effects in individuals 
with high and low dopamine synthesis capacity (Cools et al., 2009b). Finally, dopaminergic 
drug administration was shown to have opposite effects as a function of individual genetic 
variation in dopamine transmission (Cohen et al., 2007; Mattay et al., 2003). Based on these 
observations, we predicted that the dopamine receptor agonist bromocriptine would improve 
task switching, but only in those individuals with low baseline levels of dopamine. 
One way to assess differences in baseline levels of dopamine is by taking into account 
individual genetic differences. For example, using the same task-switching paradigm, we 
previously showed that performance and task-related striatal BOLD responses depended on 
individual variability in the dopamine transporter (DAT) gene, which has been associated 
with differences in gene expression in the striatum (e.g., Heinz et al., 2000; Fuke et al., 2001; 
Mill et al., 2002; VanNess et al., 2005) (but see van Dyck et al., 2005). Moreover, these effects 
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were independent of the catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) gene (Aarts et al., 2010), 
which codes for the enzyme that degrades DA primarily in the PFC. Therefore, we took into 
account individual differences in baseline dopamine function by making use of a common 
variable number of tandem repeat (VNTR) polymorphism in the 3’-untranslated region of 
the DAT gene (DAT1/SLC6A3).
We anticipated that subjects with genetically determined lower levels of dopamine as measured 
with the DAT1 genotype would show the greatest effect of bromocriptine on task switching. 
Finally, we predicted that an effect of bromocriptine would be blocked by pre-treatment with 
the selective dopamine D2 receptor antagonist sulpiride.
Materials and methods
Subjects 
Initially, 55 subjects were recruited through advertisements on the campus. DAT1 genotype 
was available for 49 subjects, and one subject was excluded because of an ADHD diagnosis. The 
resulting 48 subjects were right-handed, speaking Dutch fluently and European Caucasians 
(24 male and 24 female, mean age 21.58 years, range 18-27). They were compensated for 
participation and gave written informed consent in a manner approved by the local ethics 
committee on research involving human subjects.
Screening and inclusion
All subjects were screened before inclusion by a medical doctor and a research nurse; this 
included the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.) (Sheehan et al., 1998) 
and a physical examination for weight, heart rate, blood pressure, and an electroencephalogram, 
to exclude major psychiatric, neurological or medical illness including substance abuse at the 
time of testing. One subject had a history of anorexia nervosa, but was treated successfully 
three years prior to this study and was therefore not excluded.
General procedure
Subjects were asked to abstain from alcohol and nicotine 24 hours before testing and from 
caffeine on the day of testing. All subjects consumed a light breakfast before ingestion of the 
drugs. At the start of each session, subjects were asked about their current medical status and 
their compliance with the above mentioned restrictions.
Experimental Design
Subjects performed a pre-cued task-switching paradigm (figure 3.1) with a reward 
manipulation. The task is described extensively elsewhere (Aarts et al., 2010).
Subjects had to respond to incongruent arrow-word combinations, either by responding to 
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the direction of the arrow or the direction indicated by the word (“left” or “right”). As in 
previous work (Aarts et al., 2010), we included only incongruent trials because the switch 
cost is largest in the presence of response conflict, which is evoked more by incongruent 
than congruent targets (Aarts et al., 2009). Before each trial, a task-cue appeared indicating 
according to which task (arrow or word) the subject had to respond. Compared with the 
previous trial, the task either changed unpredictably (from arrow to word or vice versa; switch 
trial), or remained the same (repeat trial). The critical measure of interest, the switch cost, 
was calculated by subtracting performance [error rate (%) and response time (ms)] on repeat 
trials from that on switch trials.
Given our prior observation that effects of individual variability in striatal dopamine on task 
switching are potentiated under conditions of high incentive motivation (see also Baldo and 
Kelley, 2007; Aarts et al., 2010), we also manipulated reward anticipation by presenting high 
and low reward cues prior to the task cue. The reward-cue informed the subjects whether 
1 cent (low reward) or 10 cents (high reward) could be earned with a correct and quick 
response. Immediately following the response, feedback was given (e.g., “correct! 10 cents”). 
There was a variable interval between the reward-cue and the task-cue of 1 to 2 seconds. 
Subjects responded with their index fingers on a left or right button box.
The main experiment consisted of 160 trials and lasted ~ 30 minutes with a 30 second break 
RC interval
CT interval
reward cue
task cue
target
feedback
response
word
10 cent
TRIAL 4
high reward
task switch
le
le right 
correct!
 10 cent
incorrect!
0 cent
TRIAL 3
low reward
task repeat 
arrow
le
1 cent
le right 
correct!
 1 cent
incorrect!
0 cent
TRIAL 2
low reward 
task switch 
1 cent
arrow
right
le right 
correct!
1 cent
incorrect!
0 cent
TRIAL 1
(discarded)
10 cent
word
le
correct!
10 cent
le 
incorrect!
0 cent
right
Figure 3.1  Example trials from the experimental paradigm
In the first trial, the reward cue indicated that the subject could earn 1 cent with a correct and sufficiently 
quick response (as opposed to 10 cents in the second trial). The task-cue indicated that the subject 
should respond to the arrow of the incongruent arrow-word Stroop-like target in the first trial, but to 
the word of the incongruent arrow-word Stroop-like target in the second trial. Hence, the second trial is 
an example of a switch of the task relative to the previous trial. 
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after every 32 trials. In the break, the amount of money the subject earned thus far was 
displayed on the screen and subjects were told in advance the total amount would be added to 
their financial compensation as a bonus.
Pharmacological procedure
All 48 subjects were tested at least twice: once after an oral dose of the dopamine receptor 
agonist bromocriptine (Parlodel ®, Novartis; 1.25 mg) and once after a placebo. In addition, 
a subgroup (n = 14) received placebo or bromocriptine after pre-treatment with placebo or 
the dopamine D2 receptor antagonist sulpiride (Dogmatil ®, Sanofi – Aventis; 400 mg) on 
two other occasions. The order of administration of the two or four sessions was randomized 
according to a double-blind, placebo-controlled crossover design. The sessions were always 
separated by at least one week. The doses described here have been used before in similar 
psychopharmacological studies and have been shown to be well tolerated by subjects (Mehta 
et al., 2004; Cools et al., 2007a). Sulpiride or placebo was administered 30 minutes prior to 
bromocriptine or placebo.
The task was performed ~4 hours after sulpiride or placebo intake and ~3.5 hours after 
bromocriptine or placebo intake. Time of dosing was optimized for detecting drug effects 
during functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) that took place immediately prior 
to the experiment reported here (data to be published elsewhere). The timing of the fMRI 
sessions was based on prior studies showing behavioural effects at similar doses and at similar 
time points in healthy volunteers (Luciana et al., 1992; Kimberg et al., 1997; Luciana and 
Collins, 1997; Mehta et al., 2001; Mehta et al., 2003; Mehta et al., 2004; Gibbs and D’Esposito, 
2005b, a; Cools et al., 2007a; Mehta et al., 2008). Mean time to maximal plasma concentration 
of sulpiride is about 3 hours, with a plasma half-life of about 12 hours (Mehta et al., 2003), 
while mean time to maximal plasma concentration of bromocriptine is about 2.5 hours with a 
plasma half-life of about 7 hours (Deleu et al., 2002). The combination of plasma kinetics and 
physiological effects shows that the time of testing coincided with high plasma concentrations 
of both bromocriptine and sulpiride (supplementary results: table S3.1).
A session started either at 8.00, 8.30 or 10.30 AM and starting time was kept identical between 
each subject’s two or four sessions. Blood pressure, heart rate, mood measures [visual analogue 
scales; 16 ratings on a scale of 0-100 (Bond and Lader, 1974)] and blood samples (6 ml) were 
taken immediately after arrival of the subject and on average 73.1 (sd: 45.4) min minutes 
before the task was performed. Blood samples were used to determine the change in prolactin 
levels due to dopamine D2 receptor binding (Fitzgerald and Dinan, 2008) (supplementary 
material and methods).
Neuropsychological assessment
On the day of screening, subjects completed a number of questionnaires, including the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; (Beck et al., 1961), Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; (Patton 
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et al., 1995), State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; (Spielberger et al., 1970)), and Listening 
span (Daneman and Carpenter, 1980; Salthouse et al., 1991) (supplementary materials and 
methods). Verbal IQ was determined using Dutch Adult Reading Test, (DART) the Dutch 
version of the National Adult Reading Test (Schmand et al., 1991).
Genotyping
All molecular genetic analyses were carried out in a CCKL-certified laboratory at the 
department of Human Genetics of the Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre. DNA 
was isolated from saliva samples using Oragene kits (DNA Genotek Inc, Ottawa, Ontario, 
Canada). Genotyping of the 40 base pair variable number of tandem repeats (VNTR) 
polymorphism in the 3’ untranslated region of the SLC6A3/DAT1 gene encoding the DAT 
was performed as follows. Genomic DNA (100 ng) was amplified with 0.2 µM fluorescently 
labelled forward primer (5’-Ned-TGTGGTGTAGGGACGGCCTGAGAG-3’) and 0.2 µM 
reverse primer (5’-CTTCCTGGAGGTCACGGCTCAAGG-3’) with PIG tail, 0.25 mM 
dNTPs, 0.4 U AmpliTaq Gold DNA polymerase (Applied Biosystems, Nieuwerkerk a/d 
Ijssel, The Netherlands) in an PCR Optimized buffer D, (Invitrogen, Breda, The Netherlands) 
containing 10% DMSO (v/v). Cycling conditions were 12 min 95 °C followed by 35 cycles 
of 1 min 94°C, 1 min 58°C and 1 min 72°C, and a final 5 min at 72°C. PCR products were 
diluted 10 times and 1 µl of the diluted PCR product together with 9.7 µl formamide and 0.3 µl 
GeneScan-600 Liz Size StandardTM (Applied Biosystems) was analyzed on an 3730 Genetic 
Analyzer (Applied Biosystems) according to the protocol of the manufacturer. Analysis of 
the length of the PCR products was performed with Genemapper software. To investigate the 
random genotyping error rate, the lab included 5% duplicate DNA samples, which had to be 
100% consistent. In addition, 4% blanks were included, which were required to be negative.
Most of the participants (except three) took part in the study before their genotype was 
determined. After their participation, three groups of genotypes were established: a group 
homozygous for the common 10-repeat allele (10R/10R) (n = 27, mean age: 21.7 + 2.2, 12 
female), a group homozygous for the 9-repeat allele (9R/9R) (n = 7), and a group of 9R/10R 
heterozygotes (n = 14). The 9R/9R and 9R/10R subjects were combined into one group of 9R 
carriers (n = 21, mean age: 21.4 + 1.9, 12 female). Three 10R homozygotes of this sample were 
selected from an existing genetic database at the centre. Of the subgroup of participants who 
received four instead of two drug sessions, we only included data from the 10R homozygotes 
(n = 14; mean age: 21.9 + 2.4, 6 females), because these were the participants showing an effect 
of bromocriptine in the larger sample.
The DAT removes dopamine from the synapse into the pre-synaptic neuron (Willeit and 
Praschak-Rieder, 2010), thereby terminating its action. The 10-repeat allele has been 
associated with increased gene expression and presumably lower levels of synaptic dopamine 
in the striatum relative to the 9-repeat allele (e.g., Heinz et al., 2000; Fuke et al., 2001; Mill et 
al., 2002; VanNess et al., 2005) (but see van Dyck et al., 2005).
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Statistical analyses
The mean latencies of the correct responses and the proportion of errors were analyzed using 
a repeated-measures general linear model (GLM) with the within-subjects factors Reward, 
Switching, Drug and the between-subjects factor DAT1 genotype group. A similar ANOVA 
with Order (of drug administration: the order of bromocriptine and placebo in the large 
sample, or the order of all four drug sessions in the subgroup) as a covariate of no interest 
revealed no relevant interaction effects with Order (i.e., Order x Drug x Switching: F(1, 25) 
< 1; F(1, 12) < 1) for any of the reported Drug -by- Switching interactions. Accordingly, the 
ANOVA was run without this additional factor. Effects of sulpiride (pre)treatment were 
assessed for the group that showed an effect of bromocriptine (i.e. the 10R homozygotes). The 
first trial of each block was eliminated from analyses as they were neither switch nor repeat 
trials (five trials per subject).
To investigate whether drug effects reflected a form of learning rather than task switching, 
we also assessed learning curves for each subject, i.e. switch costs as a function of time 
(supplementary results: learning effect). 
Prolactin and mood ratings (three factors: contentedness, alertness, and calmness, according 
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Figure 3.2  Bromocriptine improved task switching in 10R homozygotes
The switch cost (switch – repeat) in terms of error rate (percent) differed between the two genotype 
groups: Bromocriptine reduced the switch costs in the 10R homozygotes (n = 27; with relatively lower 
levels of striatal dopamine), but not in the 9R carriers (n = 21). These results indicate that the effect of 
bromocriptine on task switching depends on baseline levels of striatal dopamine. Error bars represent 
the standard error of the difference between switch and repeat trials.
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to Bond and Lader (1974) see supplementary results) were available for 46 subjects. For each 
session we calculated the drug-induced change in prolactin and mood ratings (after - before 
drug intake) and compared this with the placebo-induced change [difference score = (drug 
session (Time2 –Time1)) – (placebo session (Time2 – Time1))] (supplementary results: 
table S3.1 + mood measures). Pearson correlations were calculated, in the 10R homozygotes, 
between trait anxiety (STAI), trait impulsivity (BIS-11), depression (BDI), listening span 
scores, bromocriptine-induced mood changes, bromocriptine-induced prolactin changes and 
bromocriptine-induced changes in task switching. 
Results
Genetic variation predicts the effect of bromocriptine on task switching
All 48 subjects performed the pre-cued task-switching paradigm after receiving a placebo or 
the dopamine receptor agonist bromocriptine (1.25 mg).
Under placebo, there was no difference in terms of task switching between the DAT1 
genotype groups [error rates; Switching x DAT1: F(1,46) < 1]. However, consistent with our 
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Figure 3.3  Sulpiride abolished the effect of bromocriptine
Shown is the switch cost (switch – repeat) in error rate (percent) for the 10R homozygotes (n = 14) 
who received pre-treatment with sulpiride, as well as bromocriptine and sulpiride alone. In this smaller 
group, bromocriptine also reduced the switch cost relative to placebo. However, when the same subjects 
received sulpiride pre-treatment, bromocriptine no longer facilitated task switching. Error bars represent 
the standard error of the difference between switch and repeat trials.
57
Dopamine D2 receptors and cognitive flexibility
prediction, bromocriptine improved task switching: The proportion of errors on switch trials 
relative to repeat trials (i.e. the error switch cost) was reduced after bromocriptine relative 
to placebo in subjects with genetically determined low striatal dopamine levels (i.e. the 
DAT1 10R homozygotes; n = 27) [Drug x Switching: F(1,26) = 5.4, p = .028]. This effect was 
driven by a combination of improvement on switch trials and impairment on repeat trials 
(supplementary results: table S3.2b). By contrast, there was no effect of bromocriptine on 
task switching in the DAT1 9R carriers (n = 21), who presumably have higher levels of striatal 
dopamine [Drug x Switching: F(1,20) < 1] (figure 3.2; supplementary results: table S3.2a). 
None of these effects were found in terms of response times (all p > .2) (supplementary 
results: table S3.2a; supplementary discussion). 
Effect of bromocriptine on task switching is blocked by sulpiride pre-treatment
To investigate whether the beneficial effect of bromocriptine on task switching in the 10R 
homozygotes was mediated by stimulation of dopamine D2 receptors, we assessed the effect 
of bromocriptine after blocking the dopamine D2 receptors with sulpiride (400 mg) in a 
subgroup of the 10R homozygotes (n = 14). First we tested whether the reduced switch cost 
after bromocriptine administration was still present in this smaller group. Again, we found that 
bromocriptine reduced the error switch cost relative to placebo [Drug x Switching: F(1,13) = 
5.6, p = .034], an effect that again reflected a combination of improved switching and impaired 
repeat performance (supplementary results: table S3.2c). As anticipated, blocking the 
dopamine D2 receptors by pre-treatment with sulpiride abolished the effect of bromocriptine 
relative to placebo [Drug x Switching: F(1,13) < 1]. Sulpiride by itself, relative to placebo, had 
no effect on task switching [F(1,13) < 1] (figure 3.3; supplementary results: table S3.2c and 
figure S3.2; [Bromocriptine (on/off) × Sulpiride (on/off) × Switching: F(1, 13)=3, p = .1]. 
None of these effects were present in the response times (all p > .3) (supplementary results: 
table S3.2c; supplementary discussion). 
Effects of motivation on task switching vary as a function of genetic variation, but are not 
modulated by bromocriptine
Our previous study (Aarts et al., 2010) revealed beneficial effects of incentive motivation on 
task switching. Specifically, switch costs were reduced when subjects anticipated high reward, 
relative to when they anticipated low reward. However, this effect was restricted to subjects 
with genetically determined high levels of striatal dopamine (i.e., the 9R carriers). Here we 
replicate this effect in an independent sample: irrespective of drug, task switching varied 
as a function of anticipated reward and DAT1 genotype. The 9R carriers showed a larger 
response time benefit of anticipated reward on switching than did the 10R homozygotes 
(supplementary results: figure S3.1 and supplementary discussion) [Reward x Switching 
x DAT1: F(1,46) = 5.3 , p = .026]. 
However, contrary to our expectations, we observed no difference in terms of this effect 
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between the bromocriptine and placebo session. [Reward x Switching x DAT1 x Drug: F(1,46) 
= 1.5, p > .1], [Reward x Switching x Drug: F(1,46) < 1]. The degree to which reward affected 
performance irrespective of task switching [main effect Reward: response time: F(1,46) = 
19.4, p < .001; error rate: F(1,46) = 20.6, p < .001] was also not modulated by bromocriptine 
(error rate and response time: [Reward x Drug: F(1,46) < 1], [Reward x Drug x DAT1: F(1,46) 
= 1.6 , p > .2]).
Neuropsychological assessments
There were no differences between the two DAT1 genotype groups in term of age, gender, IQ, 
trait impulsivity (BIS-11), depression (BDI), trait anxiety (STAI) or working memory capacity 
(listening span; all p > .2) (supplementary results: table S3.3a), and there were no significant 
correlations between any of these trait measures and drug-induced changes in performance 
(all p > .2).
Listening span
Working memory capacity (measured with listening span; Daneman and Carpenter 1980, 
Salthouse and Babcock 1991) has been associated with striatal dopamine synthesis capacity 
(Cools et al., 2008) Moreover, previous studies have shown that dopaminergic drug effects 
can be predicted from working memory capacity (Luciana et al., 1992; Kimberg et al., 1997; 
Luciana and Collins, 1997; Mehta et al., 2001; Mehta et al., 2003; Mehta et al., 2004; Gibbs 
and D’Esposito, 2005b, a; Cools et al., 2007a; Mehta et al., 2008). Accordingly, we assessed 
drug effects as a function of listening span. To this end, we divided the group into low-span 
participants (n = 23) and high-span participants (n = 25), using a median-split analysis 
(supplemental table S3.3b). Consistent with prior work, and like the 10R DAT1 genotype 
group, the low-span group was sensitive to the beneficial effects of bromocriptine on task-
switching (Drug x Switching: F(1,22) = 4.457, p = .046). Conversely, the high-span group was 
not sensitive to the effect of bromocriptine (Drug x Switching: F(1,24) < 1), similar to the 
DAT1 9R group (Drug x Switching x Span: F(1, 46) = 1.2, p > .2). Moreover, in the subgroup 
of low-span participants that took part in all four drug sessions, bromocriptine also reduced 
the switch cost (Drug x Switching F(1,9) = 5.466, p = .044), an effect that was not present after 
pre-treatment with sulpiride (Drug x Switching: F(1,9) < 1) nor after sulpiride alone (F(1,9) 
= 1.06, p = .33). 
Effects of drugs on mood ratings and prolactin levels
Participants reported no drug-induced changes in mood in the large sample (all p > .3) or in 
the subgroup (all p > .05). There were also no significant correlations between drug-induced 
changes in task performance and drug-induced changes in mood (all p > .3)
Furthermore, bromocriptine decreased plasma prolactin levels relative to placebo, whereas 
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sulpiride increased plasma prolactin levels relative to placebo (supplementary results: 
table S3.1). These data evidence the opposite effects of the two drugs in vivo. The finding 
that the prolactin response was not nullified in the combined sulpiride and bromocriptine 
session (sulpiride versus sulpiride and bromocriptine: t (21) = -.279, p = .783) likely reflects 
the fact that sulpiride was administered prior to bromocriptine. The effect of sulpiride was 
disproportionately large, thus masking any subsequent effect of bromocriptine.
Discussion 
The present results show that the dopamine receptor agonist bromocriptine improved task 
switching by stimulating dopamine D2 receptors. Specifically, bromocriptine reduced the 
error switch cost in individuals with genetically determined low dopamine levels, and this 
beneficial effect of bromocriptine on task switching was abolished by pre-treatment with the 
selective dopamine D2 receptor antagonist sulpiride. This finding significantly strengthens 
prior evidence (Mehta et al., 2004; Floresco et al., 2006b; Cools et al., 2007a; Durstewitz and 
Seamans, 2008; Stelzel et al., 2010) for a role of dopamine D2 receptor signalling in task 
switching, thus further establishing a role for dopamine outside the domains of working 
memory and learning in humans. In particular, the data concur with the dual-state theory 
put forward recently by Durstewitz and Seamans (Seamans and Yang, 2004; Durstewitz and 
Seamans, 2008), which is grounded in in vitro neurophysiology and biophysically realistic 
computational modelling work (see introduction). According to this theory, dopamine 
D2 receptor stimulation favours fast flexible switching between different task-relevant 
representations, by allowing multiple inputs to impinge simultaneously on the PFC. It also fits 
with data from animal studies showing that genetic over-expression of striatal dopamine D2 
receptors (Kellendonk et al., 2006) and  abnormal increases in dopamine D2 receptor activity 
in the rodent striatum alters strategy set shifting in rodents (Haluk and Floresco, 2009). 
It might be noted that the present finding that the beneficial effect of bromocriptine on 
task switching was blocked by pre-treatment with sulpiride highlights the role of dopamine 
D2 receptor signalling in task switching, but does not directly rule out the involvement of 
dopamine D1 receptor signalling or the importance of synergistic action between dopamine 
D1 and D2 receptor signalling in task switching. Indeed rodent work suggests that both 
dopamine D1 and D2 receptor signalling are important for cognitive flexibility (Floresco et 
al., 2006b). The conclusion that task switching implicates dopamine D2, but not D1 receptor 
signalling would require demonstration that effects of bromocriptine were not blocked by 
a dopamine D1 receptor antagonist. Unfortunately, there is a relative lack of dopamine D1 
selective drugs available for human research, and accordingly, such a demonstration will have 
to await future developments. 
An interesting feature of current dual-state theory is that the beneficial effect of dopamine D2 
receptor stimulation on task switching might be accompanied by a detrimental effect on the 
stabilization of current task-relevant representations. This hypothesis is corroborated here by 
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the observation (as well as our prior observation; (Cools et al., 2007a)) that the drug effect on 
the switch cost was driven by a combination of better performance on switch trials, and poorer 
performance on repeat trials (supplementary results: table S3.2a and b). Indeed performance 
on repeat trials would suffer from poor stabilization of task-relevant representations. It also 
concurs with previous findings in humans that the dopamine D2 receptor antagonist sulpiride 
impaired performance on task-set switching, but, by contrast, improved performance on a 
delayed response task that required the stabilization of representations in the face of task-
irrelevant distraction (Mehta et al., 2004).
Unlike this prior study (Mehta et al., 2004), we here failed to uncover a significant task- 
switching impairment after administration of sulpiride. This is surprising, not only given 
that prior finding, but also given our observation that sulpiride did block the beneficial effect 
of bromocriptine on task switching. There are a number of possible explanations for this 
discrepancy. First, there might have been a difference between the two studies in terms of 
the time of testing after drug intake. Our task switching data were acquired approximately 
four hours after drug intake, while (Mehta et al., 2004) started testing already 90 minutes 
after drug intake. Dopamine D2 receptor occupancy after sulpiride administration, measured 
approximately two hours after intake is relatively modest (Mehta et al., 2008). Accordingly 
dopamine D2 receptor occupancy after four hours might have been insufficient to exert an 
effect on its own, even though it was clearly sufficient to block the effects of bromocriptine. 
A second possibility is that it is particularly difficult to demonstrate impairment using the 
present version of the task-switching paradigm, where subjects were constantly encouraged 
and motivated to perform as well as they could by means of monetary incentive. Thus the 
paradigm might simply not have been sensitive to detecting impairment (as opposed to 
improvement). In any case, there is one major interpretational advantage of our failure to 
find an impairment after administration of sulpiride by itself; indeed, this feature of the 
data implies that the effect of bromocriptine was blocked rather than masked (or averaged 
out) by an effect of sulpiride, thus strengthening our conclusion that dopamine D2 receptor 
stimulation is essential for bromocriptine to enhance task switching performance.
The baseline-dependent effects of bromocriptine on task switching resemble previously 
observed effects of bromocriptine on reward learning and working memory (Cools et al., 
2007a; Cools et al., 2009b). For example, we have previously shown that beneficial effects 
of bromocriptine on reward learning are greatest in subjects with low dopamine synthesis 
capacity (Cools et al., 2009b). Similarly, we have also shown that beneficial effects of 
bromocriptine on task switching were restricted to high-impulsive subjects (Cools et al., 
2007a), with impulsivity being associated with low baseline dopamine function (Dalley et al., 
2007; Buckholtz et al., 2010). 
One possible mechanism underlying this enhanced beneficial effect of dopamine receptor 
stimulation in low dopamine subjects is enhanced postsynaptic receptor function. Indeed the 
dopamine system is highly plastic and regulates itself to maintain equilibrium, partly through 
changes in transporter and receptor density/function. The DAT1 10R subjects are thought to 
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be characterized by high dopamine transporter density, which is associated with enhanced 
uptake of dopamine from the synapse and thus reduced remaining levels of dopamine in 
the synapse. Following the rules of homeostasis, such low synaptic dopamine levels might 
well be accompanied by increased postsynaptic dopamine receptor function. Increased 
postsynaptic receptor function would compensate for the reduced synaptic dopamine levels, 
thus contributing to the maintenance of equilibrium in overall dopamine function. In other 
words, enhanced receptor function might represent a self-regulatory or compensatory 
mechanism aimed at maintaining homeostasis, i.e. optimal functioning of the low-dopamine 
system. In this context, the lack of a DAT1 effect on task switching at baseline (under placebo) 
is not surprising, because any dopamine-dependent function including task switching 
should depend on a combination of synaptic dopamine levels and receptor function. Indeed 
high- and low dopamine groups have been observed to perform similarly under placebo 
in a number of previous studies (Kimberg et al., 1997; Cools et al., 2007a). Critically, this 
enhanced postsynaptic receptor function might underlie the disproportional response of low 
dopamine subjects to dopamine receptor stimulation. Thus the significant effect of dopamine 
receptor stimulation with bromocriptine in the 10R, but not the 9R group is not surprising, 
given these presumed hyper-functioning dopamine receptors. 
Our finding that bromocriptine did not impair subjects with higher baseline levels of 
dopamine (i.e. the 9R carriers) was somewhat surprising given prior observations that 
subjects with already optimized levels of dopamine can be impaired by dopaminergic drug 
administration (although see Cools et al., 2007a; e.g. Cools et al., 2009b). Such detrimental 
effects of dopaminergic drug administration have been accounted for by inverted-U shaped 
relationships between dopamine receptor stimulation and cognitive performance, whereby 
both too much as well as too little dopamine leads to poor performance. Our finding that 
the 9R carriers were not impaired accordingly might reflect their positioning near, but not 
quite yet at the optimum of the so-called inverted-U shaped curve (Cools and Robbins, 2004; 
Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). However, the obvious alternative hypothesis relates to our 
failure to obtain an effect of sulpiride; the paradigm might simply not be sensitive to detecting 
impairment, perhaps due to high levels of incentive motivation induced by the reward cues 
that preceded each trial. According to this alternative hypothesis, subjects with high basal 
levels of dopamine will exhibit impairment after bromocriptine on a task that does not involve 
monetary reward. 
Task switching has most often been associated with the PFC (Monsell, 2003; Aron et al., 2004; 
Derrfuss et al., 2005; Sakai, 2008) and traditionally, cognitive effects of dopamine are ascribed 
to modulation of the PFC. However, recent theories as well as empirical data have highlighted 
a complementary role for (dopamine in) the striatum (Braver and Cohen, 2000; Frank et 
al., 2001; Cools et al., 2004; Lewis et al., 2004; Leber et al., 2008; McNab and Klingberg, 
2008). Specifically, recent computational work has emphasized the role of dopamine in 
the striatum in the updating of current task-relevant representations (Hazy et al., 2006). 
The suggestion that the striatum is well suited to serve the gating mechanism that updates 
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current task-relevant representations in the PFC concords with a rapidly growing body of 
data from functional neuroimaging and animal studies on working memory (Collins et al., 
2000; Dahlin et al., 2008; McNab and Klingberg, 2008; Dodds et al., 2009; Marklund et al., 
2009). Furthermore, it also concurs with empirical data from human imaging and animal 
studies showing (effects of dopamine D2 receptor manipulations on) striatal involvement 
during shifting (Lyon and Robbins, 1975; Oades, 1985; Collins et al., 1998; Cools et al., 2003; 
Cools and Robbins, 2004; Floresco and Magyar, 2006; Kellendonk et al., 2006; Cools et al., 
2007b; Cools et al., 2007a; Dodds et al., 2008; Leber et al., 2008; Clatworthy et al., 2009; Haluk 
and Floresco, 2009; Aarts et al., 2010; van Schouwenburg et al., 2010). For example, we have 
recently shown, using dynamic causal modelling of fMRI data that activity in the striatum 
may regulate task switching by modulating (or ‘gating’) connectivity between the PFC and 
task-relevant representations in posterior cortex (van Schouwenburg et al., 2010). While we 
do not rule out the involvement of the PFC in the present study (see e.g. Stelzel et al., 2010), 
both the DAT and dopamine D2 receptors are most abundant in the striatum (Camps et al., 
1989; Ciliax et al., 1999; Hurd et al., 2001). However, the finding that effects of bromocriptine 
are DAT- and dopamine D2-dependent, strongly implicates the striatum. This observation 
also concurs with previous work with patients with Huntingon’s disease (Aron et al., 2003b), 
Parkinson’s disease (Cools et al., 2001b, a) and focal basal ganglia lesions (Cools et al., 2006). 
In sum, our findings strengthen evidence in favour of the hypothesis that dopamine D2 
receptor signalling is important for task switching, with prior evidence suggesting that this 
effect is mediated by the striatum. The data also illustrate the need to take into account 
genetic variation in baseline levels of striatal dopamine when predicting drug effects. Finally, 
although the sample size was rather small, this study emphasizes the value of employing the 
pre-treatment approach in humans and future studies might adopt this approach to enable 
replication and extension of the present results. 
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Supplementary material
Supplementary materials and methods
Blood samples for prolactin
Secretion of the hormone prolactin is inhibited by dopamine D2 receptor stimulation in 
a dose dependent manner. In order to measure the level of prolactin in blood plasma and 
thereby ascertain the effects of the drugs, we drew blood twice during each of the sessions. 
After centrifugation, the sample concentrations were labelled with a participant code, study 
day number, state monitoring number, date and time of blood sampling and stored. Plasma 
prolactin levels were determined by an electrochemiluminescence immunoassay on a 
Modular E170 Analyzer (Roche Diagnostics) by Prof Fred Sweep and Rob van den Berg at the 
Laboratory for Endocrinology of the UMC Nijmegen.
Neuropsychological assessment
Working memory capacity was measured using the Dutch version of the listening span task 
(Salthouse et al., 1991). Subjects listened to sets of two to seven sentences while answering 
written questions about the content of each sentence. They then turned the page and wrote 
down the last word of each sentence. There are three trials at each level and the span represents 
the maximum number of last words that were remembered correctly on at least two out of 
three trials (for more details, see (Salthouse et al., 1991)). In this case, recall of final words was 
scored irrespective of recall-order. 
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Supplementary discussion
There was no effect of bromocriptine as a function of reward (see main results). At first 
sight, this might seem surprising given current literature about dopamine’s role in reward 
processing. However, bromocriptine has particularly high affinity for the dopamine D2 
receptor (Deleu et al., 2002). Accordingly, it remains possible that dopamine D2 receptor 
signalling is not critical for the effects of motivation in the present task. This hypothesis is in 
keeping with current theorizing implicating primarily the dopamine D1 receptor in reward 
processing (Frank, 2005). 
In order to stress subjects to respond as fast as possible, the response deadline was very strict, 
possibly causing a floor effect. This might have hampered the improvement of performance 
in terms of response times on bromocriptine vs. placebo, explaining the absence of any drug-
effects on response times. 
 Table S3.1 Effects of drugs on prolactin levels 
Blood samples were used to determine prolactin values before drug intake and approximately 2.25 hours after 
bromocriptine intake and 2.75 hours after sulpiride intake (see methods). All drug-induced changes in prolactin 
values were significantly different from that during the placebo session. Moreover, we observed no correlations 
between drug -induced prolactin levels and drug-induced switching performance (all p > .7)  
 
Drug 
 
 
Bromocriptine 
Sulpiride &
Bromocriptine Sulpiride 
Mean (s.e.d.) difference from placebo  
(df = 45) - 130.9 (19.9) 
**   
 
Mean (s.e.d.) difference from placebo  
(df= 13) 
 
-99.6  (24) * 
 
2010 (259) ** 
 
1964.3 (259.3) ** 
* = p < .002, ** = p < .001 
s.e.d. = standard error of the difference between drug and placebo 
Sulpiride & bromocriptine versus sulpiride: t (13) = - 0.27, p = .79 
	
Table S3.2a Mean response times and error rates on reward and switching for the 
DAT1 9R carriers (n = 21) 
  
High reward 
 
Low reward 
 
  Repeat Switch Repeat Switch 
Placebo  
Errors (%) 
(s.e.m.) *, 1 
8.27 
(1.45) 
12.21 
(1.52) 
9.29 
(1.58) 
16.28 
(2.06) 
RT (ms) 
(s.e.m.) +, 2 
344.17 
(11.58) 
348.6 
(12.59) 
350.78 
(14.25) 
358.97 
(13.58) 
Bromocriptine  
Errors (%) 
(s.e.m.) *, 3 
7.52 
(1.5) 
12.25 
(1.61) 
11.22 
(1.96) 
15.93 
(1.69) 
RT (ms) 
(s.e.m.) + 
361.3 
(11.82) 
356 
(11.9) 
360.21 
(11.83) 
368.97 
(14.97) 
s.e.m. = standard error of the mean 
Significant effects: 
* Main effect of reward: F(1,20) = 19, p < .001], main effect of switching: F(1,20) = 32.3, p < .001 
1 switching: F(1,20) = 40.7, p < .001; reward: F(1,20) = 5.1, p < .04; 2 switching:  F(1,20) = 7.4, p < .02 
3 switching: F(1,20) = 13.1, p < .002; reward: F(1,20) = 14.9, p < .001 
+ Main effect of reward: F(1,20) = 6.4, p < .02 
65
Dopamine D2 receptors and cognitive flexibility
Supplementary results
	Table S3.2b Mean response times and error rates on reward and switching for 
the DAT1 10R homozygotes (n = 27) 
  
 
High reward 
 
Low reward 
  Repeat Switch Repeat Switch 
Placebo 
Errors (%) *, 1 
(s.e.m.) 
8 
(1.20) 
11.8 
(1.38) 
8.21 
(1.23) 
14.1 
(1.74) 
RT (ms) +, 3 
(s.e.m.) 
320.89 
(6.4) 
325.36 
(6.81) 
327.2 
(6.85) 
329.88 
(7.45) 
Bromocriptine  
Errors (%) *, 2 
(s.e.m.) 
9.95 
(1.46) 
11.12 
(1.42) 
11.71 
(1.53) 
13.30 
(1.83) 
RT (ms) +, 4 
(s.e.m.) 
319.36 
(8.91) 
322.97 
(9.85) 
330.93 
(9.79) 
328.75 
(10.07) 
s.e.m. = standard error of the mean 
Significant effects: 
* Main effect of  switching: F(1,26) = 19.9, p < .001; main effect of reward: F(1,26) = 4.9, p < .04;     
  drug*switching: F(1,26) = 5.4, p < .0.3 
1 main effect of switching: F(1,26) = 25.5, p < .001; 2 main effect of reward: F(1,26) = 6.9, p < .02 
3 main effect of reward:  F(1,26) = 6.4, p < .02; main effect of switching: F(1,26) = 4.4, p <. 05 
4 main effect of reward: F(1,26) = 13.7, p < .002; + main effect of reward:  F(1,26) = 15.1, p<.001 
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	Table S3.2c Mean response times and error rates on reward and switching for the 
subgroup of 10R homozygotes who received sulpiride (pre)-treatment (n = 14) 
   
High reward 
 
 
Low reward 
 
  Repeat Switch Repeat Switch 
Placebo  
Errors (%) 
(s.e.m.) *, 1 
9.66 
(1.58) 
15.68 
(1.74) 
9.59 
(1.82) 
17.41 
(2.37) 
RT (ms) 
(s.e.m.) + 
319.14 
(10.17) 
320.42 
(11.24) 
323.25 
(10.4) 
327.7 
(12.03) 
Bromocriptine  
Errors (%) 
(s.e.m.) * 
12.09 
(2.11) 
13.32 
(1.63) 
13.39 
(2.16) 
16.06 
(2.32) 
RT (ms) 
(s.e.m.) +, 2 
305.36 
(8.39) 
310.98 
(9.29) 
316.62 
(10.32) 
317.95 
(10.58) 
Sulpiride  
Errors (%) 
(s.e.m.) 3 
9.29 
(1.76) 
13.14 
(1.87)  
13.37 
(2.53) 
18.73 
(2.64) 
RT (ms) 
(s.e.m.) 
323.67 
(12.73) 
329.18 
(14.88) 
326.08 
(12.47) 
335.54 
(15) 
Sulpiride - bromocriptine  
Errors (%) 
(s.e.m.) 4 
13.69 
(2.61) 
17.21 
(2.82) 
15.39 
(2.91) 
22.19 
(3.04) 
RT (ms) 
(s.e.m.) 
310.61 
(11.39) 
312.35 
(10.47) 
316.71 
(11.98) 
315.77 
(12.04) 
s.e.m. = standard error of the mean 
Significant effects: 
* Main effect of switching: F(1,13) = 22.1, p < .001], drug * switching: F(1,13) = 5.6, p < .04 
+ Main effect of reward  F(1,13) = 7.6, p < .02;  
1 main effect of switching F(1,13) = 24.4, p < .001;  
2 Main effect of reward  F(1,13) = 7.8, p < .02;  
3 main effect of switching: F(1,13) = 5.1, p < .05; main effect of reward: F(1,13) = 19.7, p < .001;  
4 main effect switching F(1,13) = 9.6, p < .009 
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Figure S3.1  Dopamine-dependent motivation-cognition interaction
Shown here is the switch cost (switch – repeat) in terms of response times for the two genotype groups. In 
contrast to the 10R homozygotes (n = 27), the 9R carriers (n = 21; with relatively higher levels of striatal 
dopamine) exhibited decreased switch costs under high relative to low reward [Reward x Switching x 
DAT1: F(1,46) = 5.3, p = .026].  Bars represent the standard error of the difference between switch and 
repeat trials. We did not find these effects in the error rates [Reward x Switching x DAT1: F(1,46) < 1].
Learning effect
This paradigm was designed to measure set switching and effects of incentive motivation by 
monetary reward.  To assess whether the observed drug effects on set switching reflect a form 
of learning, we analyzed drug effects as a function of time. Specifically, we binned the data in 
eight successive bins of 20 trials each, and looked at the interaction between Switching, Drug 
and Time. We found no learning effects across the two DAT1 genotype groups [Switching x 
Drug x Time: F (7,40) < 1], in the 10R homozygotes [Switching x Drug x Time: F (7,19) < 1], 
or in the 9R carriers [Switching x Drug x Time: F (7,14) = 1.74, p > .1]. 
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Figure S3.2 a-c 
Shown are mean and individual switch costs (switch - repeat) in terms or error rates, from a) the placebo 
compared with the bromocriptine session, b) the placebo compared with the sulpiride session, and c) 
the placebo compared with the bromocriptine after sulpiride pre-treatment session. 
	Table S3.3a Neuropsychological assessment for two DAT1 
genotype groups 
  
DAT1 genotype 
  9R Carriers 
 
10R Homozygotes 
n 21 27 
Age (mean + s.d.) a 21.4 + 1.9 21.7 + 2.2 
DART*-score (mean + s.d.) a 104.1 + 8.8 104.1 + 10.2 
Females: n (%) c 12 (57.1 %) 12 (44.4 %) 
BIS-11 total (mean + s.d.) b 64.5 + 10.4 64.3 + 7.5 
BDI (mean + s.d.) a 2.5 + 2.3 2.3 + 2.7 
Listening span (mean + s.d.) a 5.5 + 1.2 5.4 + 1.3 
STAI (mean + s.d.) a 32.1 + 5.7 29.9 + 6.5 
a) F(1,46) < 1.2, p > .2;  b) F(1,43) < 1, p > .9;  c) χ²(1) < 1, p > .3 
* DART = Dutch Adult Reading Test, verbal IQ measure. 
The two genotype groups did not differ in terms of age, IQ, gender, Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11), Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), listening span and 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). 
	
Table S3.3b Demographics in low and high listening span groups 
 Listening Span 
 Low High 
n 23 25 
Age (mean + s.d.) a 21.5 + 1.8 21.6 + 2.3 
DAT1 10R genotype: n (%) c 11 (47.8 %) 16 (64 %) 
DART*-score (mean + s.d.) a 104.8 + 9.9  103.4 + 9.4 
Females: n (%) c 12 (52.2 %) 12 (48 %) 
BIS-11 total (mean + s.d.) b 65.6 + 9.8 63.2 + 7.7 
BDI (mean + s.d.) a 2.6 + 2.4 2.2 + 2.6 
STAI (mean + s.d.) a 30.8 + 5.3 30.8 + 7 
Listening span score < 5 > 5 
a) F(1,46) < 1;  b) F(1,43) < 1;  c) χ²(1) < 1.3, p > .3; * DART = Dutch Adult Reading Test, 
verbal IQ measure. The two listening span groups did not differ in terms of age, DAT1 
genotype, IQ, gender, Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11), Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), 
and State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). 
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Chapter 4
Reward modulation of cognitive function 
in adult ADHD
Based on: Aarts E. *, van Holstein M. *, Hoogman M., Onnink M., Kan C., Franke B., 
Buitelaar J., Cools R. (2015) Reward modulation of cognitive function in adult attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder: a pilot study on the role of striatal dopamine. Behav Pharmacol 
26:227-240.
 * = shared 1st author
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Abstract
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is accompanied by impairments in 
cognitive control, such as task-switching deficits. We investigated whether such problems, 
and their remediation by medication, reflect abnormal reward motivation and associated 
striatal dopamine transmission in ADHD. We employed functional genetic neuroimaging 
to assess effects of dopaminergic medication and reward motivation on task switching and 
striatal BOLD signal in 23 adults with ADHD ON and OFF methylphenidate and 26 healthy 
controls. Critically, we took into account inter-individual variability in striatal dopamine 
by exploiting a common genetic polymorphism (3’-UTR VNTR) in the DAT1 gene coding 
for the dopamine transporter. Results revealed a highly significant group by genotype 
interaction in the striatum. This was due to a subgroup of patients with ADHD exhibiting 
greatly exaggerated effects of reward on striatal BOLD signal during task switching when 
they were OFF their dopaminergic medication. Specifically, patients carrying the 9R allele 
showed greater striatal signal than healthy controls carrying this allele, while no effect of 
diagnosis was observed in 10R homozygotes. Aberrant striatal responses were normalized 
when 9R-carrying patients with ADHD were ON medication. These pilot data demonstrate 
an important role for aberrant reward motivation, striatal dopamine and inter-individual 
genetic differences in cognitive processes in adult ADHD.
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Introduction
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is characterized by symptoms of inattention, 
impulsivity and/or hyperactivity (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2013). Although 
originally considered a childhood disorder, ADHD persists into adulthood in quite a number 
of cases, and affects between 2.5 and 4.9% of the adult population (Kooij et al., 2005; Kessler 
et al., 2006; Polanczyk et al., 2007; Simon et al., 2009). A first-line treatment option for ADHD 
is prescription of psychostimulant medication, primarily the dopamine and noradrenaline 
transporter blocker methylphenidate.
ADHD is associated with a wide range of cognitive control deficits that span the domains of 
attention, response inhibition, working memory and task switching (Barkley, 1997; Bush et 
al., 1999). Such cognitive control deficits have been attributed most commonly (albeit not 
exclusively; see Cortese et al., 2012) to (dorsal) prefrontal cortex dysfunction (Dickstein et 
al., 2006; Cubillo et al., 2010; Dibbets et al., 2010; McCarthy et al., 2014). And accordingly, 
effects of methylphenidate on cognitive control deficits in ADHD are thought to reflect action 
(i.e. increasing synaptic levels of dopamine and noradrenaline) in the prefrontal cortex (Aron 
et al., 2003a; Berridge et al., 2006; Schmeichel et al., 2013) (for a review see Arnsten and Li, 
2005). In addition to cognitive control deficits, ADHD is accompanied by processing deficits 
in the domains of reward and motivation (Sergeant et al., 2003; Sonuga-Barke, 2003; Scheres 
et al., 2007; Furukawa et al., 2014). Unlike the cognitive control deficits, these reward-related 
deficits are often attributed to changes in the ventral striatum (Ströhle et al., 2008; Plichta 
et al., 2009; Hoogman et al., 2011; Carmona et al., 2012; Volkow et al., 2012; Hoogman et 
al., 2013; Plichta and Scheres, 2014), as is the modulation of reward-related processing by 
methylphenidate (Dodds et al., 2008). Indeed, besides acting on noradrenaline transporters, 
methylphenidate acts by blocking dopamine transporters, which are more abundant in the 
striatum than in the prefrontal cortex (Volkow et al., 1995; Ciliax et al., 1999).
The observation that both cognitive control deficits and reward-related deficits contribute 
to ADHD concurs with the dual pathway model of AHD, according to which two subtypes 
of ADHD exist with different developmental pathways, underpinned by different neural 
circuits and modulated by different branches of the dopamine system (Sonuga-Barke, 2002, 
2003, 2005; for more recent models see Durston et al., 2011; de Zeeuw et al., 2012). More 
specifically, disturbances in the executive mesocortical dopamine circuit, encompassing 
the dorsal striatum, dorsomedial thalamus and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, underlie 
cognitive deficits in ADHD whereas motivational deficits are grounded in disturbances in the 
mesolimbic reward circuit, including the ventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex. Here we 
approach the issue from a different angle by asking whether cognitive task-related processing 
deficits and their remediation by methylphenidate reflect indirect modulation of motivation 
and reward-related processing in the striatum rather than direct modulation of prefrontal 
processing. This question is grounded in current neuroanatomical and neurochemical 
models that emphasize a hierarchical arrangement of spiraling striatonigrostriatal loops 
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allowing directional interaction between motivational and cognitive circuits (Haber et al., 
2000; Haber, 2003; Ikeda et al., 2013). Furthermore, it concurs generally with a large body 
of work showing that striatal dopamine is important not just for motor control but also 
for cognitive functioning (e.g. Cools et al., 1984). Moreover, it follows directly from work 
showing that methylphenidate-induced changes in striatal dopamine release can contribute 
to cognitive (attentional) symptoms in ADHD (Glow and Glow, 1979; Volkow et al., 2012). 
The hypothesis also concurs with observations that cognitive deficits in children with ADHD 
can be remediated by increases in motivation (Konrad et al., 2000; Slusarek et al., 2001; Uebel 
et al., 2010), although inconsistent findings have been reported as well (Oosterlaan and 
Sergeant, 1998; Desman et al., 2008; Shanahan et al., 2008; Karalunas and Huang-Pollock, 
2011). None of these studies, however, speak to the neural mechanisms of such motivational 
effects and their modulation by methylphenidate. 
Here we aimed to assess whether cognitive task-related processing deficits in adult ADHD can 
be a function of reward-related striatal functioning by using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). To index reward effects on cognitive task-related processing, we employed 
a rewarded task-switching paradigm that we previously established to be sensitive to - and 
reveal its effect only when taking into account - changes in striatal dopamine transmission 
(Aarts et al., 2010; for a review see Aarts et al., 2011; Aarts et al., 2012; Aarts et al., 2014a; see 
also Aarts et al., 2014b). 
One major challenge for studies aiming to isolate dopaminergic drug effects is that 
such dopaminergic drug effects vary greatly across different individuals as a function of 
(genetically determined) baseline levels of dopamine (Verheij and Cools, 2008; Cools and 
D’Esposito, 2011; van Holstein et al., 2011). Prior work suggests the possibility that the effects 
of methylphenidate surface only by taking into account such inter-individual differences 
(Clatworthy et al., 2009), for example by exploiting known common polymorphisms in 
dopamine genes. Here we stratify our sample by inter-individual variation in the 40-bp 
variable number of tandem repeats (VNTR) polymorphism in the 3’ untranslated region 
(3’-UTR) of the dopamine transporter (DAT) gene (DAT1, SLC6A3). This is based on 
several lines of evidence, suggesting an important role for the dopamine transporter in the 
pathophysiology of ADHD. The dopamine transporter is the main mechanism responsible 
for clearing extracellular dopamine in the striatum. Genetic variation of the DAT1 gene 
might lead to inter-individual variation in the availability of dopamine transporters and 
subsequently in dopamine levels. Although it has remained inconclusive in the literature 
which allele leads to decreased dopamine transporter availability (Costa et al., 2011; Faraone 
et al., 2013), genetic fMRI studies have consistently demonstrated the 9-repeat allele to be 
associated with increased striatal reward responses (Dreher et al., 2009; Forbes et al., 2009; 
Aarts et al., 2010). Furthermore, methylphenidate exerts its action in the striatum by blocking 
the dopamine transporter (Volkow et al., 1998; Volkow et al., 2002), mice that lack the DAT 
(i.e. DAT1 knock-out mice) exhibit ADHD-like behavior (Giros et al., 1996; Gainetdinov et al., 
1999), and several dopaminergic genes, including the DAT1 genotype have been implicated in 
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ADHD (Faraone et al., 2005; Brookes et al., 2008; Franke et al., 2008; for a review, see Durston 
et al., 2009; Gizer et al., 2009; Franke et al., 2010). 
In summary, in this pilot study we tested the hypothesis that effects of reward motivation on 
task switching and striatal BOLD signal vary as a function of DAT1 genotype adult patients 
with ADHD, when they were ON relative to OFF their methylphenidate regimen, compared 
with healthy controls.
Methods
Participants 
We present data from 23 patients with ADHD (mean + SE age 35.74 + 2.36; 14 men) and 
26 healthy control participants (mean + SE age 38.08 + 2.00; 11 men). Patients visited our 
centre on two occasions, once after intake of methylphenidate and once after withdrawal 
from methylphenidate. Healthy controls were also tested on two occasions, without any 
methylphenidate (procedure). 
Initially we recruited 57 participants (29 patients with ADHD and 28 healthy controls) from 
an ongoing study on ADHD and genetics, IMpACT-NL (Hoogman et al., 2011; Hoogman et 
al., 2013; Onnink et al., 2014; www.impactADHDgenomics.com), in which they were tested 
extensively, genotyped, and diagnosed (table 4.1). Patients were included if they met DSM-
IV-TR criteria for ADHD in childhood as well as adulthood. All participants were assessed 
using the Diagnostic Interview for Adult ADHD (Kooij and Francken, 2007). The Structured 
Clinical Interviews for DSM-IV (SCID-I and SCID-II) were administered. Assessments were 
carried out by trained professionals (psychiatrists or psychologists). In addition, a quantitative 
measure of clinical symptoms was obtained using the ADHD rating scale-IV (Kooij et al., 
2005). Exclusion criteria for participants were alcohol or substance addiction in the last 6 
months, current psychosis, manic episodes, obsessive compulsive disorder or eating disorders 
(assessed using SCID-I), full-scale IQ estimate < 70 (assessed using the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-III), neurological disorders, sensorimotor disabilities, and non-Caucasian 
ethnicity. An additional exclusion criterion for healthy comparison subjects was a current or 
past neurological or psychiatric disorder according to SCID-I.
Three patients did not complete the testing sessions. Two patients were excluded because they 
did not follow instructions regarding methylphenidate withdrawal and/or intake (procedure) 
and one because of excessive head movement. One healthy control participant was excluded 
from analysis due to suboptimal quality of the structural data leading to normalization 
difficulties, and one for meeting the criteria for an ADHD diagnosis according to the ADHD 
rating scale-IV (Kooij et al., 2005) (neuropsychological assessment). Hence, 23 patients with 
ADHD and 26 healthy controls were included in the final analyses.
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All patients had a current prescription of methylphenidate [either immediate-release 
(Ritalin®; N = 5; mean + SD 44 + 22.74 mg per day), or sustained release (Concerta®; N = 18; 
mean + SD 48.5 + 21.19 mg per day), three of them occasionally took Ritalin® in addition to 
Concerta®]. All participants were native speakers of Dutch. Participants were compensated 
for participation and gave written informed consent in a manner approved by the local ethics 
committee on research involving human participants (CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen 2009/058, 
NL27180.091.09). 
Procedure
All participants were asked to abstain from alcohol on the day of testing and from nicotine 
and caffeine at least one hour before arriving at the centre. The patients were tested once OFF 
(i.e. withdrawn from Ritalin® for 24 hours and from Concerta® for 48 hours before testing) 
and once ON methylphenidate, (i.e. after intake of (mean + SD) 13.15 mg + 5.55 of Ritalin®, 
the equivalent of (mean + SD) 0.16 + 0.05 mg/kg body weight of Ritalin®, half an hour before 
arriving at the centre). Patients using sustained-release methylphenidate were prescribed 
an equivalent dose (instant dose (mg) = sustained dose (mg) * 0.278) of immediate-release 
methylphenidate by the psychiatrist (JB) for one day (3 doses a day). Three patients using 
additional medication (one antihistamine, and two SSRI’s) were asked to take the same dose 
on both sessions. The order of the ON and OFF session was approximately counterbalanced 
across participants (table 4.2). The healthy control group did not take methylphenidate, but 
was nevertheless tested twice to rule out order effects. Control data were averaged across the 
two sessions. Sessions were separated by at least one week and both sessions took place at 
approximately the same time of day. With the exception of medication state, the procedure 
was identical for both groups and both sessions. 
Cognitive task with reward manipulation
Participants were scanned while performing an established pre-cued task switching paradigm 
(figure 4.1, box 2.3) with a reward manipulation (Aarts et al., 2010; van Holstein et al., 2011; 
Aarts et al., 2012; Aarts et al., 2014a). The paradigm started approximately 60 minutes after 
arrival (mean + SD 91.8 + 16.1 minutes after drug intake). The task was programmed and 
presented using Presentation® 13 (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.).
Participants had to respond to incongruent arrow-word combinations, either by responding 
to the direction of the arrow or the direction indicated by the word (“left” or “right”). A 
task-cue appeared 400 ms before the target indicating the task (arrow or word) that the 
participant had to perform on the current trial. Relative to the previous trial, the task either 
changed unpredictably (from arrow to word or vice versa; switch trial), or remained the same 
(repeat trial). The critical measure of interest, the switch cost, was calculated by subtracting 
performance on repeat trials from that on switch trials. In addition, we manipulated reward 
motivation by presenting high and low reward cues prior to the task cue to assess the effect 
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of reward on task switching. The reward-cue informed the participants whether 1 cent (low 
reward) or 15 cents (high reward) could be earned with a correct and sufficiently quick 
response. Immediately after the response, feedback was given (e.g., “correct! 15 cents”). There 
was a variable interval between the reward-cue and the task-cue of 2 to 6 seconds. Participants 
used their right index and middle fingers to respond with a button box.
On both sessions, the task was practiced twice outside the scanner and once inside the 
scanner. The first practice block contained 24 trials with the task cue, target and feedback 
(“correct” / “incorrect”). As soon as participants succeeded to complete this block with less 
than 5 errors, the second practice block of 24 trials was performed, in which the reward cues 
were included. The third and final practice block was performed during the acquisition of the 
anatomical scan. The mean response times (RT) of the correct trials per trial-type (arrow-
repeat, arrow-switch, word-repeat, word-switch trials) in this third practice block were 
used as the response deadline in the main experiment. This ensured equal difficulty across 
participants and sessions. 
The main experiment consisted of 160 trials and lasted ~ 35 minutes with a 30 second break 
after every 32 trials. In the break, the amount of money the participant had earned thus far 
was displayed on the screen and participants were told in advance that the total amount would 
be added to their financial compensation as a bonus.
	
Table 4.2 ADHD characteristics 
 ADHD Statistics 
 9R carriers 10R/10R DAT1 effect 
First session ON MPH 6 / 50% 6 / 55% ns 
Ritalin dose ON 14.38 (1.80) 11.82 (1.39) ns 
Ritalin a 1 / 9% 4 / 33% ns 
Concerta dose 53.18 (6.91) 36.63 (7.20) ns 
Subtypes: DIVA b   ns 
 Combined 11 6  
 Inattentive 0 3  
 Hyperactive / impulsive 0 1  
a) Three of the Concerta® users (one 9R carrier) occasionally took 15 mg Ritalin® in addition to 
Concerta®; b) DIVA was not administered for one patient in each DAT1 group; 10R/10R = 10R 
homozygotes 
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Figure 4.1  Task-switching paradigm with reward manipulation
Participants were instructed to respond either to the direction indicated by the arrow (i.e. -> or <-) 
or to the direction indicated by the word (i.e. ‘left’ or ‘right’) with a left or right button press. The task 
performed on a particular trial either changed compared with the preceding trial (i.e. switch trial; arrow 
- word or word - arrow) or remained the same (i.e. repeat trial; arrow-arrow, word-word). In addition we 
manipulated the amount of anticipated reward (e.g. 1 Eurocent vs. 15 Eurocent) on a trial-by-trial basis 
by means of a reward anticipation cue. At the start of each trial this cue indicated the amount of reward 
on that trial providing a correct and sufficiently fast button press (see also Aarts et al. 2010 and box 2.3).
Neuropsychological assessment
During the first session, participants completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11a; 
Patton et al., 1995), a self-report trait measure of impulsivity. At the beginning of both sessions, 
participants completed the Bond and Lader (1974) visual analogue scale for a comparison of 
mood between sessions (16 moods rated on scale 0-100, resulting in 3 mood categories) and 
an ADHD symptom rating scale (Kooij et al., 2005) to assess self-reported ADHD symptoms. 
Motor speed was measured using the box completion task (Salthouse, 1996), sustained 
attention with the digit vigilance or number cancellation task (Lewis and Kupke, 1977), and 
verbal fluency with the begin letters D, A, and T (Spreen and Benton, 1977).
 
Genotyping
DNA was isolated from EDTA blood samples. Genotyping of the 40-bp VNTR in the 3’-UTR of 
SLC6A3/DAT1 was carried out as described before (Hoogman et al., 2013) at the department 
of Human Genetics of the Radboud university medical center. In line with previous studies 
reporting the effect of this variant, we established a group of carriers of the 9-repeat (9R) allele 
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(i.e. the risk factor for adult ADHD) and a group homozygous for the 10R allele (Colzato et al., 
2010b; Rokem et al., 2012) (table 4.1). We preselected our participants from a previous sample 
(Hoogman et al., 2013) to homogenize sample numbers per group (diagnosis x genotype) as 
much as possible. Therefore, Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium was not considered. 
In the ADHD group, 12 individuals were carriers of the 9R allele and 11 individuals were 
homozygous for the 10R allele (table 4.1). In the healthy control group, 10 individuals 
were carriers of the 9R allele and 16 individuals were homozygous for the 10R allele. We 
performed a power calculation in G*Power (http://www.gpower.hhu.de) based on the effect 
sizes obtained in an independent dataset using a similar rewarded task-switching paradigm 
and the same VNTR in the DAT1 gene in healthy volunteers (Aarts et al., 2010). The power 
calculation revealed that we would need at least 8 participants per group (four groups: 
genotype x diagnosis) to obtain significant effects of genotype on striatal BOLD responses 
during rewarded task switching (effect size = 0.78; α = 0.05; power (1 - ß) = 0.8). Currently, 
our smallest group consists of 10 participants.
Functional MRI data acquisition
Participants were scanned in a 3T MR scanner (Magnetom TrioTim, Siemens Medical Systems, 
Erlangen, Germany), using an 8-channel head coil. T2*-weighted images were acquired with 
a gradient echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (30 axial slices, repetition time = 2020 ms, 
echo time = 30 ms, voxel size = 3.5 x 3.5 x 3 mm, field of view = 224 mm, flip angle = 80°). 
All functional images were acquired in a single run. Stimuli were presented on a computer 
display projected onto a mirror attached to the head coil. The first 4 volumes were discarded 
to allow for T1 equilibrium. Before the acquisition of the functional images, a high-resolution 
T1-weighted MP-RAGE anatomical scan was obtained (192 sagittal slices, repetition time = 
2300 ms, echo time = 3.03 ms, voxel size = 1 x 1 x 1 mm, field of view = 256 mm).
fMRI statistical analyses
Data were pre-processed and analyzed using SPM5 (Wellcome Dept. of Cognitive Neurology, 
London). First, functional EPI images were spatially realigned and corrected for differences in 
slice acquisition timing. Structural and functional data were co registered and normalized to 
a standard anatomical space (Montreal Neurological Institute) using a unified segmentation 
procedure (Ashburner and Friston, 2005). The normalized images were smoothed with an 
isotropic 8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel. 
The pre-processed fMRI time series were analyzed at the first level using an event-related 
approach in the context of the GLM. Our statistical model on the first (subject-specific) level 
considered the factors Reward (high, low), Task (arrow, word), Task-switching (repeat, switch), 
and Feedback (correct-1cent, correct-15cents, error-0cents, too late-0cents). This resulted in 
21 regressors of interest: 2 regressors for Reward-cues, 8 regressors for Targets (Reward x Task 
x Task switching), and 4 regressors for Feedback. All regressors of interest were modeled as 
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a stick function (duration = 0) convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function. 
Additionally, breaks (duration of 30 seconds), 6 motion parameters, and their derivatives 
were modeled as regressors of non-interest. Finally, we included 3 regressors of non-interest 
to account for movement-induced intensity changes by using the mean time series from the 
segmented white matter, cerebral spinal fluid and out of brain signals (Majdandzic et al., 2007; 
Verhagen et al., 2008). High-pass filtering (128 seconds) was applied to the time series of the 
functional images to remove low-frequency drifts.
At the second level, the Reward x Task switching contrast images from the first level were 
used in three GLMs to assess the effects of Reward during Task switching: two models to 
assess the interaction with DAT1 Genotype and Diagnosis (HC versus ADHD OFF and 
ADHD ON versus HC), and one model to test the interaction with DAT1 genotype and 
Medication (ADHD ON versus ADHD OFF). Statistical inference (p < .05) was performed 
at the cluster level, correcting for multiple comparisons over the search volume (the whole 
brain). The intensity threshold necessary to determine the cluster-level threshold was set at 
p < .001, uncorrected. For each effect we report the t-values (t) at the voxel-level, the whole-
brain corrected p-values for the cluster (pcluster), and the size of the cluster (k). In addition, 
supplementary exploratory analyses were performed for which the uncorrected threshold was 
set to p < .001, and we report the t-values (t) and p-values (puncorr) at the voxel level.
Behavioral statistical analyses
We excluded the first trial of each block (5 trials in total), because these cannot be considered 
as either repeat or switch trials. All trials to which subjects responded (i.e. all trials except 
response omissions) were included in the analysis, even if the response was too late for a 
reward to be obtained. For the analysis of the mean RTs, we excluded the responses faster 
than 200ms. For each participant, we calculated the mean RTs for all the correct responses 
and the proportion of errors for each of the four conditions, i.e. Reward (high - low) x Task 
switching (switch - repeat). To maximize homogeneity of variances between groups and to 
assure normal distribution of the data, a natural logarithm (LN) transformation was applied 
to the mean RTs. The mean proportions of incorrect responses were transformed with the 
following formula: 2*arcsin√x (Sheskin 2003). Levene’s tests of homogeneity of variances and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality revealed that this transformation was successful in improving 
variance between groups and the distribution of the data.
Proportions or errors and mean RTs were analyzed using a repeated-measures general linear 
model (GLM) with the within-subjects factors Reward (high, low), Task switching (repeat, 
switch), the between-subject factor DAT1 genotype (9R carriers, 10R homozygotes), and 
either the between-subject factor Diagnosis (ADHD or healthy control) or within-subject 
factor Medication (ON, OFF). Effects were considered significant when p < .05.
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Statistical analysis of mood measures and neuropsychological tests
Mood values were calculated for each session and reduced to three factors: contentedness, 
alertness, and calmness, according to Bond and Lader (1974). Neuropsychological and 
demographic differences between groups or medication states and their interaction with the 
DAT1 genotype were tested using SPSS 21 with univariate or repeated measures GLM’s or their 
non-parametric counterparts (Wilcoxon signed rank or Mann-Whitney U tests, respectively; 
table 4.3). Non-parametric DAT1 Genotype x Medication interactions were assessed with a 
Mann-Whitney U test of the difference between the score OFF and ON Medication. Non-
parametric DAT1 Genotype x Diagnosis effects were assessed using the Kruskal-Wallis test 
(table 4.3). An effect was considered significant when p < .05. 
Results 
Functional MRI effects
Main task effects
Across groups and sessions, the cue indicating a high reward compared with the cue indicating 
a low reward elicited a robust response in regions in the striatum, in the frontal cortex and the 
occipital cortex (table 4.4). There was also a strong main effect of task switching during the 
targets, as evidenced by a greater response in frontal and parietal regions on switch compared 
with repeat trials (table 4.4). 
ADHD OFF versus healthy controls:
BOLD signal in the dorsal striatum varied highly significantly as a function of ADHD diagnosis 
(patients with ADHD OFF their medication versus healthy controls), DAT1 genotype (9R 
carriers vs. 10R homozygotes) and task (Reward x Task switching) (x, y, z = -20, 4, 16; t = 
4.92; p cluster < .001; k = 324; figure 4.2A-I). This finding concurs with our hypothesis that 
the effect of Reward on Task switching in the striatum would vary as a function of DAT1 
Genotype and Diagnosis (healthy controls compared with patients with ADHD). The striatal 
effect was due to greater task-related signal in patients with ADHD carrying the 9R allele 
compared with 9R carriers in the healthy control group (Reward x Task switching x Diagnosis 
in 9R carriers: x, y, z = -18, 2, 16; t = 4.90; p cluster = .001; k = 333) and greater task-related 
signal in the 9R carrying patients with ADHD compared with the 10R homozygous patients 
with ADHD (Reward x Task switching x DAT1 in patients with ADHD OFF Medication: x, y, 
z = -12, -4, 6; t = 4.96; p cluster = .002; k = 295). To illustrate this effect, we extracted the beta 
values from the cluster in the left dorsal striatum depicted in figure 4.2A-I and plotted the 
results in figure 4.2B. The only other significant neural difference between the ADHD group 
OFF Medication and the healthy control group was observed in the posterior cingulate cortex 
(Reward x Task switching x Diagnosis x DAT1: x, y, z = -6, -12, 46; t = 5.56; p cluster < .001; 
k = 338).
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Table 4.4 BOLD maxima across all subjects 
Main effect of Reward anticipation during cues and main effect of Task switching during targets at a whole-brain 
cluster-level corrected threshold of p < .05. 
 
Label Brodmann Side MNI coordinates 
Cluster 
size Significance t-value 
 
  L/R x y z (No. 
voxels) 
Cluster level peak 
Main effect Reward:  high > low reward        
 
Superior parietal lobe 
(B7) * 
7 L -16 -68 56 3126 p < .001 7.38 
 
Insular cortex (B13) * 
Extending into the 
striatum, pallidum and 
thalamus  
13 L+R 30 26 0 3468 p < .001 6.56 
 Cingulate gyrus (B32) * 32 L+R -4 12 40 3171 p < .001 6.24 
 Occipital lobe (B16) * 16 L -26 -94 12 352 p < .002 5.81 
 Cingulate gyrus (B23) * 23 L+R -4 -30 28 283 p < .005 5.43 
Main effect Reward: low > high reward        
 Inferior frontal gyrus 10 R 48 46 8 368 p < .002 6.29 
 
Posterior Cingulate: 
Precuneus 
31 L+R -6 -56 20 460 p < .001 4.76 
 Superior temporal gyrus 39 R 50 -60 26 248 p <  .01 4.42 
 Superior frontal gyrus 9 L 12 56 26 228 p <  .02 4.06 
Main effect Task switch: 
switch > repeat 
        
 precuneus (B7) * 7 L -24 -66 34 3289 p < .001 6.89 
 
inferior frontal gyrus 
(B9) * 
9 L -48 12 28 1675 p < .001 6.02 
 
middle frontal gyrus 
(B11) * 
11 L -24 48 -10 221 p < .018 5.43 
Main effect Task switch: 
repeat > switch 
        
 
Superior Temporal 
gyus 
41 R 56 -28 12 694 p < .001 4.72 
 Occipital lobe (cuneus) 19 R 14 -88 34 180 p <  .04 3.94 
 Superior temporal gyrus 41 L -44 -32 14 617 p < .001 3.90 
* also significant after FWE correction at the voxel level (p FWE < .05) 
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Brain activation: 
ADHD OFF vs. HC
Brain activation: 
ADHD OFF vs. ADHD ON
p-values
p < 0.001 (t > 3.28) cluster-level corrected
p < 0.005 (t > 2.69) uncorrected
p-values
p < 0.001 (t > 3.29) uncorrected
p < 0.005 (t > 2.69) uncorrected
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ADHD ON versus healthy controls & ADHD OFF versus ADHD ON:
 There was no longer an effect of diagnosis when comparing patients with ADHD ON 
medication with healthy controls, suggesting that the aberrant striatal response was restored 
by Medication. Although a direct comparison of the ON and OFF session (ADHD ON vs. 
ADHD OFF Medication) did not reach significance at our stringent threshold, exploratory 
analyses confirmed that task-related responses in the same region in the striatum were 
diminished for patients ON relative to OFF Medication, depending on DAT1 Genotype 
(Reward x Task switching x DAT1 x Medication: x, y, z = -20, 4, 16; t = 3.63; p uncorr < 
.001; figure 4.2A-II and 4.2B). This is generally in line with the hypothesis that the effect 
of methylphenidate and Reward motivation on Task switching would vary as a function of 
DAT1 Genotype and Medication status (patients with ADHD ON compared with OFF their 
Medication). 
Behavioral effects
Main task effects:
Participants responded more quickly after a high than a low reward (i.e. across groups, 
irrespective of diagnosis and genotype), as evidenced by a main effect of reward in terms of 
response times (RTs) (F(1,48) = 24.36; p < .001). Participants also responded more quickly on 
repeat than switch trials (main effect of task switching: F(1,48) = 24.91; p < .001). In addition, 
participants made more errors on switch than repeat trials (main effect of Task switching 
F(1,48) = 28.67; p < .001; table 4.5). 
ADHD OFF versus healthy controls
 There were no differences between the ADHD group OFF Medication and healthy controls in 
terms of RTs (figure 2C). However, the groups did differ in terms of the Reward effect (i.e. low 
- high reward) on error rates, across switch and repeat trials. This effect depended on DAT1 
genotype (Reward x Diagnosis x DAT1: F(1,45) = 5.56; p = .023): irrespective of task switching, 
the 10R homozygotes in the ADHD group made less errors on high than low reward trials 
Figure 4.2  Rewarded task switching as a function of DAT1 genotype in patients with 
ADHD ON and OFF their methylphenidate medication, relative to healthy controls (HC)
A-I: Increased dorsal striatal responses during rewarded task switching for patients with ADHD OFF 
methylphenidate relative to healthy controls, as a function of DAT1 genotype; A-II: Increased dorsal 
striatal responses during Rewarded Task switching for patients with ADHD OFF methylphenidate 
relative to when ON methylphenidate, as a function of DAT1 Genotype; B: The beta values from the 
whole-brain cluster-corrected cluster in the left striatum depicted in A-I, illustrating the direction of 
the effect; C: The response times during Rewarded Task switching. Positive values reflect an increased 
switch cost (i.e. slower on switch than on repeat trials) for high reward relative to low reward trials, i.e. a 
detrimental effect of reward on the switch cost. Error bars represent the standard errors of the difference 
between high reward (switch - repeat) - low reward (switch - repeat).
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relative to the 10R homozygotes in the healthy control group (Reward x Diagnosis in 10R 
homozygotes: F(1,25) = 7.03; p = .014; table 4.5), while there was no difference between the 
9R carriers in the ADHD group and the healthy 9R group. The critical effect of Reward on 
Task switching errors did not differ between the patients with ADHD OFF Medication and 
the healthy control group, also not as a function of DAT1 Genotype (the critical Reward x 
Task switching x Diagnosis x DAT1 interaction: error rates F(1,45) < 1; response times F(1,45) 
= 1.92; p > .1).
ADHD ON versus healthy controls
There were no differences between the ADHD group ON Medication and healthy controls in 
terms of RTs. Switch costs in error rates were significantly greater in the ADHD group ON 
Medication than in the healthy control group (Task switching x Diagnosis: F(1,45) = 6.44; p 
= .015). The critical effect of Reward on Task switching did not differ between the patients 
with ADHD ON Medication and the healthy control group, also not as a function of DAT1 
Genotype (the critical interaction between Reward x Task switching x Diagnosis x DAT1: 
error rates F(1,45) = 1.37; p > .1; response times F(1,45) < 1).
ADHD OFF versus ADHD ON
There was no significant difference between the two medication sessions in terms of RTs or 
errors rates. The critical DAT1 by Medication interaction in terms of Reward Task switching 
only trended towards significance for RTs (Reward x Task switching x Medication x DAT1: 
F(1,21) = 3.23; p = .087; figure 2C), and was absent for error rates (Reward x Task switching 
x Medication x DAT1: F(1,21) < 1).
In summary, unlike the brain data, the behavioral data did not reveal any significant effects of 
diagnosis or medication status and/or genotype on how anticipated reward influences task-
switching performance (i.e. Reward x Task switching effects). To assess whether the increased 
BOLD signal in the striatum of 9R-carrying patients with ADHD was accompanied, if 
anything, by behavioral impairment or improvement, we inspected the numerical (marginal 
trend) pattern in RTs (figure 2C). Disentangling this marginally significant effect (Reward 
x Task switching x Medication x DAT1: F(1,21) = 3.23; p = .087) revealed that 9R carrying 
patients OFF Medication tended to show a greater switch cost on high than low reward trials 
compared with these patients ON their Medication (Reward x Task switching x Medication 
in 9R carriers: F(1,11) = 4.40; p = .06; figure 2C). These data suggest that the increased dorsal 
striatal responses in patients with ADHD carrying the 9R allele are accompanied, if anything, 
by a detrimental effect of reward on Task switching that can be remediated by methylphenidate 
(figure 2B + 2C). 
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Demographic and neuropsychological data
Table 4.1 summarizes the demographic and neuropsychological data of the patients with 
ADHD and healthy controls for the two DAT1 Genotype groups. There was no difference 
between patients and healthy controls, or between the 9R-carrying and 10R-homozygous 
group in terms of age, IQ, gender, handedness, smoking status and education level (Table 
1), nor an interaction between Diagnosis and DAT1 Genotype. As expected, the patients 
with ADHD scored higher on the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (mean + SE: 73.00 + 2.58), 
i.e. they were more impulsive than the healthy controls (mean + SE: 59.27 + 1.54; t (47) = 
4.70; p <.001). There were no differences in current SCID Axis I disorders or SCID Axis II 
personality traits as a function of Diagnosis, DAT1 genotype, or Diagnosis x DAT1 Genotype. 
Counterbalancing of the ON and OFF sessions within the two DAT1 Genotype patient groups 
was successful: there was no difference between the two DAT1 groups in the number of 
subjects being ON Medication during the first session. Furthermore, there were no differences 
in the dose of Ritalin or Concerta between the DAT1 Genotype groups, nor in the number 
of patients usually taking either form of methylphenidate, or in their ADHD subtype (i.e. 
combined, inattentive or hyperactive/impulsive) (table 4.2).
Table 4.3 summarizes the mood scores and neuropsychological tests. Most importantly, there 
were no interactions between DAT1 genotype and either medication state (ON or OFF) or 
diagnosis on mood measures or on the neuropsychological tests. However, patients OFF 
medication were reportedly less content and less alert than healthy controls and compared 
with when they were ON medication (table 4.3; contentedness: ADHD ON median 83, 
range 41.6 - 95.2; ADHD OFF median 67.16, range 23.2 - 97.6). In addition, healthy controls 
reported more calmness than the patients, both ON and OFF Medication (table 4.3). There 
were no differences in terms of motor speed (box completion task), on the time to complete 
the vigilance test (number cancellation RT) or in verbal fluency. We did observe a difference 
between the ADHD group OFF Medication and the healthy control group for missed items on 
the vigilance test, i.e. the ADHD group OFF their Medication missed more numbers (median 
4, range 0 - 17) relative to the healthy control group (median 2, range 0 - 11) and relative to 
when ON Medication (median 3, range 0 - 13). This difference was no longer present when 
comparing the ADHD group ON Medication to the healthy control group (table 4.3).
As expected, methylphenidate ameliorated symptom severity (table 4.6) both on attentive 
and hyperactive symptoms. We did not observe effects of DAT1 Genotype, nor an interaction 
between DAT1 Genotype and Medication status on symptom severity (table 4.6). 
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Table 4.6 Self-reported symptom severity 
 ADHD ON ADHD OFF Statistics 
 9R 
carriers 10R/10R 
9R 
carriers 10R/10R 
Drug 
effect 
DAT1 
effect 
Drug * 
DAT1 
Symptom severity       
 Attentive 
2.67 
(0.66) 
3.18 
(1.11) 
7.25 
(0.46) 
5.64 
(0.83) 
t(22) = 
5.92; 
p < .001 
ns 
F(1,21) = 
3.47; 
p > .05 
 
Hyperactive 
2.67 
(0.66) 
2.36 
(0.75) 
5.33 
(0.68) 
5.09 
(0.72) 
t(22) = 
5.15; 
p < .001 
ns ns 
10R/10R  = 10R homozygotes 
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Discussion
We investigated the effects of reward motivation on task switching in adult patients with 
ADHD, ON and OFF methylphenidate, relative to a matching healthy control group. 
Task-related BOLD responses were assessed as a function of inter-individual variability in 
the DAT1 gene. When OFF medication, adults with ADHD demonstrated greater effects 
of reward on dorsal striatal BOLD responses during task switching than healthy controls. 
Critically, this effect was only seen when taking DAT1 genotype into account, resulting in a 
strong genotype by diagnosis interaction. Specifically, patients carrying the 9R allele showed 
exaggerated striatal responses relative to healthy controls carrying the same allele, as well 
as relative to patients homozygous for the 10R allele. These aberrant striatal responses were 
normalized when patients with ADHD were ON medication, such that they no longer differed 
from those of controls. In short, the present pilot study reveals a dysfunctional influence of 
reward motivation on task switching in the dorsal striatum of adult patients with ADHD, but 
only in those carrying the 9R risk allele. These findings, albeit preliminary due to the small 
sample size, suggest that abnormal cognitive task-related processing in adult ADHD depends 
critically on inter-individual trait differences in striatal dopamine transmission as well as on 
the motivational state of the individual patient.
The present results demonstrate the importance of taking into account inter-individual 
variability, as for example indexed by the DAT1 genotype, when assessing task-related BOLD 
effects in ADHD. This generally concurs with previous fMRI studies in youth with ADHD, 
which have found that striatal responses during reward anticipation (Paloyelis et al., 2012) as 
well as striatal responses during more cognitive tasks, i.e. Go/No-Go paradigms (Durston et 
al., 2008; Bedard et al., 2010) depend on variation in DAT1 genotype. A recent study in adults 
with ADHD failed to extend the effect of DAT1 genotype on striatal reward responses during 
reward anticipation, observed in youth (Paloyelis et al., 2012), to adult ADHD (Hoogman et 
al., 2013). In the current sample with ADHD adults, DAT1 effects on reward-related striatal 
responses did surface, but only as a function of cognitive task-related processing. This suggests 
that, in adults with ADHD, the translation of reward information into (effortful) cognitive 
processing might be more strongly dependent on variability in the DAT1 gene than reward 
anticipation itself. 
Our study shows that patients with ADHD OFF medication demonstrate abnormal BOLD 
responses in the caudate nucleus during rewarded task switching, an effect that relied on 
striatal dopamine signaling as indexed by DAT1 genotype. In accordance, the caudate nucleus 
– known to be involved in cognitive flexibility (Cools, 1980; Aarts et al., 2011) – is well-
positioned to incorporate motivational influences from more ventral regions in the striatum 
through feedforward dopaminergic projections (Haber et al., 2000; Grahn et al., 2008; Ikeda 
et al., 2013). The finding is also remarkably consistent with our previous work using genetic 
fMRI and positron emission tomography (PET) imaging in healthy volunteers, showing that 
effects of reward motivation on cognitive control are altered by dopaminergic transmission 
95
Reward modulation of cognitive function: adult ADHD
in the left caudate nucleus (Aarts et al., 2010; Aarts et al., 2014b). In ADHD, Volkow and 
colleagues have shown that dopaminergic transmission in reward-related brain regions 
is associated with symptoms of inattention (Volkow et al., 2009b), and that connectivity 
between neural reward and attention networks is impaired (Tomasi and Volkow, 2012). Here, 
we demonstrate that cognitive task-related processing deficits in the striatum (i.e. during 
task switching) are modulated by motivation as well as DAT1 genotype in ADHD. Unlike 
suggested previously (Sonuga-Barke, 2002, 2003; de Zeeuw et al., 2012), ADHD might not 
be accompanied by isolated deficits in either motivational or cognitive/executive processing 
pathways, but rather by deficits in the integration between these pathways. 
The present finding extends to ADHD our previous work in young healthy volunteers 
showing that effects of reward motivation on task switching and associated striatal signal 
depend on the DAT1 genotype (Aarts et al., 2010; see supplement van Holstein et al., 2011). 
Unlike that previous study, however, the present study did not reveal any DAT1 genotype 
effects on rewarded task switching in healthy controls, in neural or behavioral terms. We are 
puzzled by this lack of effect, but think that it might reflect a difference in the demographics 
between the current control group that was matched to the ADHD group and the groups in 
our previous studies that primarily included university students. The most obvious difference 
is in terms of age, with the current control group being older (mean 38.12 years, SD 10.20) 
than the healthy volunteers in our previous studies (mean 21.58 years, SD 2.06; and mean 22 
years, SD 2.32, for Aarts et al., 2010; van Holstein et al., 2011, respectively). Indeed, studies 
have consistently observed a reduction in dopamine signaling starting in young adulthood 
(e.g. Volkow et al., 1996a; Reeves et al., 2002). Importantly, the increases in striatal BOLD 
in the 9R-carrying patients OFF medication were, if anything, accompanied by impaired 
performance (i.e. increased RT switch cost for high versus low reward trials, relative to 
when ON medication). These results contrast with our findings in younger 9R-carrying 
healthy volunteers who showed increased striatal responses as well as better task switching 
performance following high versus low reward cues relative to 10R-homozygotes (Aarts et 
al., 2010). This suggests that the hyperactivation in the dorsal striatum during rewarded task 
switching in the 9R-carrying patients OFF medication is maladaptive for behavior. The notion 
of maladaptive striatal hyper activation in 9R-carrying patients with ADHD is in line with the 
finding that the 9R-allele is the risk allele in adult ADHD (Franke et al., 2010). However, the 
absence of significant behavioural differences relative to healthy controls precludes statements 
of normality in terms of performance. 
The aberrant striatal responses during rewarded task switching in patients with ADHD 
(specifically 9R carriers) relative to controls were absent when patients were ON medication. 
This suggests that methylphenidate normalized striatal responses, although we only 
obtained trend effects (i.e. at p < .001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons) when directly 
comparing patients ON versus OFF methylphenidate. Our findings suggest that effects of 
methylphenidate on cognitive task-related processing are accompanied by modulation of 
the striatum. This generally concurs with prior work showing that methylphenidate can 
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normalize striatal responses during cognitive processes such as response inhibition (Vaidya 
et al., 1998; Shafritz et al., 2004; Epstein et al., 2007; Rubia et al., 2009; Rubia et al., 2011). 
Here, we demonstrate that such normalization of task-related dorsal striatal responses and 
performance by methylphenidate depends both on DAT1 genotype and on reward motivation. 
This suggests that reward motivational factors interact with the effects of DAT1 genotype to 
bias the cognitive response to methylphenidate. Future work should address the obvious next 
question, that is, whether discrepancy in the extant literature regarding the effects of DAT1 
genotype on the clinical response to medication (Kambeitz et al., 2014) also reflects variability 
in the patient’s reward motivational state. Cognitive neuroimaging measures of task-related 
(motivational) processing might be particularly sensitive to detecting DAT1-dependent 
effects of methylphenidate in ADHD. 
It might be noted that the effects in the OFF state could reflect rebound effects due to short-term 
medication withdrawal. Future studies, with a longitudinal design or comparing medication-
naive patients with medicated patients, will need to determine whether the current findings 
reflect rebound or withdrawal effects rather than an un-medicated ADHD state. 
Our findings were obtained with a sample of 23 patients with ADHD and 26 healthy controls. 
This limited sample size calls for caution when generalizing to the population (Munafo and 
Gage, 2013) and precludes definitive conclusions. The findings should therefore be considered 
preliminary and in need of replication, as was recently also explicitly highlighted (Button et 
al., 2013). Nevertheless, we believe that our findings are robust, given extensive convergent 
evidence. Indeed, we have previously observed effects of DAT1 genotype on BOLD signal 
during rewarded task switching in the same striatal region (i.e. left caudate nucleus) as we 
report here (Aarts et al., 2010). Moreover, we have previously seen that striatal dopamine 
synthesis capacity in the (left) caudate nucleus predicted the effects of reward on cognitive 
performance during a focused attention task (Aarts et al., 2014b). It is unlikely that our 
whole-brain corrected results represent a false positive effect as our power calculation based 
on an independent dataset (Aarts et al., 2010; Button et al., 2013) confirmed that our sample 
should be large enough to obtain significantly meaningful effects (see Methods). Replication 
of the effect in independent larger samples in future studies will further increase confidence 
in the reliability of the effect. 
Previously, we have obtained similar results in a PET study in healthy volunteers, showing that 
dopaminergic transmission in the left caudate nucleus altered the effects of reward motivation 
on cognitive control (Aarts et al., 2014b). In that study, we employed a Stroop interference 
paradigm instead of a task-switching paradigm, suggesting that our present results can 
be extended to other domains of cognitive control. However, future work should confirm 
whether our findings in ADHD can be generalized to domains other than task switching. 
Moreover, future studies should also examine variation in other dopaminergic genes, like 
COMT (Bilder et al., 2004), to investigate whether the current findings are limited to striatal 
dopamine processing. 
To conclude, our data suggest a dysfunctional influence of reward motivation on cognitive 
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processing (i.e. task switching) in the dorsal striatum of adult patients with ADHD, who 
carry the 9R ADHD risk allele. This deficit is remediated when patients are tested ON 
methylphenidate. These findings demonstrate an important role for both reward motivation 
as well as inter-individual trait differences in striatal dopamine transmission in cognitive 
processing deficits in adult ADHD.
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Abstract
Flexible cognitive control refers to the ability to adapt to our ever changing environment and 
is a hallmark of human cognition. It is well known that optimal flexible cognitive control is 
sensitive to reward motivation and that the promise of a reward can improve performance 
on tasks of flexible cognitive control, such as task-switching paradigms. Healthy aging is 
accompanied by impairments in flexible cognitive control, but also in reward-related processes 
and changes in processing speed. Here we test the hypothesis that changes in task-switching 
ability across the life span are a function of promised reward. We tested 118 participants 
(14-69 years old) on a task-switching paradigm with a reward motivation manipulation. 
Results revealed that increasing age is associated with reduced influence of a promised reward 
on flexible cognitive control, in terms of speed-accuracy strategy. These findings indicate that 
healthy aging across the life span is accompanied by diminished reward-related adaptation of 
cognitive strategy during task-switching. 
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Introduction
The world around us is changing constantly, imposing on us an overwhelming amount of 
information, choices and temptations. The ability to adapt behavior flexibly to these constant 
changes is a hallmark of human cognition and requires flexible cognitive control. This is a 
complex, multifactorial construct, but generally refers to the ability to inhibit impulses, set, 
maintain and update goals and pursue them without being distracted. Failures in the ability 
to exert flexible cognitive control can have vast consequences, leaving our economies a wreck 
and our traffic deadly.
Aging is one of today’s grand societal challenges. The current proportion of people aged 
60 and older is 23% in developed countries and still increasing (United_Nations, 2012). As 
people age, their ability to look after themselves decreases and most people will eventually 
require assistance or permanent care. Many of the day-to-day tasks that are required to live 
independently have a cognitive component. It is well established that older participants 
are impaired in several aspects of cognition, including memory, speed of processing, task 
switching (Salthouse, 1996; West, 1996; Kray et al., 2002; Park et al., 2002), and interference- 
and inhibitory control (i.e. stopping automatic tendencies or motor impulsivity) (Rush et al., 
2006; van de Laar et al., 2011). At least some aspects of age-related cognitive decline may 
begin already early in adulthood (i.e. from 20 years onwards) (Salthouse, 2009)
Task switching, which is considered an important aspect of flexible cognitive control (Monsell 
et al., 2003), encompasses the ability to quickly update current task demands and to adapt 
behavior accordingly. It is this cognitive ability that is the focus of the current paper, given 
accumulating evidence that it is particularly sensitive to aging (Van Asselen and Ridderinkhof, 
2000; Kray et al., 2002), (but see Wasylyshyn et al., 2011). However, in addition to cognitive 
deficits, aging is also accompanied by reward and motivational anomalies. For example, 
studies have shown age-related deficits in reward-related processing and reward learning 
(Marschner et al., 2005; Mell et al., 2005; Schott et al., 2007; Chowdhury et al., 2013), (but see 
Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007). 
Although often studied as separate entities, reward and cognition interact closely: Adaptive 
behavior becomes more important when higher rewards are at stake. Indeed, several studies 
have shown that reward motivation can improve cognitive performance (e.g. Locke and 
Braver, 2008; Aarts et al., 2010; Pessoa and Engelmann, 2010; van Holstein et al., 2011; Braver 
et al., 2014). In fact, reward-related deficits have been argued to underlie at least some of 
the cognitive processing deficits observed in psychiatric disorders, such as attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and schizophrenia (Velligan et al., 2006; Aarts et al., 2015). 
This might also be true for cognitive deficits in aging.    
In the current study, we used a task-switching paradigm in which we manipulated the amount 
of reward participants could earn on each trial to test the hypothesis that aging across the life 
span is accompanied by reduced impact of reward motivation on flexible cognitive control. 
Given the hypothesis that age-related decreases in cognitive functioning may start early in 
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adulthood, we assessed the effect of reward motivation on cognitive control across the life 
span, from adolescence (prior to the start of age-related decreases) to senescence. 
Methods
Participants and procedure
Pooling the data from five studies that were conducted between 2008 and 2015 enabled us 
to include 118 healthy participants (63 men, mean age 35.03, range 14-69). Three of these 
studies (N = 60) were conducted in a functional magnetic resonance environment: one in 
healthy young participants (Aarts et al., 2010) and the other 2 were patient studies (e.g. Aarts 
et al., 2015). We only included the healthy control participants who participated in these 
patient studies. The remaining participants were 26 (Aarts et al., 2012) and 32 healthy control 
participants who were tested in front of a computer screen (table 5.1). All studies were 
Table 5.1 Characteristics of participants and studies 
 Study A Study B Study C Study D Study E Total 
N 32 24 27 9 26 118 
Age mean 15.44 21.92 38.78 58 59.58 35.03 
Age range 14-17 18-27 24-65 29-67 42-69 14-69 
Gender (% men)  59.4 % 41.67 % 44.44 % 77.78 % 57.69 % 53.4 % 
Max possible 
reward € 12.80 € 8.80 € 12.80 € 12.80 € 13.20  
High reward  € 0.15 € 0.10 € 0.15 € 0.15 € 0.10  
Earned bonus: 
mean (SE) 
€ 9.10 
(34.05) 
€ 7.17 
(17.45) 
€10.38 
(22.09) 
€ 10.04 
(61.40) 
€ 12.05 
(12.32) 
€ 9.72 
(19.50) 
Earned bonus:  
% of max: mean 
(SE) 
71.28 % 
(2.62) 
81.49% 
(1.98) 
81.10 % 
(1.73) 
78.44 
%(4.80) 91.29% (0.89) 
80.56% 
(1.18) 
Number of trials 160 160 160 160 240  
Type of study 
Behavioral
control 
group 
patient 
study 
fMRI 
young 
healthy 
participants 
fMRI
control 
group 
patient 
study 
fMRI
control 
group 
patient 
study 
Behavioral 
control group 
patient study 
 
ITI and RC 
interval 1-2s 2-6s 2-6s 2-6s 1-2s  
CT interval 400 msec. 2-6s 400 msec. 400 msec. 1-2s  
SE = standard error; ITI = inter-trial-interval; RC = reward - task cue; CT = task cue - target.  
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RC interval
CT interval
reward cue
task cue
target
feedback
response
word
15 cent
TRIAL 4
high reward
task switch
le
le right 
correct!
 15 cent
incorrect!
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TRIAL 3
low reward
task repeat 
arrow
le
1 cent
le right 
correct!
 1 cent
incorrect!
0 cent
TRIAL 2
low reward 
task switch 
1 cent
arrow
right
le right 
correct!
1 cent
incorrect!
0 cent
TRIAL 1
(discarded)
15 cent
word
le
correct!
15 cent
le 
incorrect!
0 cent
right
Figure 5.1  Task-switching paradigm with reward manipulation
Participants had to respond to incongruent arrow-word combinations, either by responding to the 
direction of the arrow (i.e. <- or ->) or to the direction indicated by the word (“left” or “right”) with 
a left or right button press. A task cue preceding the target indicated according to which task (arrow 
or word) the participant had to respond on the current trial. The task performed on a particular trial 
either changed unpredictably compared with the preceding trial (i.e. switch trial; arrow - word or word 
- arrow) or remained the same (i.e. repeat trial; arrow-arrow, word-word). In addition we manipulated 
the value of each trial on a trial-by-trial basis by means of a reward anticipation cue (i.e. 1 vs. 10 or 15 
cents; table 1) (see also (Aarts et al., 2010; Aarts et al., 2015). Reward could be earned with a correct and 
sufficiently quick response. Immediately following the response, feedback was given (e.g., “correct! 15 
cents”). The cues and feedback were shown for 600 msec. RC interval: reward cue - task cue interval; CT 
interval: task cue - target interval (table 5.1). 
approved by the local ethics committee (CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen CMO 2001/095; 2007/153; 
2008/159; 2009/058; 2010/402) and were in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
Paradigm
All participants performed a task-switching paradigm with a reward manipulation (figure 
5.1) (Aarts et al., 2010; van Holstein et al., 2011). The task was programmed and presented 
using the Presentation® software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.; http://www.neurobs.com).
The test was preceded by 3 practice blocks. The first practice block (24 trials) contained the 
task cue and target, followed by feedback (“correct”, “incorrect”); in the second practice block 
(24 trials), reward cues were added. Finally, to account for inter-individual differences in 
response speed and subsequent task difficulty, we used the correct responses during the third 
practice block (32 trials), without reward or feedback, to determine each individual’s response 
deadline for 4 trials-types (Arrow/Word x Switch/Repeat). Participants were instructed to 
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respond as quickly and accurately as possible and had to respond correctly within the response 
deadline to obtain the reward.
The main experiment consisted of 160 (or 240) trials and lasted ~35 minutes with a 30 second 
break after every 32 (or 48) trials (table 1). In the break, the amount of money the participant 
earned thus far was displayed on the screen and participants were informed in advance that 
the total amount would be added to their financial compensation as a bonus.
Analysis
For each participant, we excluded the first trial of each block, trials with a response time 
(RT) faster than 200ms, and trials on which participants failed to respond. For each trial-
type, [Reward (low, high) x Task switching (switch, repeat)], we calculated the proportion of 
accurate responses. For the RTs, we first excluded the erroneous trials and then calculated the 
mean RT for each condition. 
Older participants usually respond more slowly compared with younger participants and 
prefer accuracy over speed (Salthouse, 1996). Upon observing such a pattern in the current 
data, i.e. opposite correlations between age and overall RTs, and between age and accuracy, we 
assessed our effects in terms of changes in speed-over-accuracy strategy use. To this end, we 
standardized the accuracy and RT measures into z-scores, inverted these scores for the RTs to 
obtain a speed measure (i.e. higher z-scores reflect faster responding) and calculated a speed-
accuracy-tradeoff (SAT) score ((z-speed - z-accuracy)/2), whereby a higher score indicates 
faster, but more inaccurate responses. 
Data were analyzed using SPSS (IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 21.0. Armonk, NY: 
IBM Corp.). A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality of the 4 trial-types revealed violation of the 
normal distribution for one trial type (p = 0.049) in terms of the SAT, and all trial-types for 
the RTs and accuracy were not normally distributed (all p < 0.001). We therefore performed 
non-parametric tests, i.e. the related-samples Wilcoxon signed rank tests to assess the effects 
of Reward (high vs. low), Task switching (switch vs. repeat) and the interaction between 
Reward and Task switching. We report the standardized test statistic as W. 
From the mean scores on the 4 trial types [Reward (high/low) x Task switch (switch/repeat 
trials)] we calculated (1) the reward effect (high - low reward), (2) switch effect (switch - 
repeat), and (3) the difference between the reward effect on repeat trials and the reward effect 
on switch trials, i.e. the degree to which an increase in reward decreases the switch effect. To 
break down this effect, we also reported the results for the reward effect on switch and repeat 
trials separately. Because age did not follow a normal distribution (Shapiro-Wilk p < 0.001), 
we used a non-parametric Spearman’s ρ correlation – r (ρ) - to assess the relationship between 
these measures and age. 
The sample in this study consists of pooled data from several studies using the same paradigm 
(table 5.1). Although the paradigm and instructions were essentially the same, the amount 
of reward participants could earn on a high-reward trial (i.e. 10 or 15 cent) or across all trials 
105
Reward modulation of cognitive function: aging
(i.e. due to 160 vs. 240 trials) varied between studies (from €8.80 to €13.20). To account for 
this confound, we validated the age-related effects in a group of participants who received 
identical low and high reward amounts and the same number of trials (and thus identical 
total amounts of reward). To this end, we directly compared performance of a subset of 68 
participants (from study A, C and D, matched in terms of these factors, table 5.1) using an 
independent samples Mann-Whitney U test (reporting the standardized test statistic, denoted 
by U), with age (using a median split) as a between subject factor. We consider p < 0.05 as 
significant.
Results
With age, overall accuracy and response times increased (Age, accuracy across trial-types: r 
(ρ) = 0.531, p < 0.001; Age, RTs across trial-types: r (ρ) = 0.607, p < 0.001). In terms of the 
SAT score, increasing age was associated with a decrease in speed over accuracy, so that older 
participants traded speed for accuracy across the task as a whole (Age, SAT across trial-types: 
r (ρ) = -0.636, p < 0.001).
Effects of reward, task-switching and their interaction 
There was a main effect of Reward in terms of SAT: participants increased speed over accuracy 
on high reward trials, compared with low reward trials (Reward: W = 6.519, p < 0.001). In 
addition, there was a main effect of Task switching: Participants also increased speed over 
accuracy on switch trials compared with repeat trials (Task switching: W = 2.241, p= 0.025). 
Moreover, there was an interaction between Reward and Task switching (Reward x Task 
switching: W = 6.452, p < 0.001), due to an increase in speed over accuracy on high versus 
low reward switch trials (Reward effect on switch trials: W = 7.276, p < 0.001; table S5.1), but 
a decrease in speed over accuracy on high versus low reward repeat trials (Reward effect on 
repeat trials: W = 4.610, p < 0.001).
The effects in terms of SAT were due to a main effect of Reward in the response times, but 
not accuracy: Participants responded faster on high reward compared with low reward trials 
(Reward in terms of RTs: W = 6.519, p < 0.001; Reward in terms of accuracy: W = 1.656, p 
= 0.098; table S5.1). In addition, there was a main effect of Task switching both in terms of 
response times and accuracy: Participants responded more slowly on switch trials compared 
with repeat trials (Task switching: W = 4.612, p < 0.001) and participants responded less 
accurately on switch compared with repeat trials (Task switching: W = 7.205, p < 0.001). 
There were no interactions between Reward and Task switching in terms of response times 
(Reward x Task switching: W = 0.337, p = 0.7) or accuracy (Reward x Task switching:  W = 
0.168, p = 0.8). 
In sum, we observed faster but equally accurate responding under high versus low reward, 
which translated into a reward-related increase in the speed-over-accuracy score. In terms of 
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task switching, we observed slower and less accurate responding on switch than repeat trials. 
The switch cost in terms of accuracy (i.e. less accurate responding on switch vs. repeat trials) 
was larger than the switch cost in terms of response times. This resulted in a switch-related 
increase in the speed-over-accuracy score. Moreover, we observed a reward-related shift in 
the SAT during task switching: A reward-related increase in speed-over-accuracy on the more 
demanding switch trials, but a reward-related decrease in speed-over-accuracy on the easier 
repeat trials.
Effects of age on rewarded task switching
The aim of the current study was to look at age-related changes in the motivational 
enhancement of cognitive control. Before assessing this primary effect of interest, we first 
looked at age-related changes in the main effects of Reward and Task switching. In terms of 
the SAT we observed an age-related decrease in speed over accuracy in terms of the effect of 
Reward (Reward x Age: r (ρ) = -0. 191, p = 0.038) and of Task switching (Task switching x 
age: r (ρ) = -0.225, p = 0.014). This age-related decrease in speed over accuracy as a function 
of reward was due to a larger age-related increase in response times than accuracy on high 
compared with low reward trials. In terms of task switching, younger participants exhibit a 
relatively larger switch cost in terms of accuracy than in terms of speed. With age, this switch 
cost in terms of speed increased, whereas the switch cost in terms of accuracy decreased. 
Next, we assessed age-related changes in the main effects of Reward and Task switching in 
terms of response times and accuracy and observed an age-related decrease in the difference 
between high versus low reward in terms of accuracy (Age x Reward (high – low): r (ρ) = 
-0.238, p = 0.009), and response times (Age x Reward (high – low): r (ρ) = 0.191, p = 0.038). 
In addition, there was an age-related increase in slowing and accuracy on switch versus repeat 
trials (RTs: Age x Task switching (switch – repeat): r (ρ) = 0.411, p < 0.001; accuracy: Age x 
Task switching (switch – repeat): r (ρ) = 0.302, p < 0.001). 
Thus aging was accompanied by a reduced reward benefit in terms of accuracy and an 
increased reward impairment in terms of response times. A larger age-related increase in 
response times than accuracy on high compared with low reward trials resulted in the age-
related decrease in speed over accuracy. In addition, there was an age-related increase in 
task switching cost in terms of response times and an age-related switch benefit in terms of 
accuracy, but this switch cost in terms of response times changed more with age, resulting in 
an age-related decrease in speed over accuracy. 
Next, we proceeded to our primary question of interest and assessed the degree to which a 
promised Reward affected Task switching in terms of SAT and found that this effect changed 
with age (Age x Reward x Task switching: r (ρ) = - 0.368, p < 0.001; figure 5.2a). Breaking 
down this three-way Age x Reward x Task switching interaction for repeat and switch trials 
separately revealed a positive correlation between Age and the Reward effect on repeat trials 
(Age x Reward: r (ρ) = 0.311, p = 0.001), but a negative correlation between Age and the Reward 
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Figure 5.2  Effects of Reward on Task switching as function of Age
A: The effect of a high versus low reward on task switching correlated negatively with age, with reduced 
reward-related changes in task-switching as participants are older. 
B: Breaking down this negative correlation between Age, Reward, and Task switching (in A) for repeat 
and switch trials revealed opposite age-related changes in the reward effect on repeat and switch trials. 
Whereas younger participants showed a reward-related decrease in speed-over-accuracy on repeat trials 
(left) and a reward-related increase in speed-over-accuracy on switch trials (right), this difference was 
abolished with increasing age. 
* Regression lines indicate the Pearson correlation (N = 118), statistics are Spearman correlations. 
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effect on switch trials (Age x Reward: r (ρ) = - 0.367, p < 0.001; figure 5.2b). Inspection of 
figure 5.2b shows that these correlations were driven by Reward effects in young, but not old 
participants. Young, but not old participants, showed a reward-related increase in speed-over-
accuracy on switch trials, and a reward-related decrease in speed-over-accuracy on repeat 
trials. Thus, the main task effects, observed across the group as a whole and described above, 
were driven by younger participants and were absent in older participants. 
The degree to which a promised reward affected task switching did not change with age in 
terms of response times (Age x Reward x Task switching: r (ρ) = -0.038, p = 0.714) or accuracy 
(Age x Reward x Task switching: r (ρ) = -0.178, p = 0.053).
We validated the SAT effects in a subgroup of participants who all received the same reward 
size (i.e. group A, C and D, table 5.1). Age-dependent effects in this subsample, which was 
not confounded by differential reward size, resembled those observed in the large sample. A 
negative correlation was observed between Age and the effect of Reward on Task switching 
(Age x Reward x Task switching: r (ρ) = - 0.360, p = 0.003; figure 5.3a). This three-way 
interaction was again due to a positive correlation between Age and the Reward effect on 
repeat trials (Age x Reward: r (ρ) = 0.277, p = 0.022) and a negative correlation between Age 
and the Reward effect on switch trials (Age x Reward: r (ρ) = -0.373, p = 0.002). The result 
from this continuous analysis with Age as a covariate was confirmed by a between-group 
independent samples Mann-Whitney U test with Age as a between-subject factor. For this 
analysis, the subgroup (N = 68, mean age 30.29, range 14 – 67 years) was split into two groups 
based on the median age (25 years old; youngest group: N = 35, mean 16.23 (SE 0.48) years 
old; oldest group: N = 33, mean 45.18 (SE 2.29) years old; U = 7.114, p < 0.001). A significant 
Age x Reward x Task-switching interaction was revealed (U = -2.755, p = 0.006), which was 
due to a Reward x Task switching interaction in the younger group (W = -3.849, p < 0.001), 
but not in the older group (W = -1.885, p = 0.059) (table 5.2, figure 5.3b). 
In sum, aging was accompanied by diminished effects of Reward on Task switching in terms 
of SAT. This effect was confirmed in a smaller subsample, corrected for reward size.
Age-related changes in response deadlines and earned rewards
We hypothesized that age-related changes in task switching would be grounded in 
motivational changes. Increasing age was indeed associated with cognitive changes: We 
observed age-related changes in task switching. In addition, we observed smaller reward 
effects with age, both across repeat and switch trials and as a function of task switching. In a 
supplementary analysis, we assessed whether this reward-related deficit in terms of behavior 
was accompanied by changes in total earnings. 
Surprisingly, we observed an age-related increase in the total reward earned on the rewarded 
task-switching paradigm. This effect was observed in the large sample (n=118) (Age x 
Total reward: r (ρ) = 0.581, p < 0.001), and in the subgroup of 68 participants in which the 
maximum bonus did not vary across participants (Age x Total reward: r (ρ) = 0.309, p = 
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0.010). A between subject analysis in this subgroup revealed that the older group earned more 
reward than did the younger group (mean €9.01 (SE 0.32) vs. mean €10.50 (SE 0.20); t(26.448) 
= 11.343, p < 0.001).  
We were puzzled by this effect and reasoned that the age-related increase in total earnings 
might originate from differences in the response deadline, which was set during a pre-test 
practice phase (methods). When the response deadline was determined, participants were 
instructed to respond as fast and accurately as possible. We reasoned that participants who 
put more emphasis on the accuracy instruction would not respond as fast as possible during 
practice. This would then result in longer, less stringent response deadlines during the actual 
test. In the current paradigm, inaccurate responses, no matter how fast, are never rewarded. 
Therefore, adopting such a cautious (slow and accurate) response strategy during practice 
may result in higher earnings. For example, imagine two participants (A and B) who are 
theoretically both able to respond within 400ms. If participant A responds cautiously during 
the practice phase, the average response time during practice will be slower (e.g. 900ms) 
than that of someone who emphasized speed during practice (participant B, e.g. 500ms). As 
a consequence, participant A will have plenty of time to respond accurately on test, thereby 
increasing the number of rewarded trials. By contrast, participant B will need to continue 
to respond relatively fast. Participant B will thus make more errors, and therefore a lower 
number of trials will be rewarded.
To test the idea that the response strategy during practice differed with age and that this would 
lead to the observed age-related differences in earnings, we first assessed whether age was 
associated with the length of the individually determined response deadlines. We observed 
an overall age-related increase in the response deadline (i.e. across 4 trial-types: Arrow/Word 
x Switch/Repeat), so that older participants were allowed to respond more slowly on test than 
did younger participants (Age x Response deadline: (ρ) = 0.587, p <0.001). One might argue 
that the differential Age x Reward effects on repeat and switch trials reported above might 
	Table 5.2 Reward x Task-switching effects for younger and older 
subgroups* 
 Younger 
(n=35) 
Older 
(n=33) 
Difference 
RT -0.164 
(-10.50;10.17) 
-0.486 
(-9.58;8.61) 
-0.055; 
P > 0.1 
Accuracy 0.66 
(-3.24;4.56) 
-2.21 
(-5.70;1.27) 
-1.061; 
P > 0.1 
SAT 0.43 
(0.25;0.61) 
0.15 
(0.01;0.29) 
-2.755; 
p = 0.006 
SAT = Speed-Accuracy-Tradeoff = (z-speed- z-accuracy) / 2 ; RT = response times 
* subgroups (study A, C and D in table 1 and figure 3a) were not confounded by 
differential reward size  
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Figure 5.3  The effect of Reward on Task switching diminishes with age in a subgroup 
matched for maximum available reward
The results in figure 2 were supported by an additional analysis, in which we only included the 
participants who all received the exact same version of the task (study A, C, D in table 1).
A: This analysis confirmed that the effect of Reward on Task switching is reduced with age. The outline 
of the data points indicates the study in which each participant participated (table 1).The red and blue 
data points refer to the younger and older group in a subsequent median split analysis (B), * The black 
solid line indicates the regression slope (Pearson) for the subgroup (N = 68), the Spearman correlation 
is reported. 
B: Analysis with age as a between subject factor (median split) revealed significant effects of Reward on 
Task switching in the younger group, but not the older group. 
also reflect these age-related differences in the maximum time participants had to respond 
on each trial type. However, this age-related effect in response deadlines was not different for 
repeat and switch trials (Age x Task switching in terms of response deadline: r (ρ) = 0.050, p 
= 0.588).
Next, we assessed whether the difference between the average response times during 
the actual test and the average response times during the practice (i.e. average response 
deadlines) changed with age. Indeed, this difference increased with age (Age x Response 
time difference: r (ρ) = 0.467, p < 0.001), suggesting that the average response deadline was 
less close to their maximum speed for older than younger participants. To test whether this 
can account for the higher earnings, we assessed whether the response time difference was 
associated with the total earnings. Indeed, a larger response deadline difference (i.e. increased 
room for improvement on test compared with practice) was associated with higher earnings 
(Total earnings x Response time difference: r (ρ) = 0.480, p < 0.001). Crucially however, the 
difference in response times between practice and test was not associated with the task effects 
(Rewarded Task switching effects in terms of SAT x Response time difference (r (ρ) = -0.037, 
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p = 0.693). Together, these results suggest that more cautious responding during practice (i.e. 
when determining the response deadlines) can explain the higher earnings in the older group 
during the test, but that it does not explain the differential task-related effects observed during 
the test. 
Discussion 
The ability to take into account information about potential rewards is crucial for flexible, 
adaptive behavior. Increasing age is associated with cognitive decline, yet the psychological 
mechanisms underlying this decline remain uncharted. In the current study, we investigated 
whether reward motivational deficits underlie age-related changes in flexible cognitive 
control across the life span. To this end, we investigated age-related changes in the effect of 
reward motivation on flexible cognitive control in 118 participants with age ranging from 14 
to 69. We observed overall age-related slowing and an age-related increase in accuracy across 
conditions. With increasing age, participants adopted an overall slower but more accurate 
strategy. However, whereas younger participants adapted their speed-accuracy strategy to the 
trial type, aging was accompanied by a more rigid strategy across trial types. Specifically, on 
the more demanding switch trials, younger participants exhibited a reward-related increase 
in speed over accuracy, while exhibiting a reward-related decrease in speed over accuracy on 
the less demanding repeat trials. By contrast, such reward- and task-dependent adaptation of 
speed-accuracy strategy was absent in older participants. 
The between subject analysis (figure 5.3b) confirmed that younger participants modulate 
their behavior differentially in distinct cognitive conditions. By contrast, in the older group, 
behavior on the switch trials was indistinguishable from behavior on repeat trials. Thus, with 
increasing age, participants drifted towards a more uniform strategy, where they preferred 
accuracy over speed across the task as a whole, but failed to adapt their behavior to changing 
motivational and cognitive task demands. This is generally in line with a diffusion modeling 
study by Starns and Ratcliff (2010), showing that older - in contrast to younger - adults do 
not adapt their speed-accuracy strategy to feedback on simple discrimination tasks. Together 
these results suggest that alterations in reward-based processing underlie cognitive changes 
in aging.
Previous work has suggested that aging is accompanied by deficits in task switching (Kray 
et al., 2002). In keeping with this prior work, we observed an age-related increase in the RT 
switch cost. Also, a number of studies have demonstrated an age-related decrease in reward 
processing (Schott et al., 2007; Rademacher et al., 2014), although some studies have revealed 
intact processing of cues predicting an upcoming reward in older individuals (Samanez-
Larkin et al., 2007) (Dreher et al., 2008). The present data – showing an age-related decrease 
in the reward effect as well as in the effects of reward on cognitive control (in terms of SAT) – 
provide support for the first account. In addition to observing commonly reported age-related 
changes in task-switching and reward processing, the current results suggest that aging is also 
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accompanied by reward-based changes in flexible cognitive control, where older participants 
no longer exhibit an effect of reward motivation on task switching performance. 
Reward-induced changes in the speed-accuracy tradeoff have not been widely studied, and 
never in the context of a cognitive task. However, at least one study suggests that potential 
rewards can induce more cautious (i.e. more accurate and slow) behavior (Bijleveld et al., 
2010). We replicate this effect in the cognitively less demanding repeat trials by showing that 
young participants exhibit reward-induced cautious behavior in the repeat condition. We 
extend this finding by showing that reward induced less accurate and faster responding on 
the more demanding switch trials in younger participants. These results suggest that reward 
can modulate cautious behavior differentially in distinct cognitive conditions.
Reward motivation, cognitive control and the interaction between reward and cognitive 
control implicate, among other mechanisms, dopamine in the striatum (Roberts et al., 1994; 
Ikemoto and Panksepp, 1999; Aarts et al., 2010; Aarts et al., 2011). Furthermore, changes in 
speed-accuracy tradeoff strategies have been associated with changes in connectivity between 
the cortex and the striatum (Bogacz et al., 2010). More specifically, stronger corticostriatal 
connections have been found to promote faster (and premature) responses. The current 
study does not address the neural mechanisms of age-related effects on rewarded task 
switching directly. However, several independent studies have revealed age-related changes 
in dopamine signaling (Volkow et al., 1996b; Bäckman et al., 2000) Erixon-Lindroth et al., 
2005), starting in early adulthood (Backman and Farde, 2005). Also, age-related decreases in 
corticostriatal connectivity, accompanied by slower (and more accurate) responses have been 
reported (Forstmann et al., 2011). Accordingly, here, we put forward the hypothesis that the 
observed change in speed-accuracy strategy during the integration of reward and cognitive 
performance reflects reduced dopamine signaling in the striatum, and a subsequent reduction 
in the adaptation of corticostriatal responses to the task conditions. The increased effect of 
reward in younger versus older participants is also in line with a number of previous findings 
in adolescents. First, neuroimaging work has revealed  increases in reward sensitivity and 
ventral striatal responses in adolescents (Somerville and Casey, 2010). In addition, previous 
work has reported reward-related improvements in impulse control in adolescents (Kohls et 
al., 2009; Geier et al., 2010). In older participants, however, if anything a decrease in reward 
sensitivity is reported (Schott et al., 2007; Rademacher et al., 2014). We extend these findings 
by showing that young (i.e. < 26 years old) subjects can show reward-related adaptations of 
flexible cognitive control during task switching, whereas older participants (i.e. > 25 years 
old) cannot. 
One limitation of the current study is the fact that we pooled data from several studies. As 
a result, there are a number of factors of no interest that differ as a function of age, such as 
effects of maximum available reward. However, we accounted for this by replicating the effects 
in a subgroup of participants who received exactly the same amount of reward and number of 
trials. Nevertheless, it is clear that the reported results require replication in future, preferably 
longitudinal, work using a single study set-up. Also, it should be noted that a large number of 
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methods exist which can be used to assess speed accuracy tradeoffs (Salthouse and Hedden, 
2002; Forstmann et al., 2011; Heitz, 2014). The method used in this study is an elementary 
formalization of a speed accuracy tradeoff. Nevertheless, the results clearly show that taking 
into account both speed and accuracy can reveal differences that would not be revealed when 
response times and accuracy are assessed separately. However, future work should extend these 
findings using more sophisticated approaches (e.g. mathematical decision making models) 
and by experimentally manipulating speed accuracy strategies (Heitz, 2014). Such model-
based approaches might be more sensitive, as they take into account trial-by-trial changes 
in speed and accuracy. The consequence of the simple composite score approach used in the 
current study is that changes in speed and accuracy are assumed to contribute equally to the 
decision process. It is therefore hard to interpret the SAT measure used in the current study 
without taking note of the separate response and accuracy measures. Finally, we cannot rule 
out completely that older participants show reduced motivational effects because they value 
money less than young participants. However, we argue that this is unlikely for two reasons. 
First, age was associated with contrasting effects of reward on switch and repeat trials. Second, 
older participants actually earned more money than did the younger participants. 
In the current study we controlled for general age-related differences in processing speed 
(Salthouse, 1996) by determining each individual’s response deadline, by using a within-
subject comparison of conditions, and by taking into account the speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
In line with previous work (Bijleveld et al., 2010; Forstmann et al., 2011), older participants 
were more cautious (i.e. slower and more accurate than younger participants). This cautious 
strategy was already evident during practice and allowed older participants more time to 
respond accurately during test. It is unlikely that allowing slower (older) participants more 
time has induced differences in reward-related speed-accuracy strategies, given the equal 
response deadline for high and low reward (i.e. only arrow/word x switch/repeat trials were 
adapted). In addition, the response deadline adaptations did not result in an age-related 
difference in switch and repeat trials, suggesting it is unlikely that this adaptation has changed 
the accuracy-over-speed strategy during the integration of reward and task switching 
differently in older and younger participants. The cautiousness of the older participants was 
further corroborated by the observation that the overall response deadline of the younger 
participants was closer to their maximum performance in terms of speed (on test). Crucially 
however, this difference was not related to the age-related adaptation to the task conditions. 
Here, we show for the first time that age-related changes in response strategies can be observed 
when participants need to flexibly adapt to changing task demands. Specifically, we observed 
an age-related decrease in the degree to which older participants use information about 
rewards to change their speed-accuracy strategy in changing cognitive control conditions; 
i.e., older participants no longer used rewards to adapt cognitive control processes. As such 
the present study goes beyond prior work focusing commonly merely on cognitive deficits 
(Salthouse, 1996; West, 1996; Kray et al., 2002; Park et al., 2002). An obvious next step would 
be to unravel the neural mechanisms underlying these changes. 
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Table S5.1 Means (CI) for all dependent variable on 4-trial types across all participants 
  low reward high reward main effect control 
  mean 95% CI mean 95% CI mean 95% CI 
repeat 
RTs § 442.00 424.66 459.35 430.07 412.79 447.36 436.04 418.85 453.23 
Accuracy 90.45 88.68 92.22 91.70 90.09 93.31 91.07 89.52 92.63 
SAT† 0.026 -0.12 0.17 -0.0785 -0.22 0.06 -0.03 -0.17 0.12 
switch 
RTs § 451.49 431.77 471.20 440.61 420.47 460.74 446.05 426.25 465.84 
Accuracy 85.46 83.36 87.55 86.57 84.65 88.48 86.01 84.14 87.89 
SAT† -0.082 -0.24 0.07 0.134 -0.03 0.30 0.026 -0.13 0.18 
main 
effect 
reward 
RTs § 446.74 428.31 465.18 435.76 416.76 453.92    
Accuracy 87.95 86.17 89.73 89.13 87.48 90.78    
SAT† -0.028 -0.18 0.12 0.028 -0.12 0.18    
§ RTs = response times in ms; † SAT = speed-accuracy-tradeoff (z-speed + z-accuracy) / 2 
95% CI = 95% (lower, upper) confidence interval. 
Supplementary material
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Nucleus accumbens core lesions in rodents impair rewarded task-switching. 
Chapter 6
The nucleus accumbens core mediates 
the beneficial effect of reward on flexible 
behavioural control: evidence from 
cross-species translation
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Abstract 
The ability to adapt behavior based on environmental cues (e.g. task switching) is an 
important aspect of cognitive functioning, one that can be influenced by the prospect of 
reward. However, experimental evidence elucidating the exact neural mechanism by which 
changes in reward motivation inform flexible control is lacking. A primary candidate for this 
function is the nucleus accumbens core (AcbC), which has been proposed as a link between 
motivation and cognition by several theoretical accounts. 
The current study aimed to develop a rewarded task-switching paradigm in rodents, in 
parallel to a paradigm extensively studied in humans. Using this paradigm, we subsequently 
aimed to test whether lesions of the AcbC disrupt the integration of reward information and 
cued flexible control.   
First, rats learned to discriminate between two auditory (A1 - A2) and two visual (V1 - V2) 
stimuli, which were associated with a distinct task cue. Further, training and testing took 
place in high (3 pellet) and low (1 pellet) reward contexts. On test, animals were presented 
with response-incongruent compound stimuli (A1V2 / A2V1) and had to rely on the task cue 
to disambiguate which of the stimuli (i.e. auditory or visual) would yield a rewarded response. 
Within this test, on a trial-by-trial basis, the task cue could either switch (e.g. auditory -> 
visual) or remain the same (e.g. auditory -> auditory), allowing the assessment of proactive 
flexible control by comparing switch and repeat trials. Task-switching performance improved 
in the high reward condition, but only in animals with an intact AcbC (prior to surgery or 
after sham surgery). These findings provide direct evidence that the AcbC is involved in using 
reward information to optimize cognitive control. 
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Introduction
When an animal is foraging for berries and suddenly comes across a nut tree (a cue) it may 
want to update its current goal and switch behaviour appropriately (from searching for 
berries to gathering nuts). Now consider that an animal is foraging in fall- or springtime, 
the expected reward will be higher in fall, and thus an animal may exert more control (e.g. 
be more flexible) to find blackberries and nuts in this season. Many everyday actions require 
flexible adaptation when environmental conditions change, and the use of cues can facilitate 
such adaptation. Cues can be differentially informative, with certain cues indicating which 
action will be rewarded, and others signifying the amount of reward to be received.
It is well known that cognitive control processes are under the influence of reward motivation, 
allowing agents to select the most appropriate and beneficial course of action (Balleine and 
Dickinson, 1998; Locke and Braver, 2008; Padmala and Pessoa, 2010, 2011; Aarts et al., 
2014b), (for reviews see: Pessoa and Engelmann, 2010; Aarts et al., 2011; Braver et al., 2014). 
Despite a well-established role for motivation in influencing cognitive control, surprisingly 
little is known about which neural mechanisms are crucial for such integration. Several 
functional neuroimaging studies in humans report increased neural activity in response to 
reward in regions typically involved in cognitive control, such as the prefrontal cortex, e.g. the 
inferior frontal gyrus (Locke and Braver, 2008) and the dorsal striatum (Aarts et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, several theories suggest a role for the human ventral striatum (VS) or rodent 
nucleus accumbens core (AcbC) in mediating a link between motivation and cognitive/
action control (Mogenson et al., 1980; Pessoa, 2009; Mannella et al., 2013; Floresco, 2015), 
suggesting that the VS/AcbC modulates the efficient pursuit of rewards or other goals in a 
constantly changing environment. However, direct evidence for a causal role of the VS/AcbC 
has thus far not been provided. 
Assessing whether there is a direct, causal role of the VS in integrating reward and cognitive 
control in humans is prevented by ethical and methodological issues. The difficulty in assessing 
this in rodents, on the other hand, is that existing paradigms for measuring (rewarded) flexible 
control are conceptually different from the paradigms used in human studies, preventing 
direct cross-species comparison. Specifically, task-switching paradigms employed in humans 
typically require a trial-by-trial adaptation to task-sets in response to external cues (Meiran, 
1996; Monsell, 2003). In contrast, rodent paradigms assessing flexible cognitive control 
include reversal learning, set-shifting, and extradimensional shift (EDS) paradigms, none of 
which involve the use of cues to initiate behavioural changes nor manipulate reward size, but 
instead assess an animals’ capacity to learn that the rule has changed (Birrell and Brown, 2000; 
Ragozzino et al., 2002; Floresco et al., 2008a; for a review see: Bizon et al., 2012). Although 
informative about aspects of flexible control, these paradigms ignore the more efficient 
process of using cues to switch actions (e.g. switching to foraging for nuts is more efficient in 
the presence of a nut tree than having to encounter several nuts before switching) and ignore 
the integration of motivational processes (which are generally held constant for such tasks). 
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A well-established paradigm to assess the effect of reward on flexible behaviour in human 
subjects is the rewarded task-switching paradigm (Aarts et al., 2010; van Holstein et al., 2011; 
Aarts et al., 2014a; Aarts et al., 2015; Etzel et al., 2015; Fuentes-Claramonte et al., 2015), which 
allows the assessment of flexible control in low and high reward conditions separately. A 
similar rodent paradigm that can tap into these processes, i.e. switching between tasks based 
on external cues and the effect of reward motivation on this cognitive process, will help the 
advancement of understanding the neural mechanisms underlying this process in a manner 
that is unconfounded by learning and working memory. In the current study we developed 
such a paradigm in rodents, and subsequently assessed whether lesions of the AcbC impair 
successful motivation-cognition integration.
Methods
Subjects
Twenty-four experimentally naive male hooded Wistar rats were used as subjects. The animals 
were housed in yellow-tinted plastic boxes located in a temperature and humidity -controlled 
colony room. They were housed in twos or threes and maintained on a 12 h light/dark cycle. 
Animals were handled daily for 4 days before training and were kept on a food deprivation 
schedule during training and testing to maintain them at ~85% of their free feeding weight. 
All procedures were approved by the Animal Ethics Committee at the University of Sydney. 
Apparatus and stimuli
Training and testing took place in 16 MED Associates (East Fairfield, VT) operant chambers 
(32 x 25 x 25 cm) with a transparent Perspex ceiling, wall and door. Each operant chamber 
was enclosed in sound- and light-resistant cabinets and equipped with a pellet dispenser 
that delivered grain pellets (45mg, BioServe Biotechnologies, Beltsville, MD) into a recessed 
food magazine. The chamber contained two retractable levers at either side of the magazine. 
Visual stimuli consisted of a panel light (flashing or steady) above each lever. Auditory stimuli 
(~80dB) were produced by a 28V DC mechanical relay that delivered a 5Hz clicker sound 
and a sonalert that delivered a 3kHz tone. Task cues were the house light (3W, 24 V) located 
on the wall opposite the magazine and white noise produced by a white noise generator. 
Two computers running MED Associates software controlled the experimental events and 
recorded lever presses. All stimuli were presented against a background sound produced by 
the ventilation fan (~60 dB). 
To signal the reward condition (i.e. high or low reward), the physical appearance of the boxes 
was manipulated by placing wallpaper behind the Perspex (black and white stripes or black 
dots on a white background), by placing floorboards on top of the stainless steel floors (smooth 
black or coarse transparent plastic) and by delivering a distinct scent (vanilla or peppermint) 
to each chamber before the start of a session. This resulted in two distinct reward contexts; 
RC-A (striped wallpaper, smooth floors, vanilla scent), and RC-B (dotted wallpapers, coarse 
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floors and peppermint scent). 
Behavioural procedures
We aimed to develop a paradigm similar to the paradigm studied extensively in humans. A 
detailed description of the paradigm used in humans can be found elsewhere (Aarts et al., 
2010; van Holstein et al., 2011; Aarts et al., 2015). 
In the rodent version of this paradigm, animals received pre-training-, discrimination 
training-, and finally test sessions, each of which took place in either reward context (RC-A 
or RC-B). Each animal always received either one or three food pellets in a certain context, 
i.e. half the animals always received one pellet per reward delivery in RC-A (low reward 
condition) and three pellets in RC-B (high reward condition), whereas the other animals 
received the opposite arrangement. Each animal received two training sessions or tests per 
day (separated by at least 4 hours); one in a high- and one in a low reward context, the order 
of which was counterbalanced. 
Pre-training and discrimination training procedures, with the exception of the reward 
context, were similar to previously described by Haddon and Killcross (2006). All sessions 
took place in either a high or low reward context (counterbalanced).
Training procedure
Pre-training
After 4 days of food deprivation, rats were given two 30 min sessions of magazine training. 
During each session a reward (1 or 3 pellets, depending on the context) was delivered on 
average every 60 seconds. On the following four days, rats received two daily 36 min sessions 
of lever press training. During these sessions levers were extended for 60 s each in random 
alternation (6 left and 6 right lever presentations) with a variable inter-trial-interval of 45-195 
s (mean 120s). Initially lever pressing took place at a continuous reinforcement schedule 
(resulting in one or three pellets, depending on the context). On the second day this was 
increased to a RI15 schedule, which remained in place for the remainder of the experiment. 
Discrimination training
Animals received two sessions (of ~ 85 minutes each) of discrimination training on each 
day for 15 days. In one training session, rats were presented with two auditory stimuli (A1 
and A2) and on the alternate training session, rats were presented with two visual (V1 and 
V2) stimuli, during which both left and right levers were available but only one of the levers 
rewarded. Within each modality, one of the stimuli (A1 during auditory sessions and V1 
during visual sessions) indicated that left but not right lever presses would be rewarded, 
whereas the other stimuli (A2 and V2) indicated the opposite arrangement (e.g. A1-L, A2-R 
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Table 6.1 Experimental design: discrimination training 
Reward context Task cue (60s) Discrimination stimulus (60s) 
  
First 10s  
(no reward)* 
Last 50s (RI15) 
 
Low  
AÙD  
A1  LL  
A1  RL  
1 pellet 
no reward 
A2  RL  
A2  LL  
1 pellet 
no reward 
VIS  
V1  LL  
V1  RL  
1 pellet 
no reward 
V2  RL  
V2  LL  
1 pellet 
no reward 
High 
AUD  
A1  LL  
A1  RL  
3 pellets 
no reward 
A2  RL  
A2  LL  
3 pellets 
no reward 
VIS  
V1  LL  
V1  RL  
3 pellets 
no reward 
V2  RL  
V2  LL  
3 pellets 
no reward 
Reward contexts were determined by wallpaper, floorboards and odour. AUD and VIS are auditory and 
visual discrimination cues, respectively (white noise and house light), A1, A2, V1 and V2 refer to auditory 
stimulus 1 and 2 (i.e. tone and clicker), and visual stimuli 1 and 2 (steady and flashing panel lights). 
Contexts, task cues and discrimination stimuli are counterbalanced.  
* The presentation of the stimulus lasted for the full duration of the trial (60s), but a response was never 
rewarded during the first 10s of a trial. A trial ended with the retraction of both levers and a variable inter-
trial-interval (30s-90s) 
	
and V1-L, V2-R) (table 6.1). Each session took place in one of the two reward contexts, which 
determined the size of the reward earned by each ‘correct’ lever press (i.e. 1 or 3 pellets). The 
order of the session (VIS followed by AUD or AUD followed by VIS) and its reward context 
were counterbalanced. Further, a session consisted of 24 ‘trials’ each of which comprised a 60 
s presentation of the task cue (white noise or house light indicating auditory or visual stimuli, 
counterbalanced) followed by a 60 s presentation of one of the target stimuli. A1 and A2 were 
each presented pseudorandomly for 12 trials during auditory sessions, and V1 and V2 were 
each presented pseudorandomly for 12 trials during visual sessions. At this stage the task cues 
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served to form an association between the task cue (noise and house light) and the relevant 
task (auditory or visual discrimination), although these associations did not become relevant 
until test. Trials were separated by inter-trial-intervals of 30s – 90s, during which the levers 
were retracted. For each ‘correct’ lever press a reward became available on average every 15 
seconds (RI15 schedule), with the restriction that a reward was never delivered during the 
first 10s of a trial. All reward contexts, stimuli, and task cues were counterbalanced across 
animals. Table 6.1 shows the design and conditions for all animals. 
Cued task-switching paradigm with reward manipulation 
On the day immediately following the last training day, animals were tested. During test 
(table 6.2, figure 6.1), the task cue was presented for 60s, followed by a 60s presentation of 
a response-incongruent compound stimulus (i.e. A1-V2 or A2-V1, for which one stimulus 
signals left lever presses will be rewarded, but the other stimulus signals right lever presses 
will be rewarded). Animals had to disambiguate these compound stimuli (i.e. whether to 
respond to the auditory or visual modality) by taking into account the task cue. For example, 
a presentation of A1-V2 preceded by the auditory task cue indicated that the animal should 
attend to the stimulus of the auditory modality, A1, and choose the associated lever press (left 
lever). The same A1-V2 compound preceded by the visual task cue, however, indicated that 
the animal should attend to the visual modality, and press the right lever. Again, ‘correct’ lever 
presses were rewarded according to an RI15 schedule, and never during the first 10s of each 
compound presentation.
The design of this task afforded a unique opportunity to examine the animals’ performance 
on a trial-by-trial basis. Crucially, the task cue (i.e. AUD or VIS) could either remain the same 
(i.e. repeat: AUD -> AUD or VIS -> VIS) or change (i.e. switch: AUD -> VIS or VIS -> AUD) 
unexpectedly from trial to trial, allowing the assessment of task-switch performance (i.e. 
performance on task-switch versus task-repeat trials) (figure 6.1). One test session consisted 
of 17 trials; one initiation trial (this was discarded, because is it not a repeat nor a switch trial), 
followed by a random alternation of eight visual (four A1-V2 and four A2-V1) and eight 
auditory trials (four A1-V2 and four A2-V1), with half the trials being task repetitions and 
the other half being switch trials.  
All 24 animals received the test twice on one day, once in each reward context (in 
counterbalanced order: AB or BA). After surgery all animals completed an additional two 
days of testing in an ABBA design.   
Surgery
In the next phase of the experiment, half the animals received excitotoxic lesions of the 
AcbC and half underwent sham surgery. Next animals received an additional five days of 
discrimination training, followed immediately by two days of testing (again two tests on each 
day in each reward context), allowing the assessment of the effect of lesions of the AcbC on 
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Table 6.2 Experimental design: test 
Task cue Compound stimuli Correct lever Reward context 
   Low [RC-A] High [RC-B] 
8 x AUD 
4 x A1-V2 Lever 1 1 pellet 3 pellets 
4 x A2-V1 Lever 2 1 pellet 3 pellets 
8 x VIS 
4 x A1-V2 Lever 2 1 pellet 3 pellets 
4 x A2-V1 Lever 1 1 pellet 3 pellets 
Task cues (noise and house light): AUD (auditory) and VIS (visual) signal the relevant modality; compound 
stimuli are composed of one of two auditory stimuli (A1 or A2; clicker and tone) and one of two visual 
stimuli (V2 or V1; flashing or steady panel lights), creating a response incongruent compound; In case of 
AUD  A1-V2 a left lever press is rewarded, whereas in case of VIS  A1-A2 a right lever press is 
rewarded with 1 or 3 pellets depending on the reward context (RC).  
	
response
TRIAL 4
task switch
le lever right lever
TRIAL 3
task repeat
le lever right lever
TRIAL 2
task switch
le lever right lever
TRIAL 1
le lever right lever
task cue
target
low reward block
high reward block
feedback
Figure  6.1  Cued task-switching paradigm with reward manipulation
On test, animals were presented with response-incongruent combinations of the auditory and visual 
stimuli (e.g. tone and house light), inducing a response conflict. Resolving this conflict correctly required 
the use of the task cue. For example, when a tone and flashing panel lights (associated with a left and 
right lever press, respectively) were preceded by a task cue signalling the auditory task (e.g. white noise), 
a left lever press would lead to a reward. However, when the same combination of stimuli was preceded 
by the presentation of the house light, a discrimination based on the visual stimulus was required 
(i.e. a right lever press was correct). Crucially, this paradigm allowed the trial-by-trial manipulation 
of a repetition or switch of the task set, allowing a direct comparison of performance on repeat (i.e. 
auditory -> auditory and visual -> visual) and switch (auditory -> visual and visual -> auditory) trials. 
In addition, animals were trained and tested in two distinct reward contexts, allowing the assessment of 
task-switching under different reward circumstances. 
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rewarded task-switching performance. 
Stereotaxic surgery was performed under isoflurane anaesthesia. Animals were placed on a 
stereotaxic apparatus (David Kopf Instruments) and received subcutaneously injections with 
0.1 ml of bupivicaine at the incision site. An incision was made to expose the skull and the 
incisor bar was adjusted to align bregma and lambda in the same horizontal plane. Excitotoxic 
lesions were made by infusing 0.4 µl of N-methyl-D-aspertate (NMDA: 10mg/ml in saline) 
over 4 minutes into the AcbC [anteroposterior +1.6, mediolateral +/- 2.2, dorsoventral -7.5 
mm relative from bregma, according to the rat brain atlas  (Paxinos and Watson, 2007)]. The 
needle was left in place for 2 minutes to allow for diffusion before being retracted. Animals in 
the sham group underwent the exact same procedure, except that only saline was infused. At 
the end of surgery, animals received a subcutaneous injection of 0.1 ml Rimadyl and 0.2 ml 
intraperitoneal injection of procaine penicillin solution (300mg/kg). Rats were given at least 6 
(max. 10) days to recover and were subjected to 4 days of food deprivation before the start of 
5 days of additional discrimination training and two test days.        
Histology
Rats were deeply anaesthetized with sodium pentobarbital and transcardially perfused with 
400 ml of 4% paraformaldehyde in 0.1 M sodium phosphate buffer. Brains were postfixed for 
1 hour in 4% paraformaldehyde, rinsed in phosphate buffered saline (PBS) for 30 minutes 
before being placed in 30% sucrose solution in PBS overnight. The brains were frozen and 
40 µm sections were collected on a cryostat. Every third section was collected on a slide and 
stained with cresyl violet. Slides were examined for placement and extent of the lesion by 
microscopically examining the sections. 
Statistical tests
Discrimination training data are presented as the average number of correct and incorrect 
lever presses per minute (recorded during the first 10s of each trial) on the auditory and visual 
discrimination sessions separately, and collapsed across the two stimuli. 
We present performance on test in terms of accuracy (correct minus incorrect lever presses, 
again as an average per minute recorded during the first 10s of each trial). We assessed the 
effect of reward on task-switching performance with a repeated-measures GLM with the 
factors reward (high vs. low), switching (switch vs. repeat) and accuracy (correct vs. incorrect) 
and anticipated that reward would improve task-switching performance. 
To increase the number of trials on the post-surgery test (where the group sizes are smaller, 
i.e. 12 instead of 24 during pre-surgery testing), all animals received two tests (post1 and 
post2) in each reward condition in an ABBA design. We first assessed whether there were 
any effects of session (post1 vs. post2) on rewarded task-switching performance or overall 
accuracy. In the absence of an interaction, we collapsed data across post-tests. 
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Table 6.3 Discrimination training  
 AUD VIS 
Day 
Correct 
Mean (SEM) 
Incorrect 
mean (SEM) F(1,23) 
Correct 
Mean(SEM) 
Incorrect 
mean (SEM) F(1,23) 
1 18.81 (3.07) 18.85 (2.68) < 1 17.69 (3.02) 20.19 (3.08) 5.429 * 
2 29.13 (3.90) 20.10 (2.29) 15.042 *** 24.19 (3.20) 24.48 (3.43) <1 
3 28.31 (3.45) 17.17 (2.09) 27.455 *** 28.69 (4.41) 26.50 (3.96)  3.372 ^ 
4 40.96 (5.13) 22.85 (2.45) 31.353 *** 30.33 (3.17) 29.48 (3.21)   <1 
5 44.06 (4.21) 21.54 (2.43)  47.350 *** 38.75 (3.37) 34.46 (3.06) 11.607 ** 
6 45.29 (3.53) 22.44 (2.07)  75.362 *** 42.79 (3.68) 35.77 (3.09)  15.027 *** 
7 56.50 (6.27) 25.98 (3.10)  54.420 *** 51.52 (4.59) 44.15 (2.65)  4.347 * 
8 58.31 (4.28) 28.90 (3.68)  72.552 *** 52.04 (4.25) 40.79 (3.73)  25.108 *** 
9 65.92 (5.75) 22.10 (2.39)  89.538 *** 55.69 (5.78) 40.77 (4.13)  20.971 *** 
10 68.56 (7.04) 27.52 (2.91)  51.151 *** 49.27 (4.85) 37.15 (3.42)  23.008 *** 
11 66.67 (6.05) 26.60 (2.51)  60.396 *** 57.15 (7.47) 36.54 (3.93)  22.899 *** 
12 67.92 (5.99) 24.35 (2.47)  44.035 *** 61.56 (6.01) 40.17 (3.56)  22.500 *** 
13 75.90 (6.68) 27.23 (3.13)  82.304 *** 65.92 (6.75) 49.88 (4.67)  16.281 *** 
14 82.67 (8.44) 28.81 (3.22)  44.893 *** 62.00 (5.95) 39.90 (3.67)  33.093 *** 
15 78.25 (5.61) 29.77 (2.51) 77.400 *** 63.65 (6.01) 39.48 (3.67)  19.949 *** 
^ = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001,  
bold = significant after correction for multiple (i.e. 30) t-tests:  p < 0.001 
 
We anticipated that all animals, except for those with lesions of the AcbC would show 
increased flexibility in the high vs. low reward condition. To assess the role of the AcbC, 
we first assessed whether surgery affected rewarded task-switching performance in the sham 
and lesion group separately, by comparing performance on pre- and post-surgery sessions. 
We anticipated an effect of surgery in the lesion group, but not in the sham group. Next, 
we assessed group effects on rewarded task-switching performance, by directly comparing 
the group effect in the pre- and post-surgery sessions separately. We anticipated differences 
between the sham and lesion group after, but not prior to surgery. 
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Results
Discrimination training
A repeated measures GLM with the factor accuracy (correct vs. incorrect) confirmed that, 
by the end of training, animals were able to reliably discriminate between the two auditory 
stimuli (F(1,23) = 77.400, p < 0.001, η2 =0.771) and between the two visual stimuli (F(1,23) 
= 19..949, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.464; Table 6.3). Reliable discrimination between the correct and 
incorrect lever was achieved during day 2 of training on the auditory training and from day 8 
onwards for the visual discrimination training (Table 6.3).
Reward context can alter task-switching performance
Importantly, animals were able to use the task cue to successfully discriminate between the 
response-incongruent stimuli, which was reflected by a main effect of accuracy (correct vs. 
incorrect lever presses: (F(1,23) = 4.667, p = 0.041, η2 = 0.169). We did not observe a main 
effect of reward or of task-switching in terms of accuracy (F < 1).  
The reward context affected task-switching performance. More specifically, animals were 
better at switching between the auditory and visual modalities in each compound stimulus 
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Figure 6.2  Task switching differences in the high versus low reward context 
A: For each reward context (high and low), the performance on switch and repeat trials is shown. The y 
axis represents the number of correct vs. incorrect lever presses (per minute), recorded during the first 
10s of each trial. Error bars represent standard errors of the difference between correct and incorrect 
responses.
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Figure 6.3  Lesion placement showing the extent (left) and peak (right) of the lesion as veri-
fied using Nissl staining for the nucleus accumbens core
Shading indicates the extent (left) or peak (right) of the lesion of each subject. The extent is represented 
as the stacked layers across subjects. 
(dependent on the task cue) in the high reward context relative to the low reward context 
(figure 6.2). This was evidenced by a significant reward x task switching interaction (F(1,23) 
= 11.395, p = 0.003, η2 = 0.331, figure 6.2). Breaking down this interaction revealed that the 
switch cost in the low reward context, i.e. a numerically higher accuracy on repeat than switch 
trials (F(1,23) = 3.188, p = 0.087, η2 = 0.122, figure 6.2), reversed into a switch benefit in the 
high reward condition (F(1,23) = 7.411, p = 0.012, η2 = 0.244; figure 6.2). 
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Histology and pre-surgery differences between groups
Figure 6.3 shows the extent (left) and peaks (right) of the lesions. Although lesions that 
extended into the shell were excluded from analyses, a small portion of the striatum dorsal to 
the core was sometimes affected. Seven animals were excluded after histology due to either 
the presence of unilateral lesions and/or extension of damage into the NAc shell or peaks 
located outside of the AcbC, resulting in 12 animals with AcbC lesions and 12 shams. 
Prior to surgery, the groups were well matched on discrimination training and test performance. 
More specifically, on the final day of training, we observed no group-by-accuracy effect on 
auditory (F(1,22) = 2.182, p > 0.1) or visual (F(1,22) = 2.644, p > 0.1) discrimination. In 
addition, prior to surgery, the lesion group did not differ from the sham group in terms of 
rewarded task-switching performance (F(1,22) < 1; figure 6.4), or in terms of overall accuracy 
on test (F(1,22) < 1). 
Retraining 
The lesions did not affect discrimination training; by the end of five days of retraining, the 
groups did not differ in terms of either auditory or visual discrimination (group x accuracy: 
F(1,22) = 2.594, p > 0.1 and F(1,22) < 1, respectively). Also, the surgery did not differentially 
affect retraining across 5 days (time x group x accuracy: all F(1,19) < 1). After correcting for 
multiple (i.e. 10) tests, animals were able to reliably discriminate between the auditory stimuli 
on all 5 days (all F(1,23) > 27.883, all p < 0.001, all η2 > 0.548) and between the visual stimuli 
from day 3 onwards (all F(1,23) > 10.731, all p < 0.004, all η2 > 0.318). Animals were not able 
to reliably discriminate between the visual stimuli on the first two days (the main effect of 
accuracy was not significant after multiple comparison correction: F(1,23) = 8.273, p < 0.009 
and F(1,23) = 9.192, p < 0.006, respectively).
Lesions of the nucleus accumbens core affect rewarded task-switching performance
No test-retest effect on rewarded task-switching performance
All animals performed the post-surgery test twice in each reward context. We first confirmed 
that the effect of reward on task-switching performance did not vary as function of session 
(F(1,22) < 1). Also, there were no overall differences in terms of accuracy between sessions 
(F(1,22) = 2.537, p > 0.1) and we did not observe any group differences in accuracy between 
the sessions (F(1,22 = 2.152, p > 0.1). In all subsequent analyses, the data were collapsed 
across these two sessions. 
Lesions of the nucleus accumbens core alter rewarded task-switching performance
Sham surgeries (i.e. pre-surgery test vs. post-surgery tests) had no effect on rewarded task-
switching performance. Surgery did not significantly affect performance in the sham group 
(surgery x reward x switching x accuracy: F(1,11) = 2.806, p > 0.1), thus across all sessions, 
task-switching performance in the sham group improved in the high- compared with low 
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reward condition (reward x task switching x accuracy: F(1,11) = 7.651, p = 0.018, η2 = 0.410; 
figure 6.4). In addition, sham surgeries did not affect overall accuracy (surgery x accuracy: 
F(1,11) < 1; main effect of accuracy: F(1,11) = 4.997, p = 0.047, η2 = 0.312). 
Surgeries in the group with lesions of the AcbC on the other hand, did affect rewarded task-
switching performance (surgery x reward x task switching x accuracy: F(1,11) = 6.782, p = 
0.025, η2 = 0.381; figure 6.4), without affecting overall performance (surgery x accuracy: 
F(1,11) < 1; main effect of accuracy: F(1,11) = 13.189, p = 0.004, η2 = 0.545). More specifically, 
prior to surgery, the task-switching performance improved in the high compared with a low 
reward context (reward x task switching x accuracy: F(1,11) = 4.850, p = 0.05, η2 = 0.306), 
while this pattern was reversed after lesions of the core (reward x task switching x accuracy: 
F(1,11) = 6.133, p = 0.031, η2 = 0.358). The reversal of the effect was characterized by improved 
task-switching performance on low reward trials after surgery (F(1,11) = 6.788, p = 0.024, η2 
= 0.382), in combination with a numerical impairment on task-switching performance during 
high reward trials (F(1,11) = 3.229, p = 0.1, η2 = 0.227). This effect was confirmed by directly 
comparing the groups, showing a difference between the sham and lesion group after surgery 
(group x reward x switch x accuracy: F(1,22) = 8.099, p = 0.009, η2 = 0.269), which was not 
present before surgery (group x reward x switch x accuracy: F(1,22) < 1; group x accuracy 
(F(1,22) < 1). This difference was due to a relative task-switch improvement in the lesion 
group in the low reward context (F(1,22) = 7.492, p = 0.012, η2 = 0.254), and a numerical 
impairment in this group in task-switching performance in the high reward context (F(1,22) 
= 1.188, p > 0.1), compared with the sham group. 
In summary, prior to surgery, task-switching performance was overall better in the high, 
compared with low reward context. Sham surgeries did not affect this beneficial effect of 
a high reward context on task-switching performance, whereas lesions of the AcbC did. 
Importantly, lesions of the AcbC did not affect overall accuracy on test, or performance 
during discrimination training. 
Discussion 
The current study assessed whether the core of the nucleus accumbens plays a crucial role 
in exerting motivational control over behaviour, thereby facilitating an agent to effectively 
pursue goals. Using a paradigm in rodents that parallels a well-established paradigm in 
human subjects (Aarts et al., 2010; van Holstein et al., 2011; Aarts et al., 2014a; Aarts et al., 
2015), (and see Etzel et al., 2015; Fuentes-Claramonte et al., 2015) we showed that animals 
were able to use cues to prepare for an upcoming change in cognitive demands and that 
this task-switching ability was improved in a high reward context. This ability to improve 
cognitive control in a high-reward situation changed after excitotoxic lesions of the AcbC. 
More specifically, animals with an intact AcbC exhibited better cognitive control in a high 
relative to a low reward situation, whereas this effect was reversed after lesions of the AcbC. 
The reversal of this effect was characterized in particular by improved task-switching 
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performance in the low reward condition, in combination with marginally impaired task-
switching performance in the high reward context in animals without an intact AcbC. 
Importantly, lesions of the AcbC did not impair flexible control per se (i.e. lesions did not affect 
accuracy on the task-switching paradigm). This finding fits remarkably well with previous 
studies, although none assessed directly whether manipulating the amount of reward earned 
when executing an appropriate action alters cognitive control. Classical learning paradigms 
Figure 6.4 | Performance (accuracy) in terms of switch cost (repeat – switch)
We observed no effect of sham surgery on overall or rewarded task-switching performance, while an 
effect of surgery on rewarded task-switching performance was observed in the group with lesions of 
the accumbens core, without affecting overall accuracy. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
difference. 
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have established a role for the AcbC in helping animals to choose the best action based on 
prospective rewards. Disrupted functioning of the AcbC in these studies generally reduces 
the facilitation of appropriate responses, for example assessed with general Pavlovian to 
instrumental transfer (g-PIT) or cue-induced reinstatement (Floresco et al., 2008b; Corbit 
and Balleine, 2011). In a PIT procedure, animals receive instrumental- (learning to press a 
lever to obtain a food reward) and Pavlovian conditioning (learning that a cue predicts the 
delivery of an outcome), followed by a test on which the Pavlovian stimulus (CS) is delivered 
with the levers present. The presence of a CS increases lever pressing, i.e. the association 
between a cue and a reward facilitates instrumental performance, but only in  animals with an 
intact AcbC (Corbit and Balleine, 2011). In addition to this general enhancement of reward-
related cues, Pavlovian cues can also selectively increase performance on the basis of the 
specific outcome predicted by the cue. Animals with lesions of the AcbC are still able to show 
this specific PIT effect. In the current study, optimal behaviour would entail the facilitation 
of flexible control in the high reward context over the low reward context. This facilitation 
of flexible control under high reward was impaired after lesions of the AcbC. Also, lesions 
of the AcbC are known to reduce the inhibition of inappropriate actions, during outcome 
devaluation (Shiflett and Balleine, 2010) (Corbit et al., 2001), (but see de Borchgrave et al., 
2002). After instrumental training on two levers which deliver two distinct outcomes, the 
value of one of the outcomes is reduced (e.g. by allowing animals to consume one of the 
outcomes freely). During a subsequent test, animals with an intact AcbC reduce responding 
to the lever which previously delivered the devalued outcome. After lesions of the AcbC 
however, animals no longer show this inhibition. In the current study, the suboptimal strategy 
would be to maximize cognitive control in the low reward context over the high reward 
context. In line with a role for the AcbC in the inhibition of inappropriate behaviour, we 
observed that animals with lesions of the AcbC exhibited more cognitive control in the low 
reward context than did animals with sham lesions. Combined, these results suggest that the 
AcbC is necessary to facilitate appropriate responses (e.g. when a CS predicts a reward) and 
to inhibit irrelevant responses (e.g. when the outcome is undesirable). 
Another field of research suggesting a role for the AcbC in facilitating and suppressing 
goals shows that animals without an intact AcbC are impaired when facing a situation that 
requires a shift in strategy (Floresco et al., 2006a). However, this deficit was clearly distinct 
from set-shifting deficits typically observed after lesions of cognitive control areas, such as the 
dorsomedial striatum (DMS) or the prelimbic cortex (PL). Animals with lesions in the DS and 
PL generally fail to make the initial shift (i.e. they persevere on the old rule (Ragozzino et al., 
2002; Ragozzino, 2007). After lesions of the AcbC on the other hand, animals show no deficit 
on the initial switch. Instead, their deficit is characterized by an inability to eliminate irrelevant 
responses after they initially switch, i.e. animals occasionally go back to the previously correct 
(i.e. now incorrect) response. These studies fit well with a role for the AcbC in orienting 
behaviour to optimize cognitive control in order to obtain rewards (Floresco et al., 2006a). A 
failure to optimize cognitive control may result in inefficient facilitation of control in a low 
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reward context, and the failure to allocate more control in a high than low reward context. We 
demonstrate, for the first time, that reward plays a crucial role in this process, by showing that 
manipulating the size of a reward can alter cognitive control in rodents, and that the AcbC is 
crucial for maintaining the balance between suppressing irrelevant and facilitating relevant 
goals. 
Although not directly tested in the current study, we would like to elaborate on a potential 
neural circuitry by which information about rewards can modulate cognitive and action 
goals. Such a mechanism should allow information from the AcbC about which goals to 
pursuit, to be conveyed to cognitive-control regions involved in flexible control i.e. the DMS 
(Ragozzino, 2007). Previous work in human subjects has revealed that reward motivation can 
enhance task-related signalling in the human homologue of the rodent DMS (i.e. the caudate 
nucleus: (Aarts et al., 2010; Aarts et al., 2015). One mechanism perfectly suited to subserve 
this interaction is via spiralling striato-nigro-striatal connections (Haber et al., 2000). These 
dopaminergic midbrain connections allow information in the AcbC to be conveyed to more 
dorsal regions of the striatum  involved in goal-directed control (i.e. DMS) and actions and 
habits (i.e. the dorsolateral striatum; DLS) (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010). A functional role 
for these connections has been shown previously by exploiting the knowledge that the AcbC is 
involved in the acquisition of drug seeking, but that drug seeking is mediated by the DLS after 
prolonged training (Belin and Everitt, 2008). Using an elegant design, these authors showed 
that disconnecting the AcbC from the DLS impairs the transition to habits. Importantly, in 
one hemisphere the AcbC remained intact (but its connection with the DLS was disrupted), 
while in the other hemisphere the DLS was intact (but its dopaminergic input from the AcbC 
was disrupted). Future work will have to reveal whether input from the AcbC to the DMS, or 
signalling in the AcbC itself, is crucial for optimal motivation-cognition integration. 
Using the rewarded task-switching paradigm in humans, we repeatedly observed dopamine-
dependent effects on behaviour and striatal responses (e.g. Aarts et al., 2010; Aarts et al., 
2015). In addition, we showed that a dopamine D2 receptor agonist did not alter behavioral 
integration of reward and task-switching, but that it did modulate task-switching performance 
(irrespective of reward) (van Holstein et al., 2011). It is possible that dopamine D1 receptor 
stimulation is modulating the effect of reward on task switching, also given the role for 
dopamine D1 receptor stimulation in reward processing (Ikemoto et al., 1997; Meririnne et 
al., 2001). Future work in rodents should test this, as D1 specific agents are not available for 
research in human subjects.
Our previous observation that dopamine D2 receptor stimulation modulates flexible cognitive 
control is well in line with set-shifting work in rodents (Floresco et al., 2006b). However, when 
comparing these task- switching and set- shifting studies, it is important to keep in mind that 
they are conceptually different and that different neural systems may underlie these processes. 
One important distinction to keep in mind is that the task-switching paradigm requires the 
alternation between well-established task-sets, in which the striatum is involved (Cools et al., 
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2001a) whereas prefrontal regions and prefrontal dopamine D2 receptor stimulation plays a 
more prominent role in ED shifting (Floresco et al., 2006b; Robbins, 2007). Future work will 
need to elucidate the differences between the neural mechanisms underlying these different 
forms of behavioral flexibility.   
This study was not without limitations and future work should aim to address these. Although 
the current design parallels the paradigm we use in our work with human subjects, a number 
of differences between the rodent and human version should be noted. First, in human subjects 
we manipulated the amount of reward on a trial-by-trial basis (Aarts et al., 2010), instead of in 
blocks, as is done in the rodent version. However, blocked designs have been proven effective 
in revealing reward-related effects on cognition in studies with human subjects (Kouneiher 
et al., 2009; Jimura et al., 2010). Second, the paradigm in humans presents a large number of 
trials in a fast succession. It is well documented that increased preparation times reduce the 
switch cost (Monsell, 2003). The current experimental design was based on previous work in 
which conflict adaptation was successfully achieved in rodents (Haddon and Killcross, 2006), 
and a first step was to expand this to the task-switching domain. The long presentation of task 
cues in the current paradigm may explain the absence of a main effect of task-switching in the 
current study. An obvious next step would be to see if the trial duration can be reduced, by 
increasing the number of trials, reducing the duration of the task cues and/or training animals 
to perform one action per trial. 
Nevertheless, we show for the first time that a complex, cue-driven task-switching task can 
translate across species from humans to rodents. Also, we provide the first direct, causal 
evidence that performance on this task relies on the AcbC, as we would expect from previous 
neuroimaging work in humans (Pessoa, 2009; Aarts et al., 2010). This novel paradigm provides 
important new opportunities for assessing the neural basis of a range of neuropsychiatric 
disorders which have been associated with deficits in the functioning of the AcbC and/or 
corticostriatal circuits (e.g. schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, addiction 
and obsessive compulsive disorder (Graybiel and Rauch, 2000; Belin and Everitt, 2008; 
Shepherd, 2013; Aarts et al., 2015; Morris et al., 2015). 
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Abstract 
Motivational, cognitive and action goals have been proposed to be processed by distinct 
corticostriatal circuits that are organized hierarchically. Reward motivation has been 
proposed to influence cognitive and motor processing via guiding information flow through 
an anterior/ventromedial to posterior/dorsolateral cascade of topographically specific regions 
of the striatum and frontal cortex. Here we tested this hypothesis in human volunteers by 
investigating effects of offline transcranial magnetic stimulation of distinct frontal regions 
associated with reward, cognition and action processing, on task-related signaling in distinct 
regions of the striatum. Immediately after stimulation of the anterior prefrontal cortex 
(aPFC), the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, or the premotor cortex, participants performed an 
established paradigm assessing reward anticipation (motivation), task switching (cognition), 
response switching (action) and their integration, while neural responses were measured 
with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Stimulation of the aPFC, and not of 
the other cortical regions, decreased reward-related processing in the caudate nucleus, while 
it decreased processing in the putamen during the interaction of reward, task switching and 
response switching. Thus stimulation of the aPFC altered processing in distinct regions of 
the striatum as a function of task demands, providing evidence for a functional cascade of 
processing across corticostriatal circuits via the striatum. 
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Introduction
The ability to adapt flexibly to our constantly changing environment requires our actions to 
be goal-directed, and goals to be hierarchically organized (Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007). 
Accordingly, when defining goals at different levels, we can distinguish between motivational 
goals (e.g. a reward), cognitive goals (e.g. a task-set), and action goals (e.g. a stimulus-response 
mapping). Reward-predictive signals engage cognitive control processes that implement and 
update abstract cognitive goal representations, which in turn direct action selection. Thus 
flexible behavior depends on a hierarchy of top-down selection processes, and requires the 
transformation of information about reward into abstract cognitive decisions, which in turn 
need to be translated into specific actions. The brain region most commonly implicated in 
such flexible, goal-directed behavior is the frontal cortex (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Clark et al., 
2004; Jimura et al., 2010). However, the cortex does not act in isolation and is connected with 
subcortical regions, such as the striatum, which is also involved in (reward-guided) cognitive- 
and motor control (Eslinger and Grattan, 1993; Groenewegen, 2003; Cools, 2011). 
Studies combining non-invasive brain stimulation (i.e. transcranial magnetic stimulation; 
TMS) with brain imaging have shown that stimulation of the frontal cortex can alter 
signaling in the striatum (Strafella et al., 2001; Strafella et al., 2003; Kanno et al., 2004; Ko 
et al., 2008; van Schouwenburg et al., 2012). More specifically, stimulating the human motor 
cortex altered signaling in the motor part of the striatum (i.e. the putamen) (Strafella et al., 
2003), whereas stimulating the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) altered signaling in the 
cognitive part of the striatum (i.e. the caudate nucleus) (Strafella et al., 2001; Ko et al., 2008). 
These observations are in line with evidence from anatomical work showing that the cortex 
and striatum are organized in parallel circuits, linking distinct parts of the cortex with specific 
regions of the striatum in a topographically and functionally specific way (Alexander et al., 
1986). 
More recent anatomical work has challenged the idea that the corticostriatal circuits are strictly 
parallel (Haber et al., 2000; Haber et al., 2006; Draganski et al., 2008; Haber and Knutson, 2010) 
and  several researchers have shown that there is a unidirectional information flow between 
corticostriatal circuits, i.e. from anterior/ventromedial to posterior/dorsolateral parts of the 
striatum and/or cortex (Haber et al., 2000; Haber, 2003; Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007; 
Haber and Knutson, 2010; Badre and Frank, 2012). Such a cascade of information processing 
might be well suited to subserve integration across the distinct functional domains associated 
with different frontostriatal circuits. Thus reward motivational processing, associated with 
a circuit connecting the anterior/ventral prefrontal cortex with the nucleus accumbens and 
anterior caudate nucleus, might influence cognitive control, by altering processing in a circuit 
connecting the dlPFC and medial caudate nucleus, to ultimately guide action selection, by 
altering processing in circuits connecting motor cortices (e.g. the premotor cortex; PMC) and 
the putamen (figure 7.1) (Cromwell and Schultz, 2003; Draganski et al., 2008; Seger, 2008; 
Haber and Knutson, 2010).
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Figure 7.1  Hypothesized interactions between corticostriatal circuits
The red, green and blue vertical arrows between the cortical regions and the subparts of the striatum 
indicate connections between parts of the frontal cortex involved in reward anticipation (motivation, in 
red), task switching (cognition, in green) and response switching (action, in blue) and distinct regions 
in the striatum. The additional arrows in the lower panel indicate directional information flow between 
circuits, for example, from the reward circuit to the cognitive, and subsequently the action circuit (red 
arrows). Stimulation with cTBS over the aPFC, dlPFC and PMC is indicated by the red, green and blue 
thunderbolts, respectively. It is important to note that the arrows between the striatal regions indicate 
information flow and do not reflect anatomical connections. 
We aimed to investigate this functionally cascading architecture in humans by assessing the 
consequences of manipulating distinct prefrontal regions for reward motivation, cognition 
and action and associated signaling in distinct striatal subregions. To this end we used offline 
inhibitory TMS, (continuous theta burst stimulation; cTBS) (Huang et al., 2005), aiming to 
decrease neural signaling in three corticostriatal circuits (Ko et al., 2008; Volman et al., 2011; 
Wischnewski and Schutter, 2015), combined with fMRI to measure the impact of stimulation 
on task evoked activity in the striatum. Task-related processing was assessed using an 
established paradigm that we have used extensively to investigate reward anticipation, task 
switching and the effect of reward on task switching (Aarts et al., 2010; van Holstein et 
al., 2011; Aarts et al., 2014a; Aarts et al., 2015). The cortical stimulation sites were selected 
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based on the main effect of reward anticipation (motivation), task switching (cognition) and 
response switching (action) in an independent dataset that used the same paradigm (Aarts 
et al., 2010 unpublished observations). Hence, a region in the anterior prefrontal cortex 
(aPFC) was selected as a target for modulating the reward circuit, a region in the dlPFC 
as the target for the task-switching circuit, and a region in the PMC to target the response 
switching circuit. These three cortical sites were stimulated on three separate days, using a 
counterbalanced within-subject crossover design, to directly compare effects on task-related 
processing between and within circuitries. 
Based on in vivo evidence about the topography of striatal connectivity from diffusion 
weighted imaging work (Draganski et al., 2008), we predicted that cTBS over the aPFC would 
attenuate the main effect of reward on BOLD signals in the anterior/ventral caudate nucleus, 
i.e. the main striatal target of the aPFC. In addition, we hypothesized that cTBS over the 
aPFC would influence reward-related task-switching signals in the posterior caudate nucleus, 
via connections between the motivational and cognitive striatum (figure 7.1), and that 
cTBS over the aPFC would influence the integration of reward, task switching and response 
switching in the putamen via connections between the motivational, cognitive, and motor 
striatum (figure 7.1). Stimulation over the dlPFC was predicted to attenuate BOLD signal 
in the posterior caudate nucleus during task switching. This effect should propagate to the 
putamen, via connections between the cognitive and motor striatum during the integration 
of task switching and response switching (figure 7.1). Finally, cTBS over the PMC was 
predicted to attenuate BOLD signals in the putamen during response switching. The goal of 
this experiment was to provide evidence for interactions between the different corticostriatal 
circuits, as well as for the directionality of these interactions, as has been shown in non-
human primates (Haber et al., 2000). 
Methods
Participants
Forty-two healthy participants were recruited to take part in the initial ‘intake’ session 
(experimental design and procedures). Eleven participants were excluded: Six participants 
did not tolerate the prefrontal stimulation well (experimental design and procedures), 
two did not feel comfortable during the TMS, one brain abnormality was revealed during 
intake, and for two participants no reliable motor evoked potential (MEP) measure could be 
obtained. The remaining 31 participants proceeded to the main experiment (experimental 
design and procedures). During the experimental sessions, one participant was excluded due 
to a contra-indication for MRI, one participants’ session was discontinued due to dizziness 
during MRI, and one participant was excluded due to technical TMS problems and one 
participant due to technical MRI problems. 
This resulted in 27 participants, ranging from 18 – 25 (mean 21.7, SD 1.95) years old (14 
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Figure 7.2  Experimental design
A: Across experimental sessions, each participant received stimulation of the anterior prefrontal cortex, 
dorsolateral PFC, and premotor cortex. The order was counterbalanced between participants (indicated 
with black, grey and white thunderbolts). Stimulation site order was counterbalanced across participants. 
Vertical dashed lines indicate a break. 
B: The order (stimulation and baseline condition) in which a participant would always perform the tasks 
(figure 7.3) was counterbalanced between participants. Values represent mean (SD) time in minutes 
(min) between the start of two runs and between cTBS administration and the start of the subsequent 
fMRI session. In addition, in the bottom panel the mean time (across participants and sessions) between 
cTBS and the start of the baseline session is specified. cTBS: continuous theta burst stimulation; 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). 
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men) who completed all sessions. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
were right-handed and pre-screened for claustrophobia, psychiatric, neurological, and 
vascular disorders, drug and medication use, alcohol consumption and smoking behavior, as 
well as any contraindications for TMS and MRI. Participants gave written informed consent 
according to the guidelines of the local ethics committee on research involving human 
participants (CMO Arnhem / Nijmegen: 2011/244). They received course credits or payment 
for their participation. 
Experimental design and procedures
All sessions took place at the Donders Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging in Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands. The experiment consisted of four visits to the center: one ‘intake’ session and 
three experimental sessions. The intake session consisted of three parts: MRI, questionnaires 
and TMS. During the MRI part, participants were introduced to the paradigm and completed 
two practice blocks (paradigm, figure 7.3, box 2.3). A third practice block was completed 
in the scanner during the acquisition of a structural scan (MRI acquisition). Finally, we 
determined the active motor threshold (aMT) and participants were familiarized with the 
sensation of cTBS in order to ensure tolerability of cTBS over the stimulation sites (TMS 
procedure). After successful completion of the intake session, three experimental sessions 
followed. During each experimental session, participants performed the paradigms twice in 
the fMRI environment (i.e. they completed two runs in each session). These sessions were 
separated by one week and for each participant the variation in start time between these 
three sessions was never more than one hour. To account for nonspecific effects related to 
the day rather than to TMS, the task was administered twice during each session: once after 
TMS (stimulation), where the mean time between the start of cTBS and the task was 10.31 
minutes (SE: 0.18) (figure 7.2b) and once without the prior influence of TMS (baseline). 
Finally, to control for order effects, 14 participants first performed the baseline fMRI run, 
followed by TMS and another fMRI run (stimulation fMRI; top panel figure 7.2b), whereas 
the remaining 13 participants started with TMS and fMRI, followed by a 30 minute break and 
another fMRI run (baseline fMRI) to allow for the TMS effects to wear off. Previous work has 
shown that effects of cTBS over the motor cortex on MEP amplitudes last up to 50 minutes 
after stimulation, but are no longer present after 60 minutes (Huang et al., 2005; Wischnewski 
and Schutter, 2015). In the current study, approximately 93 minutes (bottom panel figure 
7.2b) passed between the administration of cTBS and the start of the baseline task. The time 
between two runs in a session and between TMS and the start of the task did not vary as a 
function of stimulation site (all F’s < 1.17, all p’s > 0.3). 
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Figure 7.3  Task and response switching paradigm with reward manipulation
Participants had to respond to response-incongruent arrow-word combinations (targets) with a left 
or right button press, either by responding to the direction indicated by the arrow (i.e. <- or ->) or to 
the direction indicated by the word (i.e. ‘left’ or ‘right’). A task cue preceding the target (by 400ms) 
indicated which task (arrow or word) the participant had to respond to on the current trial. Which task 
was performed on a particular trial could either change unpredictably with respect to the preceding 
trial (i.e. task switch trial; e.g. arrow – word as in trial 4, or word - arrow as in trial 2) or remain the 
same (i.e. task repeat trial; arrow-arrow (trial 3), or word-word). In addition to such task switches, the 
paradigm allowed us to look at response switches, i.e. whether the correct response (left or right button), 
remained the same compared with the previous trial, or switched. In the current version of the paradigm 
we made sure that the task switches occurred independently from response switches; half of the task-
switch trials and half of the task-repeat trials required a switch of the response button (e.g. trial 4 and 3 
respectively, whereas the other half of the trials required a response repetition (e.g. trial 2). In addition 
we manipulated the amount of anticipated reward (€0.01 vs. €0.15) on a trial-by-trial basis by means of 
a reward anticipation cue. At the start of each trial this reward cue indicated the amount of reward on 
that trial, contingent on a correct and sufficiently fast button press. Immediately following the response, 
feedback was given (e.g., “correct! 15 cents”) (see also Aarts et al., 2015). The inter-trial-interval varied 
(jitter of 2 – 6 seconds).  
Paradigm
Participants performed a task-switching paradigm with a reward manipulation that has been 
extensively described elsewhere (Aarts et al., 2015), with minor changes to include a response-
switching component. Details of the task are described in the legend of (figure 7.3, box 2.3). 
At the start of each session, participants practiced the task (figure 7.3). The first practice block 
(24 trials), which was only administered during the intake session, was merely a switching 
task. During this block the task (i.e. whether to respond to the arrow or the word) alternated 
unpredictably from trial to trial (figure 7.3) without any reward cues, and the feedback on 
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each trial was either “correct” or “incorrect”. During the intake session and on arrival each 
experimental day, participants completed a second practice block that was exactly the same 
as the task used in the actual paradigm, only shorter (i.e. 24 trials). Finally, a block (32 trials) 
without reward or feedback was administered in the scanner right before the actual task (as 
well as during the intake session). The average response times on four trial types (arrow/word 
* task-switch/task-repeat) were used to determine each individual’s response window. These 
response deadlines were used to account for inter-individual and inter-session differences in 
response speed and subsequent task difficulty.
The paradigm consisted of 160 trials and lasted ~35 minutes with a 30s break every 32 trials. 
In the breaks and at the end of each run (i.e. after 160 trials) the cumulative amount of money 
the participant earned was displayed on the screen, (max. €12.80). Participants were informed 
in advance that we would keep track of the total amount of money on each of the six runs and 
that their earnings on one run would be added to their financial compensation as a bonus. 
At the end of the final experimental session, the participant rolled a dice to determine which 
run’s earnings was added as a bonus.
Behavioral analysis
Behavioral analyses were performed on the response times (RTs) and error rates. The first trial 
of each block, trials with extremely fast responses (<100ms) and trials on which participants 
failed to respond were excluded from analyses. In addition, trials on which the response was 
incorrect were excluded from RT analyses. Results were analyzed using a repeated measures 
ANOVA with the factors TMS condition (stimulation or baseline), Reward (high or low), Task-
Switching (switch or repeat) and Response Switching (switch or repeat) for each stimulation 
site (aPFC, dlPFC, PMC). We transformed the response times (log) and proportions of error 
(arcsine(√x)) to improve the distribution of the data (4 out of 48 RT variables: Shapiro-Wilk 
p < 0.023; 14 out of 48 error rate variable: Shapiro-Wilk p < 0.039).
TMS procedure
Stimulation sites
The stimulation sites for the motivation, cognition and action network were determined by 
assessing the peak activations in the frontal cortex in an independent study using the same 
paradigm (Aarts et al., 2010 unpublished observations). A region in the anterior PFC (aPFC; 
-30, 60, 8, Brodmann area 10, figure 7.4a red circle) was identified as part of the reward 
network (high reward cue > low reward cue); a region in the dlPFC (-36,36, 20, Brodmann 
area 46, Figure 7.4a green circle) was identified as part of the cognitive network (task switch 
> task repeat); and a region in the PMC (-28, 10, 66, Brodmann area 6, 7.4a, blue circle) was 
identified as part of the action network (response switch > response repeat). 
Each participant’s structural scan was coregistered to the standard SPM8 T1 template 
(Montréal Neurological Institute; MNI) and segmented using a unified segmentation 
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Figure 7.4  Main effects across sessions
A: Left: The main effect of Reward anticipation (high > low; red); middle: Task switching (switch > 
repeat; green) and right: Response switching (switch > repeat; blue) at a threshold of t = 3.14 (PUNC < 
0.001). Circles with black outline indicate the stimulation sites for the anterior prefrontal cortex (left), 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (middle) and premotor cortex (right). The rendered images show regions 
with a search depth of 4mm. 
B: For illustration purposes and to visualize the relative location of the main effects, the figure depicts 
the overlay of the main effects of Reward anticipation (red), Task switching (green), and Response 
switching (blue) at a low threshold (t > 1.28, p < 0.1) for coronal slices (top row: anterior to posterior) 
and axial slices (bottom row: ventral to dorsal).
procedure (Ashburner and Friston, 2005). This procedure resulted in a set of inverse 
parameters allowing the conversion of the stimulation targets in MNI space to subject space.
TMS 
During the experimental sessions, a cTBS protocol was employed that was the same as that 
reported by Huang and colleagues (2005). These authors applied cTBS at 80% of the aMT and 
reported a depression of MEP amplitudes over a subsequent period up to 60 minutes (see also 
Volman et al., 2011; Wischnewski and Schutter, 2015). 
TMS pulses (biphasic) were administered through a figure-eight coil (75mm diameter), 
connected to a MagPro X100 stimulator (Mag Venture, Denmark). Mean MNI coordinates 
for the three cortical stimulation sites were projected onto each individual’s  structural scan 
using a frameless stereotactic neuronavigation system (Localite, Sankt Augustin, Germany). 
We used standard electromyogram (EMG) recordings to visualize MEPs from the first 
dorsal interosseous (FDI) muscle of the right hand and to determine the resting MT (rMT), 
using a standard protocol (Schutter and van Honk, 2006; Volman et al., 2011). During the 
determination of the aMT, participants rested their right hand on a pillow while squeezing 
a small roll of tape with a pincer grip at 20% of their maximum strength, contracting their 
FDI muscle continuously. The aMT was defined as the lowest stimulation intensity over the 
contralateral motor cortex that elicited reproducible MEPs (in at least 5 out of 10 successive 
stimulations). The aMT was 24%-37% (mean 30.44%, SD 3.61) of the maximum stimulator 
output. 
During the experimental sessions, a cTBS protocol (bursts of three 50 Hz pulses every 200 
ms for 40s, i.e. a total of 600 pulses) was administered at 80% of the aMT. The TMS coil was 
placed as close to the target location (i.e. the aPFC, dlPFC or PMC) as possible using the 
Localite software. During the intake session, participants received the exact same protocol 
for 10 instead of 40 seconds over each of the three stimulation sites to acquaint them with the 
sensation of cTBS. 
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MRI acquisition
MRI images were acquired on a 3-Tesla MRI system (Magnetom Trio Tim; Siemens Medical 
Systems, Erlangen, Germany), using a 32-channel head coil. High-resolution T1-weighted 
MP-RAGE anatomical images were acquired during the intake session (GRAPPA acceleration 
factor 2; repetition time 2300 ms; echo time 3.03ms; field of view: 256 mm; voxel size 1 
mm3). In order to obtain a good signal-to-noise ratio for brain areas susceptible to dropout, 
functional images were acquired using a T2*-weighted multi-echo gradient-echo planar 
sequence (repetition time: 2090 ms; echo times for 4 echoes: 9.4, 21.2, 33, 45 ms; flip angle: 
90°; 32 ascending slices; 0.5 mm slice gap; voxel size 3.5 x 3.5 x 3 mm) (Poser et al., 2006). In 
addition, following each task-related fMRI acquisition, we acquired 266 resting state scans 
(data not reported). 
Preprocessing of task-related fMRI data
All data were analyzed using SPM 8 (Statistical Parametric Mapping; Wellcome Department 
London, UK, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Prior to standard preprocessing, realignment 
was performed using the estimated head motion parameters (least-squares approach, 6 
parameters) for the images with the shortest echo, which were applied to echo images for 
each excitation. The images of all sessions were aligned to the shortest echo of each session, 
and to the first session. After spatial realignment, the four echo images were combined using 
echo summation. The combined images were slice-time corrected to the middle slice and 
segmented using a unified segmentation procedure (Ashburner and Friston, 2005). The bias 
corrected T1 image was coregistered to the mean functional image and the transformation 
matrix from the segmentation procedure was used for normalization to a standard template 
(MNI). Normalized images were smoothed using an 8 mm full-width half maximum 
kernel. A study– specific T1 template was generated from an average of all co-registered and 
normalized T1 images to display the results, using MRIcron software. 
Statistical analysis of fMRI data
The preprocessed fMRI time series were analyzed at the first level using one general linear 
model (GLM) for each participant, including all sessions. For each session, the following 26 
task-related regressors were modeled at the onset of the stimulus (duration = 0) convolved 
with a canonical hemodynamic response function: Reward cues (high/low), Targets [reward 
(high/low) x Cue (arrow/word) x Task (switch/repeat) x Response (switch/repeat)], feedback 
(correct low/correct high/incorrect/too late); we additionally modeled the breaks (duration = 
30s), the first trial of each block and response omissions. To account for residual head motion, 
149
Controlling dorsolateral striatal function via anterior frontal cortex stimulation
	
Table  7.1 Main effect of Reward anticipation 
  Peak MNI 
coordinate Statistic  
   x y z t-value p-value: peak cluster size 
 
Reward (high > low) 
      
Frontal lobe        
 SFG/ MFG (B10) S -32 50 18 6.15 PFWE < 0.001 977 
 
SFG: SMA (B6) BI, dACC (B32) BI  -8 4 60 8.79 PFWE < 0.001 7318 
Subcortical        
 
Striatum BI: caudate nucleus * 10 10 0 8.11 PFWE < 0.001 4543 
 Thalamus  24 -24 4 4.92 PFWE = 0.043 50 
Occipital lobe       
 
Lingual gyrus (B17) BI  -12 -94 -4 16.18 PFWE < 0.001 213500 
Parietal lobe       
 
Posterior cingulate cortex BI (B23) -4 -30 26 5.47 PFWE = 0.005 538 
 
Reward (low > high)       
Frontal lobe       
 IFG (B10) 46 40 2 5.22 PFWE = 0.013 555 
 MFG: OFC (B11) -40 36 -12 5.2 PFWE = 0.015 403 
 MFG (B9) 32 32 48 5.07 PFWE = 0.025 697 
The table shows all areas that were significant at peak PFWE < 0.05.  
* Cluster includes the caudate nucleus, putamen, nucleus accumbens, midbrain, thalamus, pallidum and extends 
into the insular cortex and IFG;  
SMA = supplementary motor area, dACC = dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; OFC = orbitofrontal cortex; SFG: 
superior frontal gyrus; MFG: middle frontal gyrus; IFG: inferior frontal gyrus 
 BI = bilateral cluster; B = Brodmann area; s = cluster falls within the aPFC stimulation site. 
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the six original head motion parameters (3 translation, 3 rotation), their first derivative and 
the square of the original and first derivative were included in the model, resulting in 24 
motion nuisance regressors (Lund et al., 2005). In addition, we used the mean signal from 
the white matter and CSF to account for movement-related intensity changes (Verhagen et 
al., 2006). Finally, a high-pass filter (128s) was used to remove low-frequency signals (e.g. 
scanner drifts) and an AR(1) model was applied to adjust for serial correlations in the data. 
Microtime onsets were adjusted to account for the earlier mentioned slice time correction.
To assess the three main effects and the interaction effects, we generated, for each participant, 
a contrast image at the first level for the main effect of Reward (high > low reward cue), and, 
time-locked to the target, the main effect of Task switching (task switch > task repeat) and 
Response switching (response switch > response repeat). In addition, we generated contrast 
images for interactions between these factors (i.e. for the interaction between Reward and 
Task switching, between Task switching and Response switching and between Reward, Task 
switching and Response switching). 
At the second level, the contrast images of each effect were subjected to a full factorial GLM, 
taking into account the three TMS sites (aPFC, dlPFC, PMC) and TMS administration 
(stimulation or baseline). First, we assessed the main effect of each component of the 
paradigm (i.e. Reward, Task switching and Response switching) across all six sessions. We 
assessed whether the task elicited a neural response at the stimulation site to assess whether 
	
Table 7.2 Main effect of Task switching 
  
Peak MNI 
coordinate 
Statistic  
  x y z t-value p-value: peak cluster size 
Task switching (switch > repeat) 
Frontal lobe       
 IFG (B9) S -40 4 30 6.01 PFWE < 0.001 1755 
Parietal lobe       
 Superior parietal lobule (B7) -24 -66 20 8.72 PFWE < 0.001 3760 
Temporal lobe       
 Inferior temporal gyrus -48 -52 -12 6.84 PFWE < 0.001 751 
The table shows all areas that were significant at peak PFWE < 0.05; IFG: Inferior frontal gyrus; PCC = 
posterior cingulate cortex; MD = medial dorsal nucleus; SMA = supplementary motor area; ACC = anterior 
cingulate cortex; dlPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; BI = bilateral cluster, B = Brodmann area. s = cluster 
falls within the dlPFC stimulation site  
z = 4
t > 1.28
2.8
2.7
2.9
3
3.2
3.6
4
3.2
3.6
4 anterior posterior
t -value
Reward Reward x 
Task switch
Reward x Task switch x 
Response switch
A
B
3 52 4
3.52.51.5
2 4 653
t -value
peak: x = 6, y = 16, z = 2 peak: x = -6, y = 6, z = -6 peak: x = -28, y = -8, z = 8
z = 8
z = 2
t > 3.14*t > 2.61
y = 3 y = -8
t > 3.14*
y = 16
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Figure 7.5  Effect of aPFC stimulation (versus baseline) for Reward (red), the interaction 
between Reward and Task switching (green), and between Reward, Task switching and 
Response switching (blue)
A: To visualize the gradients in the striatum, the whole-brain maps for these three contrasts are shown 
in one image at a low threshold (t = 1.28, p < 0.1). We applied a filter over the image to visualize the 
anterior-posterior and medial-lateral gradient in the striatum.
B: Whole-brain maps at PUNC < 0.001, t > 3.14 (left and right) and at PUNC < 0.005, t > 2.61 (middle) 
for Reward (left), Reward x Task switching  (middle) and Reward x Task switching x Response switching 
(right). 
Asterisks (*) and black dashed circles indicate a significant effect of Reward (left) and the Reward x Task 
switching x Response switching (right) (PFWE < 0.05 within the search volume, i.e. the caudate nucleus 
or putamen, respectively) and red and blue dashed lines indicate the z-coordinates for the peaks of these 
respective effects to visualize the ventral to dorsal gradient.
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the targeted sites were involved in the task. To this end, we generated a region of interest 
by drawing a sphere of 8mm around the stimulation coordinate (figure 7.4a) and assessed 
effects of Reward in the aPFC site, effects of Task switching in the dlPFC site and effects of 
Response switching in the PMC site, using small volume corrections (SVC). In addition, we 
assessed the effects of Reward on Task switching, the effects of Task switching on Response 
switching and the three-way interaction between Reward, Task switching and Response 
switching across all sessions.
Next, we assessed whether stimulation of the aPFC, relative to baseline, (i.e. the contrast 
aPFCSTIM-BASE), changed Reward-related processing, the effect of Reward on Task 
switching and the interaction between Reward, Task switching and Response switching. For 
dlPFC stimulation, we assessed whether stimulation of the dlPFC, relative to baseline (i.e. 
the contrast dlPFCSTIM-BASE), changed the effect of Task switching and the interaction 
between Task switching and Response switching. Finally, we assessed whether stimulation 
of the PMC compared with baseline (i.e. the contrast PMCSTIM-BASE) altered Response 
switching. 
Effects that survive a family wise error (FWE) correction (peak PFWE < 0.05) were considered 
as significant. We assessed effects at the whole-brain level, but with specific hypotheses 
regarding the striatum. Therefore we applied small volume corrections in the caudate nucleus 
or putamen: effects in the caudate nucleus were assessed for the integration of Reward, Task 
switching and the interaction between Reward and Task switching, but effects in the putamen 
were assessed for the main effect of Response switching and any interactions with Response 
switching (i.e. Reward x Task switching x Response switching and Task switching x Response 
switching). For any significant (PSVC_FWE < 0.05) effect in either of these regions (e.g. the 
caudate nucleus), we assessed regional specificity by testing for the same effect in the other 
region of the striatum (e.g. the putamen). 
For visualization purposes, statistical maps are overlaid onto a study-specific template 
(see preprocessing of task-related fMRI data) displayed both at a low threshold to allow 
assessment of physiological plausibility (t = 1.28, p < 0.1) and at more stringent thresholds to 
determine statistical significance (e.g. t = 3.14, p < 0.001; figure 7.4 and 7.5). 
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Results
Neural effects
Main task effects irrespective of site and TMS revealed an anterior/ventrodorsal to posterior/
dorsolateral activity gradient in the striatum
Comparing the neural signal during high versus low Reward cues revealed a large bilateral 
network of regions, including the striatum, lingual gyrus, thalamus, cingulate cortex and 
the aPFC, overlapping with the stimulation site (SVC aPFC stimulation site: (PSVC_FWE < 
0.001) (table 7.1, figure 7.4). 
During trials on which the task switched, compared with trials on which the task was repeated, 
a network including the inferior frontal gyrus, cingulate gyrus, superior parietal lobe, and 
inferior temporal gyrus was activated (table 7.2), overlapping with the stimulation site 
(dlPFC stimulation site: (PSVC_FWE < 0.001) (table 7.2, figure 7.4a). Analysis of signal in 
the striatum did not reveal any significant effects of Task switching (but see below-threshold 
signal in figure 7.4b). One large cluster was more active during response switching compared 
with response repetition trials. This left lateralized cluster included the primary motor cortex 
(B4), premotor cortex (B6), primary somatosensory cortex, precentral gyrus (premotor 
cortex, B6 and primary motor cortex, B4) and the primary somatosensory cortex (B3) and 
extended posterior into the parietal lobe, i.e. the postcentral gyrus (peak PFWE < 0.001, t = 
6.61, z = 6.19, cluster size = 3250, peak x, y, z = -40, -36, 54). However, this cluster did not 
show any overlap with the stimulation site (figure 7.4a). Exploring effects (at p < 0.005) in the 
striatum revealed no FWE corrected effects in the putamen (but see below-threshold effects 
in figure 7.4b). 
We did not observe significant neural interaction effects between Reward, Task switching 
and/or Response switching (across site and TMS). 
Functionally specific effects in the striatum after stimulation of the aPFC 
During high versus low Reward, neural signaling in the right caudate nucleus was significantly 
decreased after aPFC stimulation compared with baseline (aPFCSTIM-BASE x Reward, 
PSVC_FWE = 0.040, k = 17, T = 3.78, z = 3.69, peak x, y, z = 6, 16, 2; figure 7.5 – red 
coloring). There were no reward-related effects of dlPFC or PMC stimulation. The effect of 
aPFC stimulation was located in the anterior portion of the caudate nucleus (figure 7.5) and 
was regionally specific within the striatum: there was no such effect of aPFC stimulation on 
reward-related signal in the putamen. 
Analysis of the two-way interaction between Reward and Task switching revealed that signaling 
in a different, more posterior region of the caudate nucleus (figure 7.5 – green coloring) was 
decreased by aPFC stimulation (but not by dlPFC or PMC stimulation), although this effect 
did not reach significance according to our statistical threshold (aPFCSTIM-BASE x reward x 
task switch: PSVC_UNC = 0.003, t = 2.78, z = 2.74, peak x, y, z = -6, 6, -6). 
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Finally, assessment of the three-way interaction between Reward, Task switching and Response 
switching revealed that aPFC stimulation decreased signaling in the putamen (figure 7.5 – 
blue coloring) (aPFCSTIM-BASE x Reward x Task switch x Response switch: PSVC_ FWE 
= 0.020, t = 3.96, z = 3.86, peak x, y, z = -28, -8, 8). This putamen effect was greater for aPFC 
stimulation than for dlPFC or PMC stimulation ([aPFCSTIM-BASE > dlPFC STIM-BASE = 
PMC STIM-BASE] x Reward x Task switch x Response switch: PSVC_FWE = 0.023, t = 3.92, 
z = 3.83, peak x, y, z = -26, -8, 12).
There were no Reward-related, Reward x Task switching-related, or Reward x Task switching 
x Response switching-related increases in neural signal after stimulation of the aPFC. 
In summary, stimulation of the aPFC modulated processing in the anterior portion of the 
caudate nucleus as a function of Reward, while it modulated activity in the putamen as a 
function of the interaction between Reward, Task- and Response switching. Visualization 
of below-threshold effects (figure 7.5a) reveals an anterior to posterior and medial to lateral 
gradient in the striatum as a function of task demands. In addition, the coronal slices in figure 
7.5b at a higher threshold illustrate the anterior to posterior (y = 16 vs. y = -8), ventral to 
dorsal (z = 2 vs. z = 8) and medial to lateral (x = 6 vs. x = -28) gradient. 
Assessment of the main effect of task switching did not reveal decreased neural signaling after 
dlPFC stimulation. 
Analysis of the main effect of Task switching (task switch versus task repeat) and of the 
two-way interaction between Task switching and Response switching did not reveal any 
regions in which dlPFC stimulation changed neural signaling.
Assessment of the main effect of response switching did not reveal decreased neural signaling 
after PMC stimulation.
Analysis of the main effect of Response switching (response switch versus response repeat) 
did not reveal any regions in which PMC stimulation changed neural signaling.
 
Behavior 
Main effects of Reward anticipation, Task switching and Response switching
Across sessions, participants responded faster on high reward trials compared with low reward 
trials (Reward: F(1,26) = 39.114, p < 0.001). There was no main effect of reward in terms of 
error rates (Reward: F(1,26) < 1). In terms of task-switching performance, participants made 
more errors on switch trials compared with repeat trials (Task switching: F(1,26) = 27.825, 
p < 0.001), but showed no main effect of task switching in terms of response times (Task 
switching: F(1,26) < 1). Finally, participants responded more slowly and made more errors 
when the same response had to be repeated compared with trials on which the response 
switched (Response switching in terms of response times: F(1,26) = 11.998, p = 0.002), and 
error rates F(1,26) = 31.989, p < 0.001). 
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Integration across goals
Across sessions, participants exhibited a significant effect of reward on task switching in terms 
of response times (Reward x Task switching: F(1,26) = 56.089, p < 0.001), but not in terms of 
error rates (Reward x Task switching: F(1,26) < 1). Breaking down this effect in the response 
times revealed that participants exhibited a switch benefit (i.e. repeat – switch performance) 
on low reward trials (F(1,26) = 12.446, p = 0.002) and a switch cost on high reward trials 
(F(1,26) = 21.376, p < 0.001). We also observed a Task switch x Response switch interaction 
in terms of error rates (F(1,26) = 7.224, p = 0.012), but not in terms of response times (F(1,26) 
1.130, p = 0.298). Breaking down this effect in the error rates revealed a larger task-switch cost 
(task switch – task repeat) on response repeat trials (F(1,26) = 31.019, p < 0.001) compared 
with response switch trials (F(1,26) = 4.224, p = 0.05). There was no Reward x Task switch x 
Response switch interaction (F(1,26) < 1 for response times and error rates). 
No effects of TMS on behavior
None of the main effects (i.e. of Reward anticipation, Task switching Response 
switching) were modulated by TMS (i.e. TMS stimulation vs. baseline) for 
any of the TMS sites (response times and error rates all F(1,26) < 3.612, 
all p < 0.05). 
We did not observe any significant main effects of stimulation irrespective of task conditions 
(in response times and error rates: F(1,26 < 1) and no interactions effects of stimulation on the 
Reward x Task switching, Task switching x Response switching or Reward x Task switching x 
Response switching effects for any of the stimulation sites (in response times and error rates: 
all F(1,26) < 2.316, all p > 0.1). 
Discussion
In the current study, we aimed to provide evidence for a functionally cascading architecture of 
corticostriatal circuits by assessing the consequence of manipulating distinct frontal regions 
during the processing of reward, cognitive (task switch) and action (response switch) goals 
while measuring signals in distinct striatal subregions. In support of our hypothesis, we 
show that task-specific information can be integrated across corticostriatal circuits. More 
specifically, manipulation of the prefrontal region involved in reward processing decreased 
reward-related processing in an anterior part of the striatum (in the caudate nucleus: x = 6, y 
= 16, z = 2), whereas stimulation of this same region decreased processing in a more posterior, 
dorsal and lateral region of the striatum (in the putamen: x = -28, y = -8, z = 8) when assessing 
the interaction between reward, task switching and response switching.
The anterior/ventromedial to posterior/dorsolateral task-related gradient we observed 
during reward processing, task switching and response switching fits well with evidence 
from anatomical studies, suggesting exactly this gradient in the striatum, forming parallel 
 156
Chapter 7 Controlling dorsolateral striatal function via anterior frontal cortex stimulation
loops with functionally similar cortical regions, when moving from the reward circuit to the 
cognitive and subsequently action circuit (Haber, 2003; Haber et al., 2006; Haber and Knutson, 
2010; Choi et al., 2012; Oh et al., 2014). We provide functional evidence that this gradient in 
the striatum is indeed associated with task-related processing, where signaling in the anterior 
caudate nucleus was associated with reward processing and increasingly posterior and lateral 
portions of the striatum were involved in cognitive and motor processes. 
Our observation that stimulation of the aPFC can modulate processing in distinct regions 
of the striatum in a task-specific way provides evidence for the hypothesis that integration 
of task-related information can occur across circuits, rather than being restricted within 
parallel loops (Haber et al., 2000). Tracing work in non-human primates has revealed that the 
dlPFC projects primarily to the dorsal caudate nucleus, but that its projection field extends 
to other regions in the striatum, primarily the anterior and medial putamen. A similar 
pattern was observed for cortical regions involved in reward processing: these projections 
terminated primarily in the ventral striatum, but extent to more dorsal regions of the 
striatum, including the caudate nucleus (Haber et al., 2006). Although this tracing work did 
not include the anterior PFC, this work does suggest that these connections could underlie 
the currently observed interaction between reward, task switching and response switching; a 
functional, task-related gradient has been shown previously in the frontal cortex (for reviews 
see: Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007; Botvinick, 2008; Badre and D’Esposito, 2009), where 
increasingly anterior portions of the frontal cortex are involved in increasingly abstract goals. 
In addition, using a computational modeling approach, Badre and Frank (2012) recently 
suggested that a dopaminergic corticostriatal mechanism may underlie the integration 
across rules when participants need to learn about task structure. We provide, for the first 
time, functional evidence that integration across corticostriatal circuits takes place when 
integrating information across functionally dissociable goals by showing that stimulation of 
the aPFC can have functionally specific effects in distinct regions in the striatum depending 
on the level of interaction (i.e. evidenced by a reward-related effect of aPFC stimulation in 
the caudate nucleus, but in the putamen during the integration of reward, task switching and 
response switching (figure 7.5). 
However, the mechanisms underlying this integration across circuits are poorly understood. 
We put forward three ways by which information about rewards can influence cognitive- 
and action goals. The first involves direct cortico-cortical projections (Fuster, 2001; Wood 
and Grafman, 2003; Badre and D’Esposito, 2009), while the second and third way assign 
also a role to the striatum in the integration across corticostriatal circuits: via direct cortico-
striatal connections or via spiraling dopaminergic connections between the striatum and 
the midbrain, i.e. striatal-nigral-striatal (SNS) connections (Haber et al., 2000; Haber, 2003; 
Haber and Knutson, 2010). Future work should directly test these hypotheses, but here we 
highlight in particular, based on recent convergent evidence from studies using the same 
experimental paradigm, a role for the dopaminergic midbrain SNS projections in conveying 
information about rewards to cognitive and action circuits. Specifically, the SNS account is 
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congruous with a role for dopamine in mediating the interaction between reward and task 
switching, which was evidenced by showing that the interaction between reward and task 
switching depends on inter-individual differences in dopamine signaling (Aarts et al., 2010; 
Aarts et al., 2011; Aarts et al., 2014a). In line with this, it is well established that TMS over the 
cortex can alter dopamine release in the striatum (Strafella et al., 2001; Strafella et al., 2003; Ko 
et al., 2008). TMS in the current design may therefore have inhibited dopamine release in the 
striatum, eliciting indirectly a decrease in the striatal BOLD response (Knutson and Gibbs, 
2007). In addition, the SNS account is congruous with the evidence from tracing work in 
non-human primates, which has shown that the striatal-midbrain projections that originate 
in the ventral striatum cover a wide range of dopamine neurons in the midbrain, including 
neurons of the midbrain that project to the caudate nucleus. Also, cortical regions in the 
monkey, involved in reward processing (areas 32, 25, 24) and cognitive control (area 46, 9) 
do not directly innervate the posterior parts of the putamen (Haber 2000). Combined, these 
results suggest that, at least anatomically, it is unlikely that direct corticostriatal connections 
mediated the putaminal effects observed after aPFC stimulation, but rather that striatal-
nigral-striatal connections, mediated these effects. 
A number of limitations require mentioning. First, aPFC stimulation modulated a region in 
the caudate nucleus more dorsal than the region in the ventral striatum that was activated 
in anticipation of a reward across all (TMS and baseline) sessions. One may expect that 
stimulation of the cortical region involved in reward processing would modulate reward-
related signaling in the ventral striatum, rather than in the caudate nucleus. In fact, if we had 
stimulated the orbitofrontal or ventromedial prefrontal cortex (OFC/vmPFC), this is indeed 
what we would expect. However, given the corticostriatal connectivity pattern (Draganski et 
al., 2008; Choi et al., 2012), the more dorsal aPFC is likely to modulate a region more dorsal 
than the ventral striatum. Unfortunately, it is difficult to target the vmPFC/OFC with TMS, 
especially due to the sensation of prefrontal TMS, which is increasingly uncomfortable when 
moving to more ventral and anterior parts of the prefrontal cortex. In addition, in our previous 
(Aarts et al., 2010) and current work, we observed activity in the aPFC when assessing the 
main effect of reward, which is in line with others suggesting a role for the aPFC and the 
caudate nucleus in reward-related processes (Kawagoe et al., 1998; Pochon et al., 2002; Locke 
and Braver, 2008). Second, effects of aPFC stimulation may be experienced as less pleasant 
than stimulation of e.g. the motor cortex and one may thus argue that the effects observed 
in the current study may be due to the sensation of aPFC stimulation. However, given the 
current pattern of results, such an explanation of the current results is highly unlikely. We 
observed clearly distinct effects of aPFC stimulation as a function of task-related processing. 
The effects of Reward and those of the interaction between Reward, Task switching and 
Response switching were assessed in the same aPFC session. Any effects of the sensation of 
TMS would have resulted in similar neural effects, irrespective of the condition, and such an 
explanation cannot account for distinct effects of aPFC stimulation. Third, the current study 
was designed to modulate processing in the striatum. We indeed show that stimulation of 
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the aPFC modulates neural responses in the striatum, but it did not induce any behavioral 
changes, which is not uncommon with offline TMS (van Schouwenburg et al., 2012; Tupak et 
al., 2013). However, the absence of a behavioral effect precludes us from making any claims as 
to whether stimulation of the aPFC and the subsequent effects on the striatum had beneficial 
or detrimental effects on functional processes. Finally, contrary to our expectations, there 
was no modulation of task-related processing after stimulation of the dlPFC or PMC. The 
dlPFC region we stimulated showed significant overlap with the main effect of task switching. 
Nevertheless, stimulation of the dlPFC site failed to alter neural processing as a function 
of task switching or as a function of the interaction between task switching and response 
switching. One explanation is that the region we stimulated is not crucial for task-related 
processing in corticostriatal circuits in our paradigm. In fact, a meta-analysis has suggested a 
role for a more posterior region of the PFC in task switching (i.e. the inferior frontal junction; 
x, y, z coordinates: -40, 4, 30) (Derrfuss et al., 2005), which overlaps with the peak in the PFC 
activated by our task-switching contrast, suggesting indeed that the region we stimulated was 
too dorsal to target the corticostriatal circuitry involved in task switching. The absence of 
an effect of PMC stimulation likely reflects the finding that the network activated during 
Response switching did not show any overlap with the stimulation site in the PMC. We may 
have therefore failed to stimulate the region involved in response switching, and as a result we 
did not observe task-related modulation of PMC stimulation in the striatum. The SNS account 
discussed above predicts that the spiraling SNS connections are organized in an ascending 
way. We set out to test this idea by showing that stimulation of the aPFC, but not of the dlPFC 
or PMC, would affect processing in the striatum as a function of reward. This is exactly what 
we observed, although due to the absence of any effects after stimulation of the dlPFC and 
PMC we cannot be confident that stimulation of the dlPFC and PMC was effective. Thus, the 
results clearly show that task-related integration can occur across corticostriatal circuits and 
that is occurs in a unidirectional manner, from anterior/ventral to posterior/dorsal parts of 
the striatum. However,  we cannot rule out that stimulation of the dlPFC or PMC, had it been 
effective, could also modulate activity in more anterior/ventral parts of the striatum. 
The current study is the first to show functional interactions between corticostriatal circuits 
during the integration of task-related goals, by causally manipulating neuronal excitability. 
The results of this TMS study show that corticostriatal circuits communicate in order to 
facilitate the translation of information across goals or functional domains. Understanding 
exactly how cognitive goals and subsequent actions are informed by reward motivation is 
important when understanding the etiology of a number of neuropsychiatric disorders with 
deficits in integrating between these signals and/or deficits in corticostriatal circuits (for 
a review see Shepherd, 2013), such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (Aarts et al., 
2015; Hong et al., 2015), schizophrenia (Morris et al., 2015), obsessive compulsive disorder 
(Graybiel and Rauch, 2000), and addiction (Belin and Everitt, 2008; Tang et al., 2015).
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General discussion
Our environment imposes on us a constant stream of stimuli and potential tasks to engage 
in. Dealing with this constantly changing environment requires the ability to flexibly adapt 
our behavioural and cognitive programs to changing task demands. In addition, we adapt 
our behaviour to changes in potential rewards, which serve both a motivational function, 
by invigorating and energizing ongoing behaviour and cognition, as well as a directional 
function, biasing behaviour towards one action or another by influencing choice and 
learning. In this thesis, I have focused on the motivational function of reward and specifically, 
on its role in motivating cognitive control. Previous experimental and anatomical work has 
suggested a role for dopamine, the striatum and connections between the striatum and the 
prefrontal cortex in motivated cognitive control (chapters 1 and 2, (Haber et al., 2000; Haber, 
2003; Aarts et al., 2010). Until recently, experimental evidence supporting these hypotheses 
was either absent, indirect or did not speak to the specific receptor types involved in the 
underlying process (chapters 1 and 2). 
In this thesis, I aimed to improve our understanding of the role of dopamine and the 
corticostriatal network during the integration of reward and flexible cognitive control. More 
specifically my work aimed to test whether the manipulation of dopamine and specific 
dopamine receptors (chapter 3, 4), and (prefrontal modulation of) signalling in the striatum 
(chapter 6 and 7) can alter motivated cognitive control. In addition, I assessed reward-
cognition integration across the life span, from adolescence to senescence (chapter 5) and in 
patients with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (chapter 4). 
Summary of findings
In chapter 1, we provided an overview of the state of the relevant literature up until the start of 
my thesis on how motivation can change cognitive control, how the neural signals associated 
with these processes may be integrated and how signals in the prefrontal cortex may modulate 
striatal processing. In that same chapter we also put forward a working hypothesis, suggesting 
an important role for striatal dopamine in motivated cognitive control. However, which 
specific dopamine receptor subtype is important for motivated cognitive control had not 
been assessed, and experimental work thus far had not directly manipulated the striatum 
and the dopamine system. In chapter 3, we filled this gap by conducting a pharmacological 
study to investigate the causal role of dopamine, specifically the dopamine D2 receptor, in 
task switching and in the integration between reward and task switching. In this study, we 
replicated the previous observation (Aarts et al., 2010) that inter-individual variation in 
the dopamine transporter genotype (DAT1/SLC6A3) can modulate the effect of reward on 
task-switching behaviour, suggesting -again- a role for striatal dopamine in this interaction. 
However, our pharmacological manipulation did not alter motivated cognitive control. 
The administration of a dopamine D2 receptor agonist did however change task-switching 
behaviour, irrespective of reward. This observation is in line with previous theorizing and 
work in humans and rodents implicating the D2 receptor in flexible behaviour (Mehta et 
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al., 2004; Floresco et al., 2006b; Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008; Stelzel et al., 2010), and was 
further strengthened by the observation that pre-treatment with a dopamine D2 receptor 
antagonist blocked these effects. Crucially, these effects depended on individual differences 
in dopamine signalling, as measured with the DAT1 genotype: Bromocriptine only improved 
task-switching behaviour in subjects homozygous for the 10R allele and did not change task-
switching behaviour in those carrying the 9R allele. Together with the knowledge that the 
dopamine transporter is most abundant in the striatum (chapter 2), these results suggest that 
the stimulation of dopamine D2 receptors in the striatum is important for flexible cognitive 
control. In addition, these results highlight the importance of taking into account inter-
individual differences in dopamine signalling when assessing drug effects (see chapter 2 and 
(Cools and D’Esposito, 2011).  However, genetic associations do not imply causality and a 
causal role for dopamine could thus not be provided. Also, when interpreting these results 
it is important to keep in mind that expression of the dopamine transporter is not exclusive 
to the striatum: The dopamine transporter is also abundantly expressed in the pallidum and 
midbrain (Ciliax et al., 1999; Dahlin et al., 2007). In addition, some dopamine transporter 
expression is present in the diencephalon, mesencephalon, hippocampus, amygdala and 
cortex (Ciliax et al., 1999; Dahlin et al., 2007).
In sum, the results in chapter 3 replicated previous work suggesting a role for striatal 
dopamine in the integration between reward and cognitive control (Aarts et al., 2010). 
However, the evidence in chapter 3 did not support a role for dopamine D2 receptors in 
motivated cognitive control. Moreover, the evidence for the involvement of striatal dopamine 
(i.e. by means of DAT1-dependency of the results) is not indisputable. Combining genetics 
with neuroimaging (e.g. functional MRI: box 2.4 and chapter 4) can strengthen the evidence 
for the involvement of striatal dopamine in motivated cognitive control.
Previous work has suggested a role for dopamine D1 receptor stimulation (Meririnne et al., 
2001), or both dopamine D1 and D2 receptor stimulation (Ikemoto et al., 1997; Koch et al., 
2000) in reward motivation. Methylphenidate (box 2.2b) is a drug which blocks the dopamine 
transporter, thereby increasing dopamine levels. In chapter 4, we manipulated the dopamine 
system by using methylphenidate, which is commonly used to pharmacologically treat 
ADHD. We assessed patients with ADHD both after intake of their normal dose of Ritalin® 
(or an equivalent dose for those usually taking Concerta®; box 2.2b) and after refraining from 
methylphenidate intake for at least 24 hours. We compared these patients to a healthy control 
group to assess cognitive task-related processing as a function of reward-related signalling in 
the striatum of adults with ADHD. In this study, we observed that patients with ADHD after 
withdrawal from their medication, compared with adults without ADHD, showed increased 
neural signalling in the striatum (i.e. in the caudate nucleus) during the integration of reward 
and cognitive control. As was the case in chapter 3, the effects in chapter 4 also depended 
on natural variation in the DAT1 genotype: Only the subset of patients carrying the 9R allele 
showed this increased striatal activation. Manipulation of the dopamine system, by treatment 
of these patients with methylphenidate, normalized this increased striatal signal in the group 
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carrying the 9R allele, but had no effect in those homozygous for the 10R allele.
 These results strengthen the evidence for a causal role for dopamine in motivated cognitive 
control and they reveal differences in striatal dopamine signalling between patients with 
ADHD and subjects without ADHD during motivated cognitive control. 
The effects observed in chapter 4 seem at odds with those observed in healthy subjects (chapter 
3 and (Aarts et al., 2010)). In healthy young adults who carry the 9R allele, reward previously 
increased the task-switch related signal in the caudate nucleus (Aarts et al., 2010). In addition, 
reward anticipation had a beneficial effect on task switching performance in young healthy 
adults (chapter 3). By contrast, in the healthy control group in chapter 4, we did not observe 
any evidence for an effect of reward on task switching, either in terms of neural signalling 
or behaviour. In patients with ADHD who carry the 9R allele of the DAT1 genotype, we 
observed that reward motivation increased the task-switch related signal in the striatum (i.e. 
the caudate nucleus), as it previously did in young healthy subjects (Aarts et al., 2010). In 
addition, (if anything) reward had a detrimental effect on task switching in these patients. 
Thus, the neural signal in the ADHD patients was in line with that observed previously in 
young healthy subjects, but to our surprise, in the healthy control group in chapter 4, we 
did not replicate previous work showing that the integration between reward and cognitive 
control was associated with a DAT1 genotype-dependent change in behaviour (chapter 3) and 
striatal signalling (Aarts et al., 2010). One potential explanation for this discrepancy is related 
to the age of the participants: Whereas the subjects in the healthy control group in the ADHD 
study were ~38 years old, subjects in the other studies were younger (~22 years old). Striatal 
dopamine levels decrease dramatically across the lifespan, starting in early adulthood (from 
~20 years onwards) (Volkow et al., 1996a; Bäckman et al., 2000; Backman and Farde, 2001). 
If striatal dopamine is indeed crucial for successful motivation-cognition integration, deficits 
in motivated cognition should be evident with increasing age. ADHD has been associated 
with a developmental delay, resulting from dysfunctional nigrostriatal dopamine projections 
(Sagvolden et al., 2005).  Such a developmental delay may explain the observation of an effect 
of reward on task switching in patients, but not in age-matched healthy controls. The questions 
remains however why this increased signalling in the 9R ADHD group is not associated with 
beneficial effects on behaviour, and why they – if anything – are even behaviourally impaired 
when integrating reward and task-switching signals. 
In chapter 5 we assessed whether any evidence for age-related changes in the motivational 
enhancement of cognitive control could be revealed. To this end we analyzed data from 
subjects ranging from 14 to 69 years old who performed the rewarded task-switching paradigm 
and we observed that increasing age was indeed associated with less flexible adaptation to 
changing task demands. Specifically, the younger group showed reward-related behaviour 
that depended on the cognitive condition (i.e. whether a task repetition or a task switch was 
required), whereas the older group did not show any reward-related change in cognitive 
control. Based on previous imaging work which revealed decreases in dopamine neurons 
with increasing age, we speculate that the age-related effects observed in chapter 5 are due 
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to the loss of dopamine cells in the midbrain, which project to the striatum. Combined, the 
DAT1-dependent effects in chapters 3 and 4, the increased BOLD response in the striatum in 
chapter 4 and the age-related deficits in motivated cognitive control (chapter 5) suggest a role 
for striatal dopamine in mediating motivated cognitive control. However, future work should 
further substantiate this claim (see future research). 
Based on previous work, we anticipated that the ventral part of the striatum would be crucial 
for motivated cognitive control (chapter 1 and 2)(Mogenson et al., 1980; Floresco, 2015). This 
idea is also in line with previous work, suggesting that the depletion of dopamine neurons in 
healthy aging is more severe in the midbrain dopamine neurons that project to the ventral 
part of the striatum compared with those projecting to more dorsal parts of the striatum 
(Fearnley and Lees, 1991). We tested this hypothesis in chapter 6 by applying excitotoxic 
lesions to the rodent ventral striatum, i.e. the nucleus accumbens core. To achieve this, we 
developed a rewarded task-switching paradigm in rodents and we showed that rodents can 
increase their flexible cognitive control when a situation is associated with a high reward, 
compared with a low reward situation, like we previously observed in humans. Importantly, 
only animals with an intact striatum showed this reward-related improvement in cognitive 
control: After lesions of the ventral striatum animals no longer showed improved flexible 
behaviour in the high reward condition, suggesting that the ventral striatum is a crucial player 
when one needs to facilitate behaviour leading to a desired outcome (a high reward), while 
inhibiting irrelevant behaviour (yielding merely a low reward) (Floresco, 2015). 
Combined, the observed deficits in aging (chapter 5), ADHD (chapter 4) and rodents with 
lesions of the striatum (chapter 6) suggest a role for the striatum in motivated cognitive 
control. One of the hypotheses formulated in chapter 1 suggested that input from the 
prefrontal cortex can modulate processing in the striatum during motivated cognitive control 
(chapter 1 and 2). We set out to test the hypothesis that manipulation of the prefrontal cortex 
can alter processing in the striatum during the integration of reward, cognitive control and 
subsequent action selection (figure 2.1 and chapter 1). To test this hypothesis (in chapter 
7) we combined fMRI with offline brain stimulation (transcranial magnetic stimulation; 
TMS) to target the cortical regions involved in reward processing, task switching (cognition) 
and response switching (action), thereby using knowledge from previous work showing 
that stimulation of cortical regions can change processing in the regions of the striatum it is 
connected to (Strafella et al., 2001; Ko et al., 2008). In line with the existence of functionally 
specific corticostriatal circuits, we showed that stimulation of the cortical region involved in 
reward processing (the anterior prefrontal cortex) altered neural signalling in the anterior 
portion of the caudate nucleus, which has been implicated in reward processing in previous 
work (Cromwell and Schultz, 2003). Crucially however, we also showed that stimulating the 
same region in the anterior prefrontal cortex modulated signalling in the motor part of the 
striatum as a function of the integration between reward motivation, cognitive control and 
action control. Combined, these results show that the prefrontal cortex and the striatum 
interact during the integration of the functions necessary to execute the task (i.e. when 
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processing signals about reward, cognition and action). 
Combined, the experiments presented in this thesis confirm that striatal dopamine plays a 
role in (motivated) cognitive control (chapter 3), and extend these findings by showing that 
dopamine and the striatum are causally involved when information about rewards affects 
cognitive goals (chapter 4 and 6). We also show that aberrant integration between reward 
and cognitive control can surface in populations with deficits in cognitive control and striatal 
dopamine signalling (chapter 4 and 5), suggesting that these cognitive deficits may stem from 
deficits in translating information about potential rewards into cognitive goals. Dopamine 
acts by changing the sensitivity of the neurons in the striatum, which is particularly sensitive 
to input from the prefrontal cortex. We show that the prefrontal cortex modulates processing 
in the striatum. We also show that signals about rewards in the reward-related corticostriatal 
circuit are integrated with signals in the motor corticostriatal circuit when information about 
reward, cognitive control and action control are integrated (chapter 7). 
Which neural mechanism underlies the integration between reward and 
cognitive control? 
It is clear from the work in this thesis that the striatum and dopamine are crucial for motivated 
cognitive control. It is also evident that top-down effects from the prefrontal cortex are 
important for motivated cognitive control and that information from the anterior prefrontal 
cortex during reward processing can affect processing in the motor part of the striatum (i.e. the 
putamen). Anatomical evidence from non-human primates has revealed three ways in which 
information can be transferred between circuits (chapter 1 and 2): Via direct cortico-cortical 
(CC) connections, via cortico-striatal (CS) connections or via striato-nigral-striatal (SNS) 
connections (figure 1.1 and 2.1) (Haber et al., 2000; Wood and Grafman, 2003; Haber and 
Knutson, 2010). The work in this thesis clearly shows a role for the striatum during integration 
of information across task-related goals (chapter 4, 6, 7), suggesting that information transfer 
takes place at the level of the striatum. Although the work in this thesis strengthens the case for 
a role for CS or SNS connections, it is important to realize that this does not rule out entirely 
that the integration (also) takes place via CC connections. It may still be the case that the 
striatum receives input from the cortex after signals have been integrated at the cortical level. 
Given the results of the work presented here I would however speculate that the integration 
takes place either by means of direct CS connections and/or by means of SNS connections. In 
the first case (CS connections), the prefrontal input to the striatum is modulated by dopamine 
(originating from the midbrain). In the case of SNS connections, dopaminergic connections 
from the midbrain convey information to increasingly posterior/dorsolateral regions of the 
striatum, which in turn project back to the midbrain (and the prefrontal cortex). The work 
is chapter 6 showed that lesions of the ventral striatum clearly affected motivated cognitive 
control. This argues against a sole role for direct cortico-striatal connections, i.e. connections 
from reward-related cortical regions to the cognitive striatum, bypassing the ventral striatum. 
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The SNS account requires a detailed topographically specific organization of the midbrain 
and its connections to the striatum and thus far it remains unclear whether this organization, 
which has been shown in non-human primates and rodents (Haber et al., 2000; Bjorklund 
and Dunnett, 2007; , but see Matsuda et al., 2009), exists in humans. Indeed, rodent work has 
suggested that the spiralling dopamine connections between ventral- and increasingly dorsal 
parts of the striatum are organized in a serial manner. This was evidenced recently by the 
observation that changes in dopamine signalling in the nucleus accumbens shell influenced 
dopamine levels in the nucleus accumbens core, which in turn affected signalling in the 
ventrolateral and dorsal striatum in a serial manner  (Ikeda et al., 2013). 
Several decades ago the idea was proposed that the ventral striatum serves as a limbic-motor 
interface, mediating the interaction between motivation and action (Mogenson et al., 1980). 
However, at the time it was unclear how the ventral striatum would do this, apart from the 
theorizing that midbrain dopamine would be involved. A recent theory has suggested a 
similar role for the ventral striatum (Mannella et al., 2013) and its input from the prefrontal 
cortex, amygdala and hippocampus, but it still does not clearly address exactly how reward 
information can be transferred to motor areas. In chapter 1 we propose that this information 
transfer occurs via cognitive control regions, rather than via direct connections between 
motivation and action regions. Evidence from human (Draganski et al., 2008; Choi et al., 
2012), non-human primate (Haber, 2003) and rodent (Oh et al., 2014) work has not revealed 
any direct connections between cortical reward-processing areas and the motor striatum or 
between the ‘reward midbrain’ (VTA) and the ‘motor striatum’(the putamen). In fact, Ikeda 
and colleagues (2013) showed that information is processed serially, and that it is ‘forwarded’ 
from more ventromedial regions of the (rodent) striatum to increasingly more dorsolateral 
regions. Therefore, it is anatomically not plausible that this information transfer occurs via 
direct CS connections from reward areas to the motor circuit. In chapter 7 we directly assessed 
the interaction between reward, cognition and action, showing that integration across these 
corticostriatal circuits occurs. However, determining whether information bypasses the 
‘cognitive’ striatum requires a replication of the current finding after inactivation or lesion of 
this region, which is not feasible in human subjects (future research). Neuroimaging work 
(e.g. Aarts et al. 2010 and chapter 4) has revealed a role for the caudate nucleus in motivated 
cognitive control, while a role for the ventral striatum in motivated cognitive control is shown 
in chapter 6 (and hypothesized in chapter 5). Although these results may seem contradictory 
at first, they are in fact perfectly in line with our hypothesized underlying neural mechanism. 
When interpreting the results from chapter 4, it is important to realize that the BOLD 
response is thought to reflect the input from other regions, rather than its output to other 
regions (Logothetis et al., 2001). The neural signal in the caudate nucleus will thus reflect 
the input from regions projecting to the caudate nucleus. This is perfectly in line with the 
idea that information in the ‘reward striatum (the rodent nucleus accumbens or human 
ventral striatum / anterior caudate nucleus) is transferred to the ‘cognitive striatum’ (the 
rodent dorsomedial striatum or the human (posterior) caudate nucleus). Excessive NMDA 
receptor activation in the nucleus accumbens (chapter 6) will have caused neuronal death 
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in this region (Sattler and Tymianski, 2001). The loss of neurons in the nucleus accumbens 
will disrupt both its input from the cortex, as well as its output to the dorsal striatum (e.g. via 
the midbrain). In summary, these results reflect that information transfer from the nucleus 
accumbens (disrupted in chapter 6) to the dorsal striatum (measured in chapter 5) mediates 
motivated cognitive control. In addition, the results fit well with those from chapter 7: NMDA 
lesions (chapter 6) will also disrupt prefrontal input to the striatum, disrupting prefrontal 
modulation of striatal processing (chapter 7). 
It is clear from the literature that dopamine is involved in flexible cognitive control. In chapter 
3 we show a clear and causal role for the dopamine D2 receptor in task switching. Work on 
the role for dopamine D1 and D2 receptors in reward processing suggests that concurrent 
activation of dopamine D1 and D2 receptors is crucial for reward-related processes (Ikemoto 
et al., 1997). Conversely, it was suggested that dopamine D1 –receptor stimulation may be 
crucial for reward-related processes (Beninger and Miller, 1998; Meririnne et al., 2001). In 
chapter 4, the administration of methylphenidate in adults with ADHD normalized the 
increased signal in the caudate nucleus which was present when the patients had not taken 
their medication, possibly by increasing dopamine levels in the striatum (Volkow et al., 2001), 
but possibly also (noradrenaline) in the prefrontal cortex (Berridge and Arnsten, 2013). 
Although the work in chapter 3 and 4 strengthened the evidence for a role for dopamine 
in motivated cognition, it did not lead to a conclusion about which dopamine receptor is 
involved. Future work will have to elucidate which dopamine receptor mediates effects of 
reward motivation on cognitive control (future research).
Rewarded task switching vs. motivated cognitive control
The work in this thesis focused on one aspect of cognitive control: switching between well-
established task sets. However, as was discussed in chapter 1, there are numerous ways to 
manipulate and measure motivation and cognitive control and differences between these 
paradigms result in the recruitment of different brain regions and potentially opposing effects 
of dopamine. 
Studies that measure attention, working memory, or forms of flexible control that require new 
learning commonly report effects in the prefrontal cortex (Pochon et al., 2002; Locke and 
Braver, 2008; Engelmann et al., 2009; Pessoa and Engelmann, 2010), while our form of flexible 
‘habit-like’ cognitive control appears to rely more heavily on the striatum than it does on the 
cortex (Aarts et al., 2010) (chapter 1). However, our work and that of others has shown that 
effects of reward motivation on cognitive control are not restricted to the prefrontal cortex and 
often both cortical and striatal regions are activated during motivated cognitive control, also 
when ‘prefrontal’ paradigms are used. For example, signals in the striatum and inferior frontal 
gyrus have been associated with reward effects on response inhibition and attention tasks 
(Padmala and Pessoa, 2010; Krebs et al., 2012) and reward reduced conflict-related signalling 
in the medial PFC during a Stroop-like task and increased coupling between the ventral 
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striatum and a cortical region involved in attention processing, i.e. the intraparietal sulcus 
(Padmala and Pessoa, 2011). This is illustrated further (and causally) in chapter 7, where we 
show that manipulating the prefrontal cortex with TMS has effects on the integration across 
task-related goals in the striatum without directly altering processing in the cortex. In fact, 
activity in chapter 4 was not restricted to the striatum, but was also revealed in the posterior 
cingulate cortex, an area that is connected to the dorsal striatum (Di Martino et al., 2008; 
Beckmann et al., 2009), suggesting indeed that processing in the corticostriatal network was 
altered during motivated cognitive control in these patients.
The absence of significant effects in the striatum in studies that report prefrontal effects does 
not necessarily imply that the striatum is not playing a role in the underlying process. Instead, 
the measurement technique in studies that report effects in the prefrontal cortex may simply 
not be sufficiently sensitive to detect changes in striatal BOLD response. The BOLD signal 
in the ventral part of the brain, including the striatum is more susceptible to signal drop out. 
Functional MRI may therefore generally be more sensitive to changes in signal in ‘cognitive’ 
dorsal cortical regions. Taking into account the DAT1 genotype to account for inter-individual 
differences in dopamine signalling in our work (e.g. chapter 4 and (Aarts et al., 2010)) can 
increase the sensitivity to detect changes in the striatum. 
These studies are generally in line with the idea that reward changes processing in the cognitive 
control region involved in the task at hand. And they suggest that the prefrontal cortex and 
striatum can act in concert to mediate the interaction between different task aspects.   However, 
in chapter 1 we argued and illustrated that reward motivation can have opposite effects on 
cognitive flexibility and stability and we argued that this effect may be due to opposing effect 
of dopamine on cognitive flexibility and stability (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008). The idea 
that dopamine can be detrimental for cognitive focussing was demonstrated recently in a 
study using a Stroop task (Aarts et al., 2014b), for which good task performance requires a 
stable task representation (i.e. not be distracted by the irrelevant dimension in the incongruent 
condition). Importantly, rewarded Stroop performance was associated with dopamine levels 
(i.e. dopamine synthesis capacity). More specifically, increased dopamine levels in this study 
were associated with a detrimental effect of reward on cognitive performance. The work in 
this thesis focused on cognitive flexibility, and did not formally manipulate stability. However, 
whereas one may think of switch trials as a form of cognitive flexibility, performance on repeat 
trials will likely benefit from stable task representations. The results in chapter 5 revealed 
opposing age-related effect of reward motivation on switch and repeat trials, suggesting 
that (reward and age-induced changes in) dopamine can have opposite effects on cognitive 
flexibility and cognitive focussing (limitations). The number of studies that assessed the 
role of striatal dopamine in mediating the integration between reward and cognitive control 
(whether it is flexible control or maintaining stable task representations) is scarce. Therefore 
it remains unclear which factors determine whether the effects of dopamine are beneficial or 
detrimental for cognitive control. Reward-induced changes in dopamine may modulate how 
susceptible the cognitive (dorsal) striatum is for input from the reward (ventral) striatum or 
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from the prefrontal cortex. Reward motivation may serve to bias the gating mechanism of 
the striatum to a more flexible state, which is beneficial in some cases (e.g. in the case of task 
switching), but not others (e.g. on a Stroop task or on repeat trials) (future research). 
To date not many studies have directly manipulated the dopamine system during motivated 
cognitive control. The work in this thesis fills this gap and combines experiments using 
pharmacology, excitotoxic lesions, and non-invasive brain stimulation to show that (prefrontal 
input to) the striatum is involved in motivated cognitive control and that integration across 
corticostriatal circuits occurs when integration across goals is required. These results may 
even extend beyond motivation-cognition integration to other goals. For example, a role for 
a prefrontal-striatal gating mechanism and integration across corticostriatal circuits has been 
suggested when subjects need to integrate information across hierarchical rules (Badre and 
Frank, 2012). 
What can we learn from cross-species evidence? 
The ability to use information about upcoming rewards to adapt their cognitive control 
strategy changed with increasing age in healthy human subjects and in rats with lesions of the 
ventral striatum (chapter 5 and 6). When their striatum was intact, the animals in chapter 
6 showed a reward-related improvement of flexible cognitive control, as we previously 
showed in a subset of healthy young human subjects (e.g. the 9R carriers in chapter 3). When 
comparing the results obtained in work with human subjects with those from the rodent 
work in chapter 6, a number of things are worth considering. First, it is important to keep in 
mind to what extent findings from the rodent literature generally translate to human work. 
Secondly, it is important to take note of the parallels and differences between the human and 
rodent rewarded task-switching paradigm. 
Cross-species translation: Evidence from task switching in humans and rodents
Flexible behaviour and its underlying neural substrates have been extensively studied in both 
human and rodent subjects. One paradigm that is commonly used to assess flexible cognitive 
control in rodents is the strategy set-shifting paradigm (Ragozzino et al., 1999). In a T-maze 
(Ragozzino et al., 1999) or operant (Floresco et al., 2008a) version of this task, animals learn 
to obtain a food reward by making a left (turn or lever press) response, thereby ignoring 
the illumination of a light (over either the left or right arm or lever). After the successful 
acquisition of this response strategy, the previously correct strategy (e.g. a going left) is 
no longer rewarded, and the animal has to learn that the rule has changed. Crucially, the 
previously irrelevant stimulus (the light) now becomes relevant and the previously relevant 
rule (‘go left’) needs to be suppressed. The number of trials the animals needs to reach a pre-
defined criterion (e.g. 8 consecutive correct responses) is taken as a measure for cognitive 
flexibility. A major advantage of this paradigm is its ability to distinguish between several 
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aspects of flexible control by analysis of the types of errors: Animals may fail to shift (i.e. they 
persevere on the old rule) or they may exhibit deficits in rule maintenance (i.e. they initially 
shift, but then fail to maintain this new strategy). One draw-back, when trying to compare the 
results obtained with this paradigm to those observed with the human cued task-switching 
paradigm is that switches are not signalled by a cue, but need to be learned. In addition, set-
shifting paradigms only allow one switch per test, rather than testing the fast trial-by-trial 
adaptation generally measured in humans. 
Extensive studies on strategy set-shifting have revealed a prominent role for the rodent medial 
PFC, in particular the prelimbic cortex (Ragozzino et al., 1999; Floresco et al., 2006b; Floresco 
et al., 2008a). In addition, dopamine signalling plays an important role in successful shifting 
behaviour (Floresco et al., 2006b; Haluk and Floresco, 2009), as does the dorsal striatum 
(Ragozzino et al., 2002). Human cued task switching work generally reports neural responses 
in the dorsal striatum and dorsal prefrontal cortex (inferior frontal gyrus) and a role for 
dopamine (Crone et al., 2006; Stelzel et al., 2010; Aarts et al., 2012; Aarts et al., 2014a), (see 
Derrfuss et al., 2005) for a meta-analysis. 
An interesting open question relates to if and how strategy set-shifting differs from cued task 
switching. A particularly important distinction resides in the learning component. Whereas 
the strategy set-shifting paradigm assesses how well animals learn to change their behaviour; 
cued switching requires the ability to quickly change task-sets. Given the role for the nucleus 
accumbens in learning (Schultz et al., 1997), it is perhaps not surprising that the rodent 
nucleus accumbens is crucial for certain aspects of successful strategy shifting (Floresco et 
al., 2006a). Interestingly, this nucleus is not involved in the initial shift, a role reserved for 
the dorsal striatum, but it is crucial to maintain a recently introduced novel rule. The first 
study that tested cued task switching in rodents (Baker and Ragozzino, 2014b, a) revealed 
that flexible behaviour was disrupted by lesions of the medial PFC and the basal ganglia, 
including the dorsal striatum. However, one major confound in this paradigm is caused 
by the occurrence of ~4 times more repeat than switch trials. As a consequence, switching 
between task-sets is no longer the only difference between switch and repeat trials. Instead, 
potential confounds are introduced (e.g. increased novelty or saliency of switch trials, and the 
overall expectation that a task will repeat). This confound is not present in the novel paradigm 
presented in chapter 6 where trials switch and repeat equally often.
Together, the work in human subjects and in rodents both show an important role for 
dopamine, the dorsal striatum and corticostriatal circuit in task-switching, in particular 
the inferior frontal gyrus in humans and the prelimbic cortex in rodents (Robbins, 2007; 
Klanker et al., 2013), suggesting that these processes translate quite well across species. So 
far it is unclear how the role of the nucleus accumbens in strategy set-shifting (Floresco et 
al., 2006a) can be reconciled with its role in motivated cognitive control (chapter 6). One 
possibility may be related to the role of this region in the approach of reward-related stimuli 
and its role in facilitating appropriate actions. The nucleus accumbens may play a role in how 
much updating takes place in prefrontal cortex, thereby mediating a balance between flexible 
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updating of task-sets in the high reward condition (chapter 6) or in maintaining the new 
strategy after new learning has taken place (after a successful set-shift and the receipts of a 
reward). 
Rewarded task-switching
In the rewarded task-switching paradigm presented in chapter 6, two discrimination tasks 
alternate unpredictably on a trial by trial basis and the use of cues is required to determine the 
relevant stimulus dimension. This paradigm is the first rodent paradigm that manipulates and 
compares reward conditions (i.e. high vs. low reward) and cognitive conditions (i.e. switch vs. 
repeat trials). The paradigm parallels the human paradigm (chapters 3, 4, 5, and 7; but see 
limitations) and the pattern of results in chapter 6 is generally congruous with our previous 
work: Reward can improve cognitive flexibility both in (a genetically determined subset of) 
humans and in rodents. The results from the rodent work (chapter 6) also fit remarkably well 
with the pattern of results in the aging work (chapter 5): A reduction in the reward benefit 
on task switching was observed both in older adults and in animals with lesions of the ventral 
striatum, strengthening the hypothesis that the age-related effects observed in chapter 5 were 
related to age-related changes in striatal dopamine.  
Implications for neuropsychiatry
In chapter 4 and 5 we tested the hypothesis that cognitive deficits in ADHD and aging may be 
grounded in a deficit to use information about potential gains to adequately allocate cognitive 
processes. A similar deficit could underlie cognitive deficits observed in other neuropsychiatric 
disorders such as schizophrenia, addiction, Parkinson’s disease and obsessive compulsive 
disorder (OCD). 
For example, both schizophrenia and OCD have been associated with cognitive deficits 
(chapter 2) and changes in the corticostriatal circuitry (Shepherd, 2013). Cognitive deficits in 
schizophrenia are thought to be related to hypoactivity in the mesocortical dopamine system, 
whereas positive symptoms (e.g. hallucinations and delusions) are thought to be related 
to hyperactivity in the dopaminergic nigro-striatal connections and increased dopamine 
D2 receptor signalling (Simpson et al., 2010). In line with the work in this thesis, excessive 
dopamine D2 receptor stimulation may induce a flexible state, at the expense of the ability to 
maintain stable representations (Barch and Ceaser, 2012) decreasing the ability of patients 
with schizophrenia to filter out irrelevant input. The repetitive behaviours typically observed 
in OCD on the other hand are thought to originate from increased activity in the corticostriatal 
circuitry, in particular hyperactivity in the cortex and hypoactivity in the striatum. Combined 
with the potential involvement of (at least) dopamine D1 receptor in OCD (Nordstrom and 
Burton, 2002), this underlying pathology may yield excessive maintenance of prefrontal 
representations, causing the inflexible, repetitive behaviours observed in OCD. In addition, 
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previous work has revealed that dopamine-dependent connections between the ventral 
and dorsal striatum are crucial for the development of cocaine-seeking habitual behaviour 
(chapter 1 and (Belin and Everitt, 2008). 
Overall, the work in this thesis contributes to a better understanding of the role of dopamine 
in the cortico-striatal-nigral circuitry, thereby contributing to our understanding of the 
underlying neuropathology in at least aging, ADHD, schizophrenia, addiction and OCD.
The work in this thesis contributes to our general understanding of how reward motivation 
can alter cognitive control. The results suggest that reward motivation can have dissociable 
effects in subjects with different genetic predispositions, both in healthy subjects (chapter 3) 
and in patients with ADHD (chapter 4). These findings once more emphasize the importance 
of taking into account differences in the baseline state of the (dopamine) system when 
assessing the effect of dopaminergic drug. In addition, the results in patients with ADHD 
highlight the heterogeneity of the disorder: The effects of reward motivation on cognitive 
signalling in the striatum were only revealed in a subset of patients. If the inter-individual 
variation in the DAT1 genotype was not taken into account, the aberrant striatal processing 
would not have been revealed. Additional work is needed to assess whether taking into 
account inter-individual differences in dopamine signalling can predict individual responses 
to methylphenidate treatment in ADHD. 
Knowing exactly which neural mechanisms -including which receptor subtype- underlie 
changes in motivated cognitive control may be an important step forward in treating patients 
with ADHD and potentially also schizophrenia and OCD. 
Limitations
Although the work in this thesis generally contributed to our understanding of the role of the 
striatum and dopamine in motivated cognitive control, the experiments in this thesis were 
not without limitations and these should be mentioned. 
In chapter 4 we assessed the effects of methylphenidate on motivated cognitive control in 
patients with ADHD. A number of limitations with respect to the effects of methylphenidate 
are worth mentioning. First, the effects in chapter 4 were especially evident when comparing 
the ADHD group to the healthy control group, but they were less conclusive when directly 
comparing the effects of methylphenidate within the ADHD patients (medicated vs. withdrawn 
from methylphenidate). Second, we cannot exclude entirely the possibility that the effects of 
methylphenidate in chapter 4 were due to noradrenaline, rather than dopamine (chapter 
2). This explanation is quite unlikely, given the observation of DAT1–dependent effects in 
the striatum in chapter 4, but firm conclusions can only be drawn after the observation that 
the effects of methylphenidate can be blocked with co-administration of a (non-selective) 
dopamine receptor antagonist (see chapter 3 and box 2.2) (future research). Third, it is 
important to keep in mind that the effects of methylphenidate were assessed in patients with 
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ADHD who take methylphenidate on a daily basis and who refrained from taking their normal 
medication prior to the experimental session. When comparing this to drug administration 
studies in non-medicated subjects, the long term effect of methylphenidate should be taken 
into account. For example, it has been suggested that long-term use of methylphenidate may 
– among other things – decrease excessive reward-related signalling in the striatum (Seeman 
and Madras, 1998; Robbins, 2002). It remains unclear from chapter 4 to what extent the 
effects in the ADHD patients after medication withdrawal reflect deficits related to ADHD, or 
to long term effect of methylphenidate use. Another limitation of the work in chapter 4 is that 
it failed to reveal clear behavioural effects, i.e. it remains unclear how the change in striatal 
signalling would affect behaviour. 
The results in chapter 5 speak to opposite effects of dopamine on cognitive focusing (task 
repetition) and cognitive flexibility (task switching). However, cognitive flexibility and stability 
were not formally manipulated in this study. Moreover given the age-related degeneration of 
dopamine neurons, and the opposite effects of reward on task switching and repeat trials, it 
is reasonable to speculate that dopamine mediated these opposite reward-related effects on 
cognitive control. However, future work should test this hypothesis (future research).
In chapter 6 I present a novel rodent paradigm allowing the independent manipulation of 
reward motivation and cognitive control, enabling the assessment of the interaction between 
reward and task switching. Although this paradigm parallels the paradigm used in human 
subjects (box 2.3), at least two differences should be considered when comparing the results 
between species. First, whereas the size of the reward varied on a trial-by-trial basis in the 
human version, the rodents performed the task-switching paradigm in separate high and 
low reward blocks. However, similar block-designs have been used in humans to reveal 
motivation–cognition interactions (Locke and Braver, 2008; Kouneiher et al., 2009), although 
not with the rewarded task-switching paradigm. It is therefore unlikely that these differences in 
trial-by-trial fluctuations in reward expectancy will have dissociable effects on task-switching 
behaviour. Second, the trial duration in the rodent paradigm is much larger than that in the 
human paradigm: The animals were presented with the task cue for one minute and were then 
given another minute to press the levers during the presentation of the target, whereas these 
events lasted merely a second in the human paradigm. As a consequence, the time between 
the task cue and the target was much shorter in the human version of the paradigm than it 
was in the rodent paradigm (i.e. 400ms instead of 1 minute). Longer cue-target intervals in 
humans are known to decrease the switch cost (Meiran et al., 2000). Moreover, situations in 
real-life often require instantaneous decisions and the need for lengthy preparation times 
can be detrimental for survival. In the future it is thus advisable to reduce the the cue-target 
interval. The large cue-target interval in chapter 6 may potentially account for a switch benefit 
in the high reward condition, and a non-significant switch cost in the low reward condition: 
If increasing the cue-target interval will increase the difficulty of switching, animals may well 
show the same pattern of results as that observed in the 9R subjects in the healthy population. 
One additional question that is raised when comparing the results in rodents to those in 
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humans (chapter 3 and 4) is related to the baseline-dependency of these effects. Whereas the 
effect of reward on task switching in humans were only revealed when taking into account 
a baseline measure of dopamine signalling, in rodents the effects were revealed without 
accounting for individual differences. This discrepancy is possibly explained by the absence 
of genetic variation in rodents, caused by the inbred nature of laboratory animals. 
In chapter 7 we assessed the role of prefrontal modulation of striatal processing during 
motivated cognitive control and subsequent action selection. However, the effects of prefrontal 
stimulation on the processing of information about motivated cognitive control (without 
taking into account response switching) did not reach significance. One potential explanation 
for the effect may be related to the nature of the spiralling dopamine connections between the 
striatum and the midbrain (Ikeda et al., 2013). The striatum sends inhibitory (GABA-ergic) 
projections to the midbrain. These GABA-ergic connections inhibit the dopamine neurons 
that project back to the (‘next’ region) in the striatum (figure 2.1). If we assume that distinct 
SNS projections originate from the ventral striatum, the anterior caudate nucleus, posterior 
caudate nucleus and putamen (figure 2.1), then I would speculate that the inhibition caused 
by stimulation of the anterior prefrontal cortex (reflected by the decrease in reward-related 
BOLD response after prefrontal stimulation observed in chapter 7), decreased the inhibition 
of the projection from the anterior caudate nucleus to the section of the midbrain it projects 
to. This part of the midbrain (which in turn projects to the posterior caudate nucleus) will 
cause an increase in dopamine signalling in the posterior caudate nucleus (i.e. attenuating 
the inhibitory effect of TMS, masking any direct prefrontal modulation of the prefrontal 
stimulation). Crucially then, this increased signalling in the posterior caudate will increase 
the inhibition on the midbrain and will subsequently decrease dopamine release from the 
midbrain to the putamen (reflected by a decrease in BOLD response in the putamen during 
the integration of motivation, cognition and action in chapter 7). However, this idea is highly 
speculative and evidence to substantiate the projections assumed above is currently absent 
(future research). 
Future research
Based on the combined evidence presented in chapter 3, 4, and 5 we propose a role for striatal 
dopamine in mediating motivated cognitive control. This claim can be assessed in a number 
of ways. First, direct measurements of dopamine signalling in the striatum, for example 
using voltammetry or microdialysis in rodents, should reveal increases in striatal dopamine 
signalling during motivated cognitive control. Second, age-related dopamine cell loss in 
the striatum, measured using molecular imaging (e.g. single photon emission computed 
tomography; SPECT) should be related to age-related changes in motivated cognitive control. 
This latter approach would parallel the way in which the relationship between motivated 
cognitive control and dopamine was previously established in Parkinson’s disease (chapter 1: 
figure 1.2f (Aarts et al., 2012). Third, in addition to the results of NMDA lesions in chapter 
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6, the demonstration that infusion of a dopamine antagonist in the striatum will impair 
performance on the rewarded task-switching paradigm will further substantiate a role for 
striatal dopamine in motivated cognitive control. 
In chapter 3 and 5, we aimed to elucidate the role of specific dopamine receptors in motivated 
cognitive control. Two hypotheses should be assessed in future work. First, given previous 
work showing that reward-related effects of methylphenidate are blocked by a dopamine D1 
antagonist, but not by dopamine D2 receptor antagonism (Meririnne et al., 2001), dopamine 
D1 receptor stimulation is a likely candidate for a role in motivated cognitive control. Second, 
a role for concurrent dopamine D1 and D2 receptor stimulation in reward motivation 
(Ikemoto et al., 1997) has been suggested. This suggests that concurrent D1 and D2 receptor 
stimulation may also be crucial for motivated cognitive control. These hypotheses can be tested 
by administration of a compound which increases dopamine levels (e.g. methylphenidate), in 
combination with the pre-treatment approach we used in chapter 3. More specifically, in 
addition to a placebo session, the administration of methylphenidate should be combined 
with the pre-treatment of (1) placebo, (2) a dopamine D1 receptor antagonist, (3) a dopamine 
D2 receptor antagonist and (4) a combination of both a D1 and D2 receptor antagonist. 
The administration of methylphenidate after pre-treatment with a placebo is hypothesized 
to improve motivated cognitive control compared with the placebo session. Pre-treatment 
with a dopamine D2 receptor antagonist will not have any effect on motivated cognitive 
control (chapter 3). However, if dopamine D1 receptor stimulation mediates the effect of 
methylphenidate on motivated cognitive control, the effects of methylphenidate will be 
blocked after pre-treatment with a dopamine D1 receptor antagonist. Crucially, if motivated 
cognitive control is mediated by a combination of dopamine D1 and D2 receptor stimulation, 
only pre-treatment of both a dopamine D1 and D2 receptor antagonist will fully block the 
effects of methylphenidate. One problem however is the lack of an available dopamine 
D1 agonist or antagonist for use in research with healthy human subjects. Until a suitable 
pharmacological agent becomes available, the rodent paradigm presented in chapter 6 can 
be used to assess whether a dopamine D1 agonist (which is available for use in rodents) 
affects successful motivated cognitive control. In addition, methylphenidate acts not only 
on dopamine transporters, but it also blocks noradrenaline transporters. To confirm that 
dopamine mediated the effects of methylphenidate, an additional session should be included 
to show that the effects of methylphenidate can be blocked with co-administration of a (non-
selective) dopamine receptor antagonist.
In chapter 1, we proposed that motivation can have opposite effects on cognitive stability and 
flexibility. Although the results in chapter 5 are generally congruous with this idea, this should 
be addressed formally in future experimental work. For example by using the reward Stroop 
paradigm presented in chapter 1 (figure 1.3) to contrast the effects of cognitive widening 
and focusing on Stroop performance in one paradigm. Cognitive widening will be beneficial 
for performance on congruent Stroop targets, whereas cognitive focussing will benefit 
performance on incongruent trials. Future experimental work is necessary to reveal whether 
Striatal dopamine and motivated cognitive control
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reward motivation can indeed have opposite effects on cognitive stability and focussing. 
In chapter 7 we provided evidence for prefrontal modulation of processing in the striatum 
during reward processing and the integration of reward, cognition and action. This design 
did now allow the testing of the exact nature of these projections. First, we cannot exclude 
that information is transferred directly from the anterior prefrontal cortex to the putamen 
(or the anterior caudate nucleus to the putamen), thereby bypassing the ‘cognitive’ striatum. 
The new rodent paradigm developed in chapter 6, with the addition of an action component 
(i.e. response switching as in chapter 7), allows further testing of this hypothesis. Using a 
disconnection approach, lesions of the ventral striatum and of the dorsal contralateral 
striatum (which leave intact one ventral striatum and one dorsal striatum in each hemisphere) 
(Belin and Everitt, 2008), can be used to assess whether connections between the ventral 
striatum and dorsal striatum are crucial for the integration between motivation, cognition 
and action. Also, lesions (or stimulation) of the midbrain neurons that project to the dorsal 
striatum should affect motivated cognition if the SNS account is valid. Finally, the idea that 
serial connections from the ventromedial to increasingly dorsal regions of the striatum, via 
dopaminergic midbrain connections (Ikeda et al., 2013), mediate motivated cognitive control 
should be substantiated. This can be achieved by showing that the effects of inhibition of the 
‘reward cortex’ and ‘reward striatum’ on processing in the ‘motor striatum’ (chapter 7) can be 
blocked after dopamine receptor antagonism in the ‘cognitive striatum’ (limitations). 
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Conclusion 
Imagine again that you are a squirrel. You are still in the forest, alternating between collecting 
nuts and berries. You have just collected a nut, but now you see a larger berry (i.e. another 
task) coming up. What happens in your squirrel brain? Well, I would speculate (based on the 
existent literature and the work in this thesis) that the appearance of the large berry (i.e. a large 
reward) will elicit a dopamine response in your midbrain. The projections of these dopamine 
neurons to your ventral striatum will increase the sensitivity of your ventral striatum to input 
from your prefrontal cortex. These reward-related signals in the ventral striatum will enhance 
processing in the regions involved in flexible updating. This may occur via a number of routes. 
First, these reward-related signals will alter signalling in the dorsal parts of the striatum via 
the spiralling dopamine connections in the midbrain (thereby increasing the stimulation of 
dopamine D2 receptors in the caudate nucleus, causing a D2-dominated state thereby enabling 
you to quickly update the new task set). Alternatively (or concurrently) these signals in the 
striatum act by changing the gating mechanism from the striatum to the ‘cognitive’ prefrontal 
cortex and subsequently the other regions in the cognitive corticostriatal circuit. If the berry 
you are about to collect is smaller, then the updating signals in your cognitive control network 
will also be smaller, leading to less flexible updating of your task sets. 
In conclusion, the research in this thesis aimed to elucidate the causal role for striatal 
dopamine and the corticostriatal network during the integration of reward and flexible 
cognitive control. We showed that dopaminergic manipulation with methylphenidate 
indeed changed motivation-cognition signalling in the striatum. In addition, a causal role 
for the ventral striatum in motivated cognitive control was established, followed by evidence 
for frontal modulation of striatal processing during the integration of signals related to 
motivation, cognition, and action across subparts of the striatum. Together, these results are 
in line with a role for striatal dopamine in motivated cognitive control, and they show that 
integration across corticostriatal circuits is involved in this process.
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Om goed te kunnen functioneren is het belangrijk dat we ons gedrag snel en gecontroleerd 
kunnen aanpassen aan de omgeving. Er zijn dagelijks veel situaties waarin we snel verschil-
lende bezigheden moeten afwisselen. Bijvoorbeeld als je een artikel schrijft en tussendoor 
besprekingen hebt. Om efficiënt en snel te kunnen wisselen tussen taken is een goede coör-
dinatie van verschillende functies (gedragscontrole) nodig; je moet je aandacht richten op 
wat je aan het doen bent, maar vlug kunnen schakelen wanneer dat nodig is. Deze vorm van 
gedragscontrole wordt in het Engels ‘task switching’ genoemd. Hier zal ik het multi-tasken 
noemen. 
Als je een stuk moet schrijven en een aantal besprekingen hebt zul je waarschijnlijk vrij pro-
ductief zijn als je één dagdeel aan schrijven besteedt en een ander dagdeel aan vergaderen. 
Het wordt lastiger als je om het uur een korte vergadering hebt en vaak moet afwisselen tus-
sen schrijven en vergaderen. Als je kans op een promotie toeneemt als je op beide taken goed 
werk levert, wordt het waarschijnlijk makkelijker om tussen verschillende werkzaamheden af 
te wisselen. Met andere woorden, multi-tasken gaat beter als je gemotiveerder bent. Informa-
tie over potentiële beloningen moet ons vermogen om te kunnen multi-tasken dus beïnvloe-
den. Alleen dan weten we wanneer het de moeite waard is om extra goed tussen verschillende 
werkzaamheden te schakelen. Problemen met gedragscontrole kunnen daarom veroorzaakt 
worden door problemen in motivatie. Dit kan betekenen dat hersengebieden die belangrijk 
zijn voor gedragscontrole (bijvoorbeeld multi-tasken) niet goed van de beloningsgebieden te 
horen krijgen of het de moeite waard is om gedragscontrole uit te oefenen. 
Psychiatrische stoornissen gaan vaak gepaard met problemen in gedragscontrole en het ver-
werken van beloningen. Dit is bijvoorbeeld het geval bij mensen met schizofrenie, verslaving-
sproblemen en aandachtstekort-hyperactiviteitstoornis (ADHD). Het is daarom belangrijk 
goed te weten welke hersenprocessen ervoor zorgen dat multi-tasken beter gaat als je ge-
motiveerder bent. In mijn promotieonderzoek heb ik de hersenprocessen onderzocht die 
ervoor zorgen dat multi-tasken beter gaat als je gemotiveerd bent. 
De wisselwerking tussen motivatie en multi-tasken in het brein
Dit proefschrift begint met een overzicht van wat er al bekend was over de rol van het stria-
tum en de hersenstof dopamine bij motivatie, multi-tasken en de wisselwerking tussen deze 
processen (motivatie heeft invloed op multi-tasken). In hoofdstuk 1 bespreek ik hoe het sa-
menspel van verschillende hersengebieden het mogelijk maakt dat beloningsinformatie de 
hersengebieden voor multi-tasken kan bereiken. Figuur 1 laat de hersengebieden zien die in 
mijn proefschrift de hoofdrol spelen. 
Voor ik aan mijn promotieonderzoek begon was al aangetoond dat dopamine en het stria-
tum betrokken zijn bij de wisselwerking tussen beloning en multi-tasken. Hiervoor werd een 
computertaak gebruikt waarbij deelnemers geld konden verdienen als ze goed konden multi-
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Figuur 1 De verbindingen tussen het striatum en de prefrontale cortex
Het striatum is grofweg in te delen in drie deelgebieden: de onder/voorkant (rood/oranje), het midden 
(groen) en de buitenkant (blauw). Het onderste en voorste deel (rood/oranje) spelen een belangrijke 
rol bij beloning (in het vervolg het “beloningsstriatum” genoemd). Het middelste deel, de nucleus 
caudatus (groen), is belangrijk voor gedragscontrole zoals multi-tasken. Het putamen (blauw), helpt 
bij de regulatie van bewegingen, of motoriek. Bij al deze processen speelt dopamine signalen uit de 
middenhersenen een belangrijke rol. De cortex, het buitenste deel van de hersenen, speelt ook een 
belangrijke rol bij motivatie, gedragscontrole en motoriek. Er zijn gebieden in het voorste deel van de 
cortex, de voorhoofdskwab, die betrokken zijn bij beloning (rood/oranje), gedragscontrole (groen) en 
motoriek (blauw). De beloningsgebieden in de voorhoofdskwab en het striatum werken nauw samen 
en zijn sterk met elkaar verbonden (rode en oranje pijl tussen deze gebieden). Hetzelfde geldt voor 
de gedragscontrole gebieden (groene pijl) en de motoriek gebieden (blauwe pijl). Maar beloning zou 
nooit invloed op ons gedrag kunnen hebben wanneer informatie over beloningen beperkt zou blijven 
tot de rood/oranje gebieden. Er zijn verbindingen in het brein die ervoor zorgen dat informatie over 
beloningen uit de rood/oranje gebieden in de groene gedragscontrole en blauwe motoriek gebieden 
terecht komt. I) door middel van directe verbindingen tussen de delen van de cortex, II) door directe 
verbindingen tussen de delen van het striatum, III) via de middenhersenen. Dopamine en het striatum 
spelen een belangrijke rol bij de integratie van beloningsinformatie en multi-task informatie. Scenario 
II en III zijn daarom het meest waarschijnlijk. Bij veel psychiatrische stoornissen is sprake van een 
verstoring in dopamine signalen en van een verstoring in de overdracht van signalen tussen de cortex 
en het striatum.
tasken (het multi-task spel). Dit onderzoek toonde echter geen oorzakelijk verband aan tus-
sen dopamine en prestaties op het multi-task spel. In het brein zijn bovendien 5 soorten 
dopamine receptoren (type 1 tot 5) aanwezig. Een receptor is als een antenne die signalen 
oppikt en aan de zenuwcel doorgeeft. Medicatie werkt vaak op meerdere soorten receptoren. 
Het is daarom belangrijk om te weten welke dopamine receptoren een rol spelen bij multi-
tasken.
Dopamine D2 receptoren in het striatum zijn betrokken bij multi-tasken
In het werk in hoofdstuk 3 heb ik onderzocht of dopamine D2 receptoren in het striatum 
een rol spelen tijdens multi-tasken. Om dopamine D2 receptoren te stimuleren werd het 
medicijn bromocriptine gebruikt. Bovendien keek ik of er een oorzakelijk verband tussen 
dopamine en prestaties op het multi-task spel was. 
In eerste instantie liet ik de beloning die verdiend kon worden buiten beschouwing en keek 
ik puur naar het vermogen om te multi-tasken. Ik zag dat deelnemers beter konden multi-
tasken nadat ze bromocriptine hadden ingenomen. Eén probleem was echter dat dopamine 
D1 receptoren ook op bromocriptine kunnen reageren. Om te bevestigen dat het verbeterde 
multi-tasken echt door dopamine D2 receptoren kwam, werd een truc toegepast die in di-
eronderzoek veel gebruikt wordt. Vlak voor de inname van bromocriptine werd een ander 
medicijn ingenomen dat dopamine D2 receptoren blokkeert. Als bromocriptine een positief 
effect op multi-tasken had door de stimulatie van D2 receptoren, dan zou bromocriptine nu 
geen effect op multi-tasken meer moeten hebben. Dit was precies wat ik vond: wanneer do-
pamine D2 receptoren geblokkeerd waren, zag ik geen verbetering van bromocriptine meer. 
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Medicatie werkt echter niet bij iedereen hetzelfde; sommige mensen ervaren een positief ef-
fect, terwijl bij anderen geen verschil merkbaar is. Deze variabiliteit in de effectiviteit van 
medicatie kan deels verklaard worden door individuele genetische verschillen. Daarmee 
wordt bedoeld dat mensen met een bepaalde variant van een gen anders op medicatie rea-
geren dan mensen met een andere variant van hetzelfde gen. Dit was nu ook het geval: Alleen 
mensen met een bepaald type dopamine gen lieten een verbetering van bromocriptine zien. 
Dit gen reguleert de aanmaak van dopamine transporters. Deze bevinden zich op de rand van 
de zenuwcel. Hier zorgt de dopamine transporter ervoor dat vrijgekomen dopamine weer op-
geruimd wordt. Gebeurt dat niet, dan veroorzaakt dopamine ruis in de informatieoverdracht 
van de ene naar de andere cel. Het is bekend dat de effecten van dit dopamine gen vooral in 
het striatum zichtbaar zijn. De conclusie van het werk in hoofdstuk 3 was dat dopamine D2 
receptoren in het striatum cruciaal zijn voor multi-tasken en dat het belangrijk is naar indi-
viduele verschillen te kijken wanneer we medicatie bestuderen. 
Deelnemers konden tijdens het multi-tasken geld verdienen. Zo kon ik onderzoeken wat de 
invloed van beloning op multi-task prestaties was. De belofte van een hoge beloning zorgde 
ervoor dat mensen beter konden multi-tasken. Ik zag echter geen effect van bromocriptine en 
kon dus geen oorzakelijk verband tussen dopamine en de integratie van beloning en multi-
tasken aantonen.
Metylfenidaat beïnvloedt de manier waarop beloningssignalen en multi-task signalen in 
het striatum geïntegreerd worden
In hoofdstuk 3 kon ik geen bewijs vinden voor een effect van bromocriptine op de integratie 
van beloning en multi-tasken. In hoofdstuk 4 wilde ik op een andere manier een verband tus-
sen dopamine en de integratie tussen beloningssignalen en multi-task signalen onderzoeken. 
Hiervoor gebruikte ik een medicijn dat veel gebruikt wordt bij de behandeling van ADHD: 
metylfenidaat (bijvoorbeeld Ritalin®). Metylfenidaat heeft invloed op dopamine niveaus in 
het brein en heeft geen specifiek effect op een bepaalde dopamine receptor. In hoofdstuk 4 
keek ik eerst of de hersenen van mensen met ADHD, vergeleken met mensen zonder ADHD, 
op een andere manier signalen over beloning en multi-tasken integreren. Daarna onderzocht 
ik de invloed van metylfenidaat, en daarmee dopamine.
We weten dat patiënten met ADHD een verstoring laten zien in hersengebieden die be-
trokken zijn bij gedragscontrole en dat patiënten met ADHD vaak minder activiteit hebben 
in beloningsgebieden. Het is mogelijk dat beloningssignalen in patiënten met ADHD moeite 
hebben gedragscontrole gebieden bereiken. Als dit zo is, dan zouden problemen met gedrag-
scontrole in ADHD (zoals impulsief reageren, of niet gecontroleerd tussen taken kunnen 
wisselen) veroorzaakt worden door een verstoring in motivationele en beloningsprocessen. 
Dit zou bijvoorbeeld kunnen verklaren waarom kinderen met ADHD die zich op school niet 
kunnen concentreren, maar wel uren achtereen met volle aandacht een computerspel kun-
nen spelen. 
In hoofdstuk 4 vergeleek ik deelnemers met en zonder ADHD terwijl ze het multi-task spel 
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speelden. De resultaten lieten een verhoogde hersenactiviteit in deelnemers met ADHD zien 
tijdens de integratie van belonings- en multi-task signalen. Deze verhoogde hersenactiviteit 
werd gemeten in de nucleus caudatus (figuur 1). Dit verschil was alleen aanwezig wanneer de 
patiënten met ADHD geen medicatie hadden ingenomen. 
Dit was echter niet het hele verhaal. Van mensen met een bepaald type dopamine transporter 
gen (het “ADHD gerelateerd gen”) is het waarschijnlijker dat ze ADHD hebben. Ik zag alleen 
een verhoogde hersenactiviteit in de deelnemers met ADHD die het ADHD gerelateerd gen 
bij zich droegen. Metylfenidaat had ook alleen in deze deelnemers een effect. Deze resultaten 
tonen aan dat de hersenen van mensen met ADHD, vergeleken met die van mensen zonder 
ADHD, op een andere manier signalen over beloningen overbrengen naar gebieden die bij 
gedragscontrole betrokken zijn. Het werk toont ook aan dat het belangrijk is verschillen tus-
sen mensen te bekijken wanneer we de werking van medicatie bestuderen. Dat metylfenidaat 
het verschil in hersenactiviteit kon verhelpen toont een direct verband aan tussen dopamine 
en de integratie van belonings- en multi-task signalen in het striatum.
Ouderen gebruiken een andere strategie tijdens het multi-task spel
Een opmerkelijk resultaat in hoofdstuk 4 was dat alleen in de groep deelnemers met ADHD 
een effect van beloning op multi-tasken te zien was. In hoofdstuk 3 liet ik zien dat beloning 
het multi-tasken beïnvloedde in gezonde deelnemers, maar dit zag ik in de groep zonder 
ADHD in hoofdstuk 4 niet. Eén mogelijke verklaring hiervoor is de leeftijd van de deelne-
mers. De deelnemers in hoofdstuk 3 waren jonger (gemiddeld 21 jaar oud) dan de gezonde 
deelnemers uit hoofdstuk 4 (gemiddeld 38 jaar oud). In hoofdstuk 5 liet ik zien dat jongeren 
tijdens het multi-tasken extra snel zijn als ze een beloning kunnen verdienen, terwijl het ge-
drag van ouderen niet door de beloningen beïnvloed werd.
Om beloningsinformatie te gebruiken voor het optimaliseren van multi-tasken is het 
ventrale striatum cruciaal
Eén verklaring voor de effecten in ADHD (hoofdstuk 4) is dat de communicatie tussen het 
beloningsstriatum en controle gebieden verstoord is. Als dit zo is, dan zou het uitschake-
len van het beloningsstriatum ervoor moeten zorgen dat een beloning het multi-tasken niet 
langer verbetert. In mensen is het echter ethisch gezien niet mogelijk een hersengebied uit 
te schakelen. In proefdieren kan dit wel. In hoofdstuk 6 heb ik daarom een versie van het 
multi-task spel gemaakt die door ratten gespeeld kan worden. Nadat de ratten het spel had-
den geleerd zag ik dat ze beter konden wisselen tussen taken wanneer ze meer eten konden 
verdienen. Vervolgens injecteerde ik in het beloningsstriatum van de helft van de ratten een 
stofje dat ervoor zorgt dat de zenuwcellen rondom de plaats van de injectie niet meer functio-
neren. In de dieren met een uitgeschakeld beloningsstriatum zorgde beloning er niet langer 
voor dat ze beter werden. Dit werk levert direct bewijs voor het idee dat het ventrale striatum 
cruciaal is om beloningsinformatie te gebruiken voor het optimaliseren van multi-tasken. 
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Signalen uit hersennetwerken kunnen geïntegreerd worden
Zoals gezegd kunnen we bij mensen geen hersengebieden uitschakelen. Voor onderzoek met 
mensen is wel een stimulatie techniek beschikbaar waardoor gebieden die direct onder de 
schedel liggen tijdelijk minder signalen aan andere gebieden kunnen doorgeven. Gebieden in 
de voorhoofdskwab vormen een netwerk met de gebieden in het striatum die een vergelijk-
bare functie hebben (figuur 1). Als beloningen een effect op ons gedrag (gedragscontrole en 
reacties) hebben moet informatie uit de beloningsgebieden in controle- en motoriek gebie-
den terechtkomen. De verbindingen zijn aanwezig. In mensen was echter niet eerder onder-
zocht of beloningssignalen geïntegreerd kunnen worden met signalen in de andere gebieden 
in het striatum terwijl mensen een taak uitvoeren waarvoor deze informatieoverdracht nodig 
is. In hoofdstuk 7 heb ik dat onderzocht. 
Ik heb het gebied in de voorhoofdskwab dat betrokken is bij het verwerken van belonin-
gen (de aPFC) gestimuleerd (figuur 1). Vervolgens keek ik wat het effect daarvan was op de 
hersenactiviteit in het striatum. Ik heb eerst gekeken of ik door het stimuleren van de aPFC 
de hersenactiviteit in het beloningsstriatum kon veranderen. Dit was inderdaad het geval: 
na het minder gevoelig maken van de aPFC zag ik dat het beloningsstriatum minder sterk 
op beloningsinformatie reageerde. Hierna heb ik gekeken of ik bewijs kon vinden voor de 
integratie van signalen tussen de netwerken. Wanneer informatie beperkt blijft tot het belon-
ingsnetwerk, dan zou het stimuleren van de aPFC alleen een effect moeten hebben in het be-
loningsstriatum. Het stimuleren van de aPFC zou dan geen verandering in hersenactiviteit in 
de andere netwerken teweeg moeten brengen. Na stimulatie van de aPFC zag ik een afname 
van de hersenactiviteit in het putamen (motorisch striatum) terwijl mensen verschillende 
informatiebronnen tijdens het multi-task spel integreerden. Het werk in hoofdstuk 7 laat 
zien dat signalen uit afzonderlijke netwerken in het striatum geïntegreerd kunnen worden.
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Conclusie
Om goed te kunnen functioneren is het belangrijk dat we ons gedrag snel en gecontroleerd 
kunnen aanpassen aan de omgeving. Het is belangrijk om te weten wanneer het de moeite 
waard is om tussen werkzaamheden te schakelen.
In hoofdstuk 3 en 4 liet ik zien dat dopamine belangrijk is voor de effecten van beloningsmoti-
vatie op multi-tasken. In hoofdstuk 4 toonde ik aan dat het effect van beloningsmotivatie op 
multi-tasken verstoord is bij mensen met ADHD. In hoofdstuk 5 zag ik dat ouderen anders 
omgingen met beloningen tijdens het multi-tasken dan jongere deelnemers. Het onderzoek 
in hoofdstuk 4 en 5 levert bewijs voor het idee dat stoornissen met gedragscontrole door een 
verandering van de invloed van beloning kunnen komen. In hoofdstuk 3 en 4 liet ik zien dat 
het belangrijk is naar individuele verschillen te kijken als we effecten van medicatie bestu-
deren. In hoofdstuk 6 en 7 heb ik informatieoverdracht tussen de netwerken onderzocht 
wanneer beloningen invloed op ons gedrag hebben. In hoofdstuk 6 liet ik zien dat het be-
loningsstriatum cruciaal is voor de overdracht van beloningsinformatie tijdens multi-tasken. 
Met het werk in hoofdstuk 7 toonde ik voor de eerste keer in mensen aan dat informatie 
tussen verschillende netwerken geïntegreerd kan worden. 
Het werk in dit proefschrift laat zien dat het belangrijk is om bij de behandeling van gedrag-
sproblemen ook naar beloningsfactoren te kijken. Deze bevindingen bieden perspectief en 
onderbouwing voor de ontwikkeling van het gebruik van tactieken van ouders of therapeu-
ten. Denk daarbij aan het verhogen van beloningen als een kind zich weet in te houden of te 
concentreren. Mijn werk laat zien dat de verbindingen tussen de netwerken een belangrijk 
doelwit kunnen zijn voor de ontwikkeling van nieuwe medicatie om problemen met gedrag-
scontrole te behandelen. 
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